

# "Mob Fury" in Karachi

IT is perfectly natural and understandable that the people of this country should be angered by the violence done in Karachi to the Indian Chancery and many of its members; but more than anger this seems to be a fit occasion for concern. Abuse of India and assaults of Indians have never been uncommon in Pakistan, but the difference between the virulence of the past and the attacks of this week is that on the present occasion everything was stage-managed by the State. Of course, in the past also the ultimate source of instigation could usually be traced back to the Government — which had its own reasons for diverting the country's attention from the failures at home — but no rioting was actually ordered by the Government; and as long as this was not done, there was always a hope, however theoretical, that some day someone might raise the voice of sanity and open the eyes of the people to their folly and to the way they were being duped by the politicians. But under dictatorship that chance vanishes. If there is one lesson which the week's events in Karachi have to teach us, it is surely this: that both the friendship and enmity of dictators are bad. Either can be switched on at will, which means that even when friendship is switched on there can be no wise reason for rejoicing.

For the Pakistan Government to pretend that the mob attack on the Indian Chancery in Karachi was spontaneous and mild is untruthful to the point of cynicism. There is no getting away from the main facts of the incident. The police knew of the coming attack a good few hours before it actually took place; this is clear from the fact that it formally warned the Chancery to expect the attack. What would be the normal reaction of a military dictatorship to information that a public demonstration accompanied by violence was going to take place in defiance of an official ban even on peaceful public meetings? The question is admittedly a hypothetical one; for it is only in the remotest degree likely that such an act of defiance would be contemplated in the first place. Secondly, even if it were, the police, with advance information in its hands, would undoubtedly make short work of the would-be demonstrators.

But the treatment meted out to them in this particular instance was illustrative of a tolerance which would excite comment even in Hyde Park on a Sunday. Knowing that a mob was collecting to attack the Indian Chancery, the police respected its wishes and did no more than take up non-interfering positions round the site. When the mob eventually arrived with truck-loads of stones, the police let them be off-loaded without hinderance. Finally, when it actually started wrecking the Chancery, the police looked on with commendable restraint. When every glass in the building had been smashed and a good deal of other damage caused, and when numerous members of the Chancery had been injured, the benevolent policemen decided that enough was enough. One of them blew a whistle, concluding the game — and the furious, excited, uncontrolled mob instigated beyond restraint by the riots in Jabalpur instantly assumed calm and self-control, and melted away in obedience to the whistle. Such superbly controlled fury on the part of the mob, such magnanimous suspension of authority on the part of the police under a dictatorship are marvels which only the Ayub regime can perform.

The Indian Government has quite properly demanded compensation for all the damage caused to the Chancery and it has also lodged "a strong protest" to the Pakistan Government, which has acknowledged the protest and expressed "regret" at the incident, at the same time indicating its attitude on the compensation demand by declaring that the Indian account of the damage is highly "exaggerated". That is a very practical approach to the whole issue. An expression of regret costs nothing, and refusal to pay is economical. But we should not be content to leave matters at that. We should do the graceful thing by accepting the Pakistani "regrets" as genuine and reminding the Government that this regrettable incident would never have taken place but for the negligence or inefficiency of the police in Karachi. The police in Karachi either did not know that mischief on a grand scale was afoot, or it was unable to control it for a full hour afterwards — even though it was fully armed with deadly whistles. In both cases, it was gravely at fault; and we should advise President Ayub to discipline it severely in the interests of his own regime. A dictatorship cannot afford so unreliable a police force.

## Congo's New Phase

IT is a measure of the loss of prestige the United Nations has suffered in the Congo that few people anywhere are certain that the increased powers vested in Mr Hammarskjöld by the new Security Council resolution will be put to actual use. There are reasons for the doubt. The resolution sanctioning the use of force has come pretty late in the day, when the U N Command's capacity to use force is considerably less than the situation demands. The resolution can be made effective only if and when the contributing countries can be persuaded to send more troops to the Congo. The Security Council has empowered the Secretary-General to disarm the Congolese armed hands at an especially difficult time; the task, which would have been simple in the initial stages of the Congo operation, may now involve a good deal of bitter fighting in several areas.

But when sceptics question the likelihood of the resolution being implemented, they have the intentions of Mr Hammarskjöld in mind rather than the physical inadequacy of the forces currently at his command. They believe, in fact, that the Secretary-General has never used his powers to the full in the past and is not likely to do so in future. But if this strongly implied acceptance of Mr Hammarskjöld's mala fides is justified, then an implementation of the new resolution is more rather than less probable; for the faction to benefit most from it would be the one opposed to the late Mr Lumumba. It is not, however, necessary to question the bona fides of the Secretary-General, and the countries who really wish to see the Congo fiasco ended should come forward quickly to strengthen the U N Command sufficiently to enable it to disarm the local "armies" and facilitate the reactivation of parliament,