January 12, 1957

great deal of discontent, cynicism and lack of faith which is corroding the administration at every stage and undermining public morale. This is because, among other reasons, the author of the manifesto is a supreme literary artist, but, he has no grip over the administration of which lie is the architect nor has he a thorough grasp of the processes of change through which the country must pass for his magnificent dreams to become a reality.

The manifesto traces the development of Congress aims by stages from the betterment of the masses and the under-privileged to the objective of establishing a socialist pattern of society. In the manifesto some of the objectives in the Second Plan have been filled in and a more concrete and complete picture of the socialist pattern as the Congress sees it has been clearly drawn as earlier promises have been made more specific—a national minimum for everyone has been accepted as a firm objective, progressive participation of labour in the conduct of industry has been defined as the aim of industrial democracy and accepted as the other objective; agricultural cooperatives and co-operative village management have been defined and accepted as the counterpart of industrial democracy.

All this is to be attained, it has been reiterated at every step, only through democratic methods. That is to say, peoples' willing acceptance of the aims and ready co-operation in their realisation have been laid down as the criterion, for policy decisions and actual execution. There is the implied assurance that coercion will not be resorted to in either case. What is the value of such promises when the Congress has not succeeded in evolving a workable method of popular participation in any of the major fields of national activity, either in arriving at the correct decisions and policy making or implementation and execution?

After an exhaustive elaboration of the aims and ideals—in fairness it must also be admitted, giving them more concrete expression than in the past—the manifesto has this small paragraph on the method of execution:

"The administrative machinery should be adapted to suit the purposes of the Plan. Cumbrous procedures and red tape should be avoided and it should be so organised that rapid decisions are taken and given effect to. In particular, it should not isolate itself from the people but function in co-operation with them."

This is too amorphous a base and too insecure, on which to raise such a magnificent edifice. Profession of democracy is unavailing in the face of growing authoritarianism and centralisation; any day a better chit to the Congress would be greater evidence of its responsiveness to the peoples' thoughts and feelings.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

IF the Truman Doctrine stretched America's frontiers to Ankara, the Eisenhower Doctrine is an announcement by President Eisenhower that, subject to the approval of Congress, it is Washington's policy to extend the territorial boundaries of the United States to the eastern most part of west Asia. Both doctrines mean and imply expansion of America's spheres of influence over territories which are far beyond America's sovereign jurisdiction. Even as the Truman Doctrine was the origin of the "cold war" in Europe, the Eisenhower Doctrine is widely deployed as an attempt to start the "cold war" in west Asia. In its aim, neither the Truman Doctrine nor the Eisenhower Doctrine is vague. Both doctrines have the common declared objective of containing Communism. Both doctrines imply, and rely on, the Dulles policy of "deterrence".

Even so, the Eisenhower Doctrine may not, necessarily, intensify the "cold war" in west Asia. If it does not provoke this undesirable sequence it will be because the present conditions in west Asia are different from those prevailing in Europe at the time of the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine. This interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine is based on the assumption that President Eisenhower's Secretary of State will not distort the Eisenhower Doctrine in pursuance of his policy of "deterrence".

As the avowed aim of the Eisenhower Doctrine is to contain Communism in west Asia, can it, the question naturally arises, avoid an intensification of the "cold war" in that region? That essentially depends upon the diplomacy and statesmanship of the politicians and ruling parties in west Asia. Even though the Eisenhower Doctrine is basically a projection of Washington's North Atlantic policy to west Asia, it may remain perpetually a burden and responsibility for America and America alone. Marshall Aid and the Truman Doctrine created NATO. Economic and military aid offered to west Asia under the Eisenhower Doctrine may not succeed in creating MEDO. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are not west Asian countries. With the sole exception of Iraq, no west Asian country is a member of the Baghdad Pact. Almost all west Asian countries resisted MEDO, when it was originally mooted as an adjunct of NATO. Events since then would seem to lend weight to the assumption that west Asian powers will be more vehement now in their opposition to revived American attempts to establish MEDO. West Asian powers may receive both economic and military aid from America without abandoning their policy of neutrality. With vision and determination, west Asian powers can enjoy the material and military benefits of the Eisenhower Doctrine without suffering from its involved undesirable consequences and commitments.

