

of the Chief Minister in regard to States reorganisation. Though the Chief Minister has very little to do with the loss of the four talukas in the southernmost part of the State to Madras, the fact that he toyed with the idea of a Dakshina Pradesh State has created uncertainty in the minds of the people as to where exactly he will lead the State. The prestige of the Congress will stump in the event of a merger of the State with Madras or Karnataka. Politically, it was therefore an unwise move on the part of the Chief Minister. But the right thing for the party to do in the situation was to give a clear mandate to the Chief Minister.

Experience in Travancore -Cochin suggests that it is not in the interest of parliamentary government that a few should be allowed to negate the wishes of the overwhelming majority in a legislative party. One way of preventing a handful of dissenters within a party from precipitating a ministerial crisis could be to establish a convention that such dissenters would not be admitted to other parties. In this respect, Congress and PSP have been the worst offenders. But in a small State like Travancore-Cochin with party groupings as they are, the other question is even more important. If stable government by a party with a substantial majority is not possible, does it follow that

the State is to be deprived of parliamentary government altogether? Whatever the difficulties, there is no situation which is so desperate that it is beyond the resource of political parties in the legislature to cope with it. To assume an alternative to it, is to retard the growth of parliamentary government.

Whatever the provocation, therefore, it is fatal to assume that President's rule is inevitable in Travancore-Cochin or that it is the only possible solution. One of the factors which has swayed party loyalties in Travancore-Cochin in the past and prevented the parties from assuming full responsibility for the situation is the opportunity which the possibility of President's rule has given to parties to play off one against the other. In the past, on more than one occasion, parties have tried to play for safety and manoeuvred to pass on the responsibility for bringing on President's rule. So today if Travancore-Cochin does have President's rule, the question will be, for how long and how will it affect the fortunes of the different parties in the next election, and which party will come out of it unscathed. The answer to it is not to have President's rule under any circumstances and allow the party leaders to go through all the manoeuvres they are capable of to produce the best possible combination they can. People get the Govern-

ment, which they deserve. Why should Delhi have to come to the rescue? After all, it is the responsibility of the people of Travancore-Cochin to run their own Government. The decision of the Praja Socialists, or of what remains of the party, to take the Lohia line without Lohia, and to abstain rigorously from any electoral or ministerial alliance with any party under any circumstance, does not, by itself, rule out the possibility of a coalition between the other parties.

Constitutional proprieties, it may be suspected, are being interpreted too narrowly in quarters which should know better. There is an important responsibility before the next Government, whoever forms it. For reorganisation of States requires, according to the Constitution, that the wishes of the people involved should, be ascertained in advance. Without, stretching words beyond the verge of decency, the only way the wishes of the people can be ascertained is through their elected representatives. Taking their stand on the letter of the law. Constitutional Pundits have given their decision that if the President is allowed under the Constitution, to run the Government of the State, he can just as well indicate or ascertain the wishes of the people concerned. This is a dangerous doctrine which even the unstable politics of Travancore cannot render acceptable.

## Western Powers' Dilemma

NOT even a year has passed since the "summit Conference" at Geneva among the four Heads of State. But sufficient time has elapsed to emphasise the impact of the "hydrogen stalemate" on the world situation, as well as on the relations between the major NATO partners. Subsequent tie developments have underlined Moscow's awareness of some of the implications of the decisions reached at the "summit Conference". Moscow's diplomatic initiative, since the Geneva Conference among Heads of State has, belatedly, been acknowledged by the Western Powers. They have shown concern over Russia's gestures to eastern European countries. They have expressed alarm over Moscow's economic overtures to Asia. They are perturbed over the spreading Russian influence in West Asia.

But recent discussions at New Delhi between Pandit Nehru and the Foreign Ministers of the three Wes-

tern Powers have disclosed certain other equally significant consequences of the "Geneva spirit", which neither Russia nor any of the Western Powers seems to have anticipated. As the "cold war" has become less tense, as the realisation has grown that, there is no sane alternative to peaceful co-existence, the conflicting interests among the major NATO allies have come out into the open. These inherent conflicts became evident from the communique issued jointly by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Britain. These differences could no longer be ignored or obscured after the French Foreign Minister's indictment of the Western Powers' foreign policy. Sir Anthony Eden has explained the differences between Britain and America as a natural aspect of relations between democracies. America's Secretary of State has sought to minimise the significance of M Pineau's recent dispa-

raging comments on the Western Powers' undue reliance on security on the ground that France remains a NATO Power. Mr Dulles has not denied the differences between the foreign policies of India and America. But he has repeated Sir Anthony's argument that such differences are only to be expected among "free" countries.

Despite these sophisticated explanations, it becomes increasingly obvious that the Western Powers are divided on many of the world issues. These differences are of two kinds, though all the disagreements arise out of the Western Powers' attitude to Russia. It is clear that America is not in agreement with all the aspects of Britain's policy to west Asia. No less evident is Britain's resentment over the American policy to far-east Asia. France has a grievance that Britain and America do not consult her in formulating their policies to west Asia and far-east Asia. She complains that her

NATO allies, Britain and America, do not appreciate her position or the situation in north-west Africa. Her Socialist Foreign Minister has expressed disagreement with the Anglo-Israeli solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, which excludes co-operation and consultation with Russia. Both Britain and France resent, implicitly if not explicitly, some of the pressures which America has exerted since the last world war. These are the inherent conflicts among the Western Powers in their constant search for spheres of influence, which have, perhaps, not been appreciated by Russia earlier. Now, after these differences have come out into the open, Moscow is not unprepared to exploit the situation.

In west Asia, the Baghdad Pact has complicated the Arab-Israeli dispute. This regional military alliance offered the opportunity to Russia to create her sphere of influence in West Asia. This military pact has, similarly, helped Egypt to win her Arab neighbour away from Britain. As the Baghdad Pact was inspired by America, she cannot disown responsibility for Britain's discomfiture in west Asia, or for Britain's tense relations with Greece as a sequel to the developments in Cyprus. Arab States are opposed to the Baghdad Pact. They resent the Western Powers' attitude to the Arab-Israeli dispute. They have every reason to welcome Russian co-operation to solve their dispute with Israel. What the Baghdad Pact has achieved in fortifying the northern tier in the region concerned against Russia is not generally known. But it is undeniable that it has prejudiced Britain's position in West Asia, complicated the Arab-Israeli dispute and provided Russia the opportunity to enter the west Asian scene.

SEADO has had equally disastrous consequences. Russia has been emphatic in her hostility to SEADO and Baghdad Pact countries. Even as she has gained friends in west Asia by offering military and economic aid, she has tried to fortify Afghanistan to offset the Western Powers' military aid to Pakistan. She has offered economic co-operation to India and Burma to match America's plans for economic aid to undeveloped countries. Apart from Thailand, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, all Asian countries are opposed to SEADO and the Baghdad Pact. India remains unimpressed by the arguments of the British and Ameri-

can Foreign Ministers that regional military alliances are necessary to maintain peace in these regions. She is more in sympathy with M Pineau's appraisal of the changed world situation. Not military pacts, but economic help is the road to peace and goodwill in these regions, as well as in the world as a whole. It would be foolish to pretend that M Pineau's recent outburst against the Western Powers' foreign policy or Mr. Dulles's talks with Pandit Nehru will lead to any

change in America's foreign policy. It is doubtful whether Sir Anthony will have the courage or the statesmanship to pursue a foreign policy independently of America. But India can continue her foreign policy of good neighbourliness in the secure knowledge that, as more and more countries realise the futility of a foreign policy based exclusively on security, there will be an agonising re-appraisal in America of the changed and changing world situation.