

aspects of planning, like the phasing of a plan. Appendix B on "Phasing a Development Plan" originally appeared in *The Economic Weekly*, Special Number, June 1960. One is much more enlight-

ened about the structure of the Indian economy, and the basic elements of this structure which determine the development strategy, by Reddaway's basic tables than one would be by reading a number

of descriptive books on the Indian economy. This is doubtless a very valuable addition to the literature not only on Indian development but also on operational planning techniques.

Mao Tse-tung's Thoughts on War and Peace Points from a Lecture during Resistance to Japan

(By a Military Correspondent)

In "The Art of War", a classic, Sun Tzu laid down: "Know your enemy and know yourself; and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster". Mao Tse-tung quoted this in a series of lectures in May/June, 1938, ten months after the Japanese had attacked China. Mao's thinking on war may not have changed much in the years since.

"On the protracted War", the title under which the lectures were issued by the Foreign Language Press, Peking, in 1954, gives illuminating indications of the way Chinese attitudes to war and peace took shape in those difficult years of fighting the Japanese and the Kuomintang at the same time; and Mao Tse-tung not only led the campaigns from the late thirties to the Communists' coming to power in 1949 but is also Chairman of the Communist party right now when the Chinese are engaged in aggression against India, presumably with his knowledge and under his general direction. What he said 24 years ago on war and peace and the role of China in either may have general application in the context of the attack on India; and there may be a lesson or two to learn from his concept of the protracted war — its motivations and aims

IN the lectures there are not many references to India; one casually mentions "the subjugation of India by Great Britain to prove that a small hut strong capitalist country can vanquish a big and backward country", and another ominously prophesies: "This war (against Japan) will not only affect China and Japan, greatly impelling both to advance, but also affect the world, impelling all nations, first of all the oppressed nations like India, to march forward."

There has indeed been some marching forward lately by the Chinese. The differences may yet be more obvious than significant. In 1938 Mao was fighting a defensive war; secondly, the war was all in his own country against an invader. Now he is fighting an offensive war and in territory not his. From Mao's point of view, however, this may seem mere sophistry, for he can have but little doubt in his own mind that, again, he is fighting a defensive war and in his own territory. It would seem, therefore, that the views so vigorously expressed in 1938 may still have some relevance to the current conflict; and his general formulations on war and its methods are, of course, of permanent validity — so far as he and his men are concerned. First his general observations.

"Just" Wars

"Wars in history", Mao said, "can be divided into two kinds, just and unjust. All progressive wars are just and all wars impeding progress are unjust. We Communists are opposed to all unjust wars, but we are not opposed to progressive, just wars. As for wars of the latter kind. Communists not only do not oppose them, but will participate actively in them". It is hardly necessary to point out that he arrogates to himself the exclusive right of defining "just", "unjust", "progressive" and "progress", terms which have baffled the wisest of men since the beginning of time but which arouse not the slightest doubt in a Marxist mind. It is, therefore, to be taken for granted that. In Peking's view, the war against India is a just and progressive one. The fanatical zeal this generates is an objective quantity in political and military terms: and the nightly and loud righteousness of Peking Radio is not something synthetic.

How is a "just" war to be prosecuted? One of the most endearing things about Mao Tse-tung as a writer is his love of old Chinese literature and history coupled with a fondness for telling epigrams. Quite blandly he says, "... politics are bloodless war while war is politics

of bloodshed", Clausewitz could hardly have improved upon this; but on the ethics of war Mao is even more explicit. "War abhors no deception", he quotes approvingly. On such methods he says:

The mobilized people will definitely play a great role in the application of our tactic of defeating the enemy by creating illusions for him and springing on him surprise attacks. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and morality in war.

An obliging footnote elucidates the allusion for the ignorant:

Hsiang Kung was the Duke of Sung who reigned in the seventh century B C in the Era of Spring and Autumn. In 638 B C Sung fought with the powerful state of Ch'u. Having deployed his forces, the Duke saw that the Ch'u troops were just crossing the river. One of his officers suggested that, as the Ch'u troops were numerically stronger, this was the moment for an attack. But the Duke said: "No, a gentleman should never attack people in a scrape" . . . The Duke ordered the attack only after the Ch'u troops were fully prepared. As a result, the Sung troops met with a

disastrous defeat and the Duke himself was wounded".

The Duke was obviously gaga; but Mao Tse-tung's contempt for him brings out his total lack of patience with anything smacking of sentimentality. He is convinced that his cause is just; and, to achieve his objective, nothing is too low. Recent pathetic recitals of what India has done for Communist China for so many years at the U N and elsewhere and what China has done in return may well have given Mao a good laugh. This does not invalidate India's policies; and noble intentions are to be respected even when they appear to have been defeated by unscrupulous adversaries. What needs to be recognized is that almost everything China has done to this country in recent years is, as dramatic critics put it, "in character". There has been grave inconsistency between China's professions and practice towards India; there is none between its past practice and present.

Civilized Aversion

Pandit Nehru has rightly emphasized time and again that the struggle on the border is going to be a long, long one; that India must be prepared for it. The warning needs to be repeated, for it is clear that Nehru and the country have been drawn into this conflict against themselves, with the most extreme reluctance that may have in the past taken something away from the thoroughness and single-mindedness required to erect timely and adequate defences. Readiness to negotiate if the Chinese will withdraw to their positions of September 8 reflects the same civilized aversion to an avoidably long war. Quite contrary is Mao's attitude to a long war. He almost likes it for its own sake. Not only is his book called "On the Protracted War"; he makes almost a fetish of the war's desirable duration. Here are a few of Mao's observations on a long war:

We must recognize that this armed resistance is going to be a bitter, protracted war... The fact that she (China) is a big country enables her to keep up a protracted war... We point out that the only way to win ultimate victory lies in a strategically protracted war... The protracted-

ness of the war is predetermined... Our strategic directive for the Anti-Japanese War is for a protracted war...

Some of this insistence on a protracted war was, of course, dictated by circumstances. China was a vast country; Japan small. China had an "enormous population"; Japan's was small. The Japanese army was efficient; the Chinese strength lay in numbers, territory and growing patriotism which, Mao worked out, would wear the Japanese out. Japan wanted a quick decision; China knew there could be no quick victory for her. In positional warfare the Chinese were sure to be beaten" hence the formulation of mobile and guerrilla war, which always needed greater numbers. Territory and numbers were, therefore, to be bartered for time.

Mao's calculation of other favourable possibilities included a social revolution within Japan, greater international support for the Chinese cause because of the impending assault of Fascism on the capitalist West and the collapse of the national bourgeoisie of China in the process which would leave the Communists supreme. Considering the date of the prophecy, the forecast was not bad at all; many of these things did come about, although it is to be doubted that the end of Japan came more from Chinese resistance than from the atom bomb or that the Nationalists came to grief less for their own corrupt rottenness than for Communist strategy.

New Dictum

But beyond and above all this there is a higher philosophy of protracted war — self-proven, self-contained, self-justified,, axiomatic and totally independent of objective circumstances or requirements of particular situations. Why? A clue may be found in the following dictum by Mao Tse-tung:

It is therefore proper for us to regard the War of Resistance and national reconstruction as interconnected.

China affects to believe that India demands Chinese territory and, so, Peking has to fight. Can it be that, even if China's so far unstated territorial rights as she conceives them were conceded, there would still remain her need for *national*

reconstruction through "the war of resistance"? The cost of this reconstruction may seem inhumanly high. Mao Tse-tung only refers to China's vast population and quotes an old proverb: "As long as the green mountains are there, one shouldn't worry about firewood"

India China Border

THE boundary between India and China extends over 2,200 miles. The boundary of Bhutan with Tibet extends over 300 miles. The entire length of this border has been either defined by treaty or recognised by custom or by both. It follows the geographical principle of the watershed which is in most places the crest of the Himalayan mountains. This long boundary could be divided into three sectors — the eastern, the middle and the western.

In the eastern sector, the traditional boundary was settled at a tripartite conference of representatives of the Government of India, Tibet and China held in Simla in 1918-1914. The boundary line as agreed upon — and reaffirmed formally by the Indian and Tibetan representatives — was incorporated in a map attached to a draft convention, and signed by the Chinese representative.

East of Bhutan this line is called the McMahon Line (after McMahon, the British official who participated in the conference). But the McMahon Line merely confirmed the natural, traditional and administrative boundary in the area.

We now come to the western sector. Jammu and Kashmir has a boundary with Sinkiang and Tibet that is about 1,100 miles in length, two-thirds of it in the Ladakh district. Well known and long sanctified by custom, this boundary was reaffirmed by the Treaty of 1842 signed by the representatives of Kashmir on the one side and the Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China on the other. The area was later surveyed by Indian officials, and Indian maps began to show the boundary with precision. Even official Chinese maps of 1893, 1917 and 1919 showed the boundary in this area exactly as depicted in official Indian maps today."—Extract from "Menace to India's Freedom", published by the Publications Division, Government of India.