At this stage of the argument, it may not be irrelevant to revert to the theory, discussed in this journal more than once in recent weeks. Despite the Eisenhower Doctrine's over-emphasis on containing Communism, it is no bar to joint economic exploitation of west Asia with the Soviet Union. It would, in retrospect be not wrong to presume that the contours of the Eisenhower Doctrine were sketched as Communist military equipment began to be supplied to Egypt and, then, to Syria. There would seem to be not the least shadow of any doubt that the Russian threat to Britain and France that she would intervene with volunteers and "rockets" if the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt did not end, provoked Washington to plan out the details of the Eisenhower Doctrine. As it became evident that the hasty Anglo-French aggression against Egypt did not end, provoked Washington to plan out the details of the Eisenhower Doctrine. As it became evident that the hasty Anglo-French aggression against Egypt did not end, provoked Washington to plan out the details of the Eisenhower Doctrine. As it became evident that the hasty Anglo-French aggression against Egypt did not end, provoked Washington to plan out the details of the Eisenhower Doctrine. As it became evident that the hasty Anglo-French aggression against Egypt did not end, provoked Washington to plan out the details of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
to the Eisenhower Doctrine as a device to fill the resultant power vacuum. With President Eisenhower's triumphant return to Washington, the Eisenhower Doctrine has now been announced. These are the "cold war" aspects of the Doctrine.

But recent reports about America's gestures of economic help to Egypt and the Eisenhower's Doctrine's major emphasis on economic cooperation and assistance (the studied avoidance of the aid aspect of economic help is not without significance) reflect Washington's belated reaction to Moscow's policy to Asia since the Geneva Summit Conference. Even though economic assistance to west Asian countries is offered for "the maintenance of national independence", and not explicitly for economic improvement, the gesture is more open and without any strings. Military aid is offered only to those west Asian countries who seek such assistance. There is a similar rider to the proposed use of American armed forces in this region. This last proposal has a further condition that the American armed forces can be employed in west Asia only "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism". President Eisenhower expresses the hope that no occasion will ever arise to undertake this last action to enforce the Eisenhower Doctrine for security in west Asia. President Eisenhower's hopes are not likely to be falsified by events. No "overt armed aggression" is likely by any nation "controlled by international Communism". Syria is unlikely to attack her powerful neighbours like Turkey, Iraq and Israel, though there are more chances of Iraq or Israel committing acts of aggression against Syria or Jordan. There is always the possibility of combined aggression by Arabs against Jews, or by Israel against Arab States. But Washington's offer, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, to supply military equipment to countries in this region is a partial assurance that any future aggression in this region will not necessarily be aided and abetted by International Communism.

That the Eisenhower Doctrine may perpetuate the "cold war" in west Asia, is not its major flaw. Its basic defect is, as President Eisenhower confesses himself, that it will not, and is not expected to, solve the problems that plague this region. "There are the problems of Palestine and relations between Israel and Arab States, and the future of the Arab refugees. There is the problem of the future status of the Suez Canal....It is not the purpose of the legislation, I propose" President Eisenhower confesses, "to deal directly with these problems". These difficult issues, President Eisenhower concedes, would exist quite apart from the threat of international Communism. There are, perhaps, not many instances in history where a sponsor of any policy has so eloquently damned it as President Eisenhower has himself condemned the Eisenhower Doctrine. There is another phrase in President Eisenhower's address before Congress which is no less objectionable. In his appeal to Congress to endorse his policy, he elaborates the strategic and economic importance of west Asia. His argument is that, without the Eisenhower Doctrine, "Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organisation". This is an open admission that the Eisenhower Doctrine is expected to fill the political vacuum created by the ignominious retreat of Britain and France from west Asia. In rejecting the Eisenhower Doctrine, west Asian countries will echo Pandit Nehru's warning, some years ago to the Paris session of the General Assembly, that Asian problems could no longer be solved in the context of Europe alone.

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