

Charter, provided the other industrially advanced countries of the world led by the U.S.A. and the U.K. do so. The Commission also unanimously approves of the continuance of the Tariff concessions agreed to at Geneva and Annecy, although it recognises their limited value. In regard to the Indo-British Trade Agreement of 1939, the Commission recommends the early initiation of trade talks between the two countries with a view to the revision of the terms of the Agreement in order to bring these into line with the changed pattern of Indo-British trade after World War II.

The major part of the Report, however, deals with the objectives and priorities of a short-term economic policy which should be pursued by the Government in the immediate future, "Only by strict adherence to such a policy can the foundations be laid for large-scale economic development in future years and a sound long-term economic policy." The Report emphasises the need for defence industries, ration-

alisation of agriculture, industries needed for, the implementation of the agricultural programme and the construction and maintenance of large irrigation and multi-purpose projects, increased production in the industries producing basic raw materials and consumption goods in that order. *Pari passu* there should be efforts to stimulate the tertiary occupations and exports.

Though the members of the Fiscal Commission may claim to have achieved a fairly large measure of success in giving their report the semblance of a "comprehensive policy document," their laboured attempts to produce that effect indeed detract much from its readability and usefulness. While the Report deals effusively with *jejune* platitudes, specific issues referred to the Commission receive sketchy treatment. Is it too much to hope that the Government of India will subject the conclusions arrived at by the Commission to the closest scrutiny before forming their views on the Report?

uptill now. Both these countries have extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Government of China; but as members of the United Nations, none of them have refused to accept the bonafides of Chiang Kai-shek's nominee on the Security Council.

The immediate reaction in the United States to such peace overtures may be readily imagined. If cease fire in Korea is made conditional upon US recognition of the Mao Tse lung regime in China, it is sheer blackmail to which America will never submit. If she did, it would be proved to the world that aggression pays. But the immediate emotional reaction is not always the final considered judgment. And independently of the developments in Korea, America's refusal to face the facts in China has gone to the point whether it causes serious embarrassment even to such a faithful ally as Britain. True enough, there are sections of opinion in Britain herself, which question the wisdom of and doubts the benefits derived from Britain's recognition of Communist China. It has estranged American sympathies without making things any easier for British commercial interests. It has not made the future of Hong Kong any more secure.

But in their own phlegmatic, matter of fact, unemotional manner, Britain has bowed down to the inevitable in China and may go farther, provided there is some chance of stabilising the situation in South East Asia that way. Malaya has not been such a signal success as to encourage Britain further in an aggressive policy against Communism in these regions. However unpromising this line of approach may look at first sight, and however adamant American opposition may be, it would be wrong, therefore, to suppose that Pandit Nehru's efforts are foredoomed to failure.

For the case of China's representation on the Security Council is so overwhelmingly strong, on its own merits, that it will be difficult for the USA to make it look indefensible, even by tagging it on to the question of ceasefire in Korea with which it is not logically connected. Circumstances have only added urgency to what should have been done as a matter of course.

Judging retrospectively, what had been regarded as hasty and unwar-

Pandit Nehru's Peace Move

THE misgivings aroused by India's stand with regard to Korea that, by opposing aggression, she has ceased to be neutral in the cold war between the power blocs, will be removed by the initiative Pandit Nehru has taken for a peaceful solution of the Korean dispute. Marshall Stalin has responded to his offer to seek a settlement through the Security Council. He has remained silent, however, about seeking a settlement through unofficial contacts which had also been suggested by Pandit Nehru, no doubt to get round the long standing deadlock in the Security Council itself over the question of China's representation. Russian acceptance of the offer for negotiations, however, is conditional on the presence of the permanent representatives, that is to say, of the Peoples Government of China on the Council which must also hear the Korean case from the Korean people.

Does it hold out the chances of a settlement? The dispute about the

representation of China on the Council has created a deadlock which it has not yet been possible to break primarily because of the refusal of the United States either to extend diplomatic recognition to the People's Government of China or even to accept the representative of the latter on the Security Council, independently of extending such diplomatic recognition. This is not entirely a distinction without a difference. A move had been sponsored some time ago at Lake Success to break the deadlock in this manner. Whatever logic or commonsense may suggest, technically there is nothing to prevent the United States, as a member of the United Nations from accepting the representation on the Security Council of the Government at Peking while the State Department continues diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek's exiled Government in Formosa. As a matter of fact both India and Britain have actually been doing some thing very similar

ranted on the part of India in confirming North Korea as an aggressor on insufficient evidence, may turn out to be a tactical advantage in the initiative she has taken for a peaceful settlement. It has not put Pandit Nehru out of court with Soviet Russia. It should have and it has improved his standing with the Western Powers.

But will it regain for him the prestige he has lost in the eyes of the people of Asia? Egypt