Central Bank

For macroeconomics, the government is divided into the central bank and the treasury. Positive profits recorded by the first are cancelled out as a negative item in the second. However, a debate has been generated by the transfer by the Reserve Bank of India of a record surplus to the coffers of the overnment. The issue is examined in a stock-flow-consistent model. A tension is found to reside in the pledging of profits for advances to banks on the one hand, and reducing the government budget deficit on the other. In the case of India, we conclude that central bank profits are intended to substitute for taxation.

Spending a few years in Washington D C as India’s executive director at the International Monetary Fund or some Ivy League think tank should not be considered as a qualification for the post of Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.  Instead, deputy governors and even those junior to them who have spent the immediate preceding years working in Mumbai, and most of whom do have doctorates the PhDs in relevant sub areas, should have the first lien on the governor’s job.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the choice of location of prudential supervision of banks. Should central banks assume this role or should there be a unified regulator covering all financial institutions? With the growing concern among central banks about the need to maintain financial stability, can such problems be effectively tackled if regulation/ supervision is vested with the central banks? The evidence.