Taliban

The ways of rescripting India’s language of engagement with non-state armed groups like the Taliban are discussed. The engagement essentially does not accord moral legitimacy to acts of violence by the Taliban, but pushes for refashioning India’s image from being an “alien” other to a “differentiated” other.

The Taliban takeover cannot be understood outside the hegemonic economic and geopolitical interests.

The political leadership in Pakistan, even when democracy has grown and strengthened, has limited writ over what it can do regarding what the military considers its terrain. The Taliban may have been partially eliminated, but other equally odious militants continue to find protection through some organisations and individuals in the military. Dealing with the threats to Pakistan’s future and stability entails a deeper look within rather than blaming India or Afghanistan.

Despite public support to root out the al Qaida network and depose the Taliban, the Bush administration will be mistaken if it believes that the Vietnam syndrome - a public aversion to unnecessary foreign adventures - is obsolete. The degree of domestic dissent will depend on how carefully the US conducts its Afghan operations.

The war against terrorism threatens to make reason its first casualty and demands for justice are in danger of being reduced to thirst for revenge.