

be no less real and insurmountable. After all the Government of which he is the head is not known for efficiency and quick despatch of business. Nevertheless, the tone of the debate itself stresses the urgency of holding the election as early as possible. For Important developments have taken place in the political held since the Parliament met last. The Congress itself has now an official opposition—the democratic front, and a very important section of the Congress in West Bengal—the problem province—has finally broken away from the parent organisation, and under the leadership of such a tried and trusted Congress man as Dr. P. C. Ghosh, it has openly gone into opposition. That

the final disintegration of the Congress should start from Bengal is a pointer the significance of which can hardly be missed.

About the deadlock in Indo-Pakistan trade relations, the President regretted that no decision had been taken by the International Monetary Fund on the par value of the Pakistani rupee, but did not say what his Government proposed to do about it. On the issues of evacuee property and canal waters, the Government of India have proposed to Pakistan that a tribunal of the highest standing should be set up to arrive at an amicable settlement of the disputes. Whether Pakistan is prepared to accept this proposal is not yet known.

—ignore that guns and bayonets cannot secure peace, though they may succeed in winning a war after it has broken out. India's stand that a device among the Big Powers to resolve disputes and conflicts through mediation is endorsed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, though he has not openly canvassed, the argument advanced by Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, that an international army may succeed in deterring small Powers from acts of aggression, but is not likely to prevent Big Powers from acts of aggression or to localise the war after its occurrence when major powers are involved. Measures for collective security are, at best, devices for winning a war and not making wars impossible.

Kid Gloves Off

IF Moscow has not forgotten the diplomatic rebuff it received when the Security Council ordered an international army into action in Korea, Peking has not forgiven Washington for its consistent refusal to grant recognition to Red China or for its determined opposition to admit Mao Tse-tung's representatives to the United Nations. Neither the Security Council's decision to invite representatives of Communist China to reply to General MacArthur's allegation of Red China's intervention in the Korean war nor its earlier concession to allow Mao's representatives to participate in its discussions on Peking's accusation of United States aggression in Formosa, has swerved the Moscow-Peking axis from its unflinching determination to undo the Security Council's June resolution on Korea.

"By refusing to join the Security Council's discussion on the MacArthur report, Mao Tse-tung has made it abundantly evident that Peking disapproves of the June resolution of the Council and that it insists on a discussion of the general situation in Korea. With characteristic bluntness, Peking has informed Lake Success that it is not anxious to appear before the Security Council in defence of it? alleged action in Korea unless it is allowed to discuss "the most pressing question of armed intervention" in Korea.

Amidst his pre-occupations with developments in Tibet and in

Nepal—events which are beyond his control and not of his own making

Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru can take grim satisfaction that his warnings and apprehensions have come true. Red China's intervention in the Korean war—even Peking is not anxious to refute General MacArthur's allegations—and the sinister implications of Mao's refusal to accept the Security Council's invitation except on his own terms, confirm the Prime Minister's grave doubts about the wisdom of allowing the United Nations forces to cross the 38th parallel without a fresh mandate from the Council as well as India's opposition to the Acheson Plan for investing the veto-less General Assembly with authority in matters of world defence and security, which has hitherto been exercised by the Council in virtue of the provisions originally embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Informed and unbiased students of world affairs accept Mr. Nehru's recent elucidation of India's foreign policy in which he elaborated the reasons behind India's opposition to the Acheson Plan. Obsessed with by-passing the veto-ridden Security Council, Mr. Acheson and those who believe in measures for collective security through the creation of a balanced international force out of the balanced national armies of member-states—a plan which is, in essence, a projection of the defence formula for the Atlantic community to the international sphere

This is the fundamental issue involved in the Security Council's invitation to Red China to reply to General MacArthur's charges and the subsequent rejection of the invitation by Mao Tse-tung unless the Security Council is prepared to extend the scope of discussions to include the issue of "armed intervention" in Korea. It is no use trying to tell Peking that it is trying to deliberately confuse issues by insisting on being heard on Formosa—a claim which has been accepted by the Security Council. Nor is it likely to serve any fruitful purpose by twitting Peking that its Foreign office is being naive in feigning that it has never heard of President Truman's open rebuke to General MacArthur and his Administration's acceptance of the United Nations investigation on Formosa.

Formosa is a side issue, though Peking's insistence on combining Formosa with the Korean issue may have been influenced by the mid-term elections in America, which revealed a growing support of those Republicans who are in favour of a more forward policy in Asia and the Far East and of giving a carte blanche, to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan to do as he likes in and with Korea, Formosa and possibly Indo-China. Yet it should not be ignored that Formosa is one of Red China's neighbouring islands in which she has an abiding strategic and political interest, and the argument, that the United States could intervene in Formosa because it might technically be regarded as a part of the

occupied enemy territory of Japan, is likely to be brushed aside by Peking as a lawyer's quibble.

Far more significant is Peking's determination to re-open the whole Korean issue. Strategists have expressed surprise at the belated Chinese intervention in the Korean war. Washington and the diplomatic experts at Lake Success have, tried to console themselves with the comforting possibility that Red China's intervention in the Korean war is motivated by her understandable desire to keep the American forces away from the Manchurian border and to protect the gigantic power plants on the borders of the Yalu river, which feed Manchurian industries with electricity. These are possible motives, but the reasons openly put forward by Peking for its refusal to participate in the Security Council's discussions on the MacArthur report make it clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that Mao is playing for wider and higher stakes.

From Red China's excursions into Korea, Tibet and Indo-China, the chiefs of stall" of the Western Powers will conclude that Mao has entered into a pact with Moscow to wage the third world war on two fronts. Recent developments in Asia and the Far East will be interpreted in London, Paris and Washington as fresh evidences of the Communist States' feverish preparations towards aggression. Washington will specifically accuse Peking of being coerced and cajoled by Moscow to create trouble in Asia and the Far East so as to keep considerable armies of the Western Powers employed in the eastern theatre in order to facilitate an easy plunder of Europe by Russia.

These allegations and charges cannot be ruled out of consideration altogether. But sober persons who refuse to be rushed into hysterical or hasty conclusions will not fail to concede, that, along with Formosa, Korea is a neighbouring strategic island in which Red China must

necessarily be interested. It was through Korea that aggressive Japan launched and based her initial operations on the Chinese mainland. Peking suspects that, in the name of the United Nations, America is interested in fortifying Korea as a bastion against Communist China. Both geography and logistics demand that Peking must have a voice in the ultimate solution of the Korean problem. And the belated intervention as well as the reason offered for refusing the Security Council's invitation is a rude reminder to the Western Powers that Peking can be deprived of her legitimate political and strategic interests only at the cost of a major and protracted war. This, and nothing less, is the basic problem which now confronts Lake Success. And Washington would be rash to base its actions on the belief that the problem can be successfully solved without a major conflagration now that the veto-free General Assembly has powers to order a collective force into action.

Weekly Notes

Gray, red or blue ?

PRESIDENT Truman's chief adviser on foreign economic policy has recommended an allocation \$1,600 million to the undeveloped countries. This is the total and not an annual payment, made up of both private and public funds.

Is it too much or too little? Since all these figures are on paper only, one may as well have a look at them. Dr Lokanathan thinks South-East Asia will need \$1,000 million a year for the next five or six years. The Commonwealth Conference in London arrived at the figure of £1,800 of which £700 has to be external capital whatever that may mean. Assuming that not all of the external capital has to be in hard currency, the dollar needs for development may not be so difficult to reconcile with Mr Gordon Gray's figures, as Dr Lokanathan's or a commonsense view of the situation would seem to suggest.

The Ecafe Chief did one good thing, however. He mustered sufficient courage to tell the people of

New York that most of these investment has to be on Government account or from public bodies, the implied hint being that cajoling the private American investors will not do. President Truman has not yet swallowed this bitter pill.

Hut Gray's report contains a lot more. Communism has indeed put all of them on the run. Even the United Nations has taken up with a start to the realisation that something should be done about land tenure in the undeveloped countries, the cultivator must be put on his feet and cottage industries set up, if necessary, with Government assistance. The Economic Committee of the General Assembly has passed a resolution to this effect.

The whole thing has a familiar ring about it. If one looks up the report produced by the British Government in India before the first Co-operative Societies Act was passed in 1904, one would come across similar sentiments, and the same faint sense of urgency, rather dampened by the mildewed publication.

This brings us to the crux of the problem as Mr. Gray sees it. Actually, he sees red, and turns blue. Dealing with the threat of Communist aggression in South-East Asia, Mr. Gray thinks that the fate of the non-Communist Governments in this area will depend largely upon their success in finding solutions to their economic problems. Of these, the leading one, India, hardly gives him any cause for hope. India has been living on her capital, and used up \$1,600 million of sterling balances without adding a cent to her capital during the last five years. This thesis, too, is familiar. Only Mr. Gray did not add that this was due to the tax system which redistributed incomes in favour of the lower income groups, and thus retarded savings.

Britain is to be helped and put on her feet, provided she plays fair, which means freer trade, and restoring the convertibility of sterling into dollars. Japan has to be put on her feet to improve the living standards and to maintain peace in the Far East.