State Electricity Boards

Rationalisation of tariffs is perhaps the most important prerequisite of viability of the power sector. An important step was taken in this behalf in 1998 by enactment of a legislation for the setting up of the electricity regulatory commissions (ERCs) at the centre and in the states. But the experience of the functioning of the ERCs so far is far from satisfactory. It is now imperative that ERCs take a strong position and refuse to entertain the submissions of SEBs and licensees for tariff revisions till their reasonable directives are complied with. It is time the ERCs made full use of the penal powers available under the concerned legislation. For what is at stake is not only the viability and the future of the power sector but also the credibility of the ERCs

Power sector policy in India appears to have locked itself into adverse arrangements at least twice in the recent period. The first was when agricultural consumption was de-metered and extensive subsidies were offered; the second when Independent Power Producer contracts with major fiscal implications were signed by the State Electricity Boards. A third set of circumstances, with the potential for equally powerful forms of institutional lock-in, appears to be in the making with the reproduction of the Orissa model on the national scale. This paper provides an analysis of the social and political context in which power sector reforms have taken place in India. While a state-led power sector has been responsible for substantial failures, is the design of the reformed sector well aimed at balancing efficiency and profit-making on the one hand and the public interest on the other? The discussion of the forces and actors that have shaped the reform processes is intended to contribute to an understanding of how the public interest can best be served in the ongoing effort to reshape the power sector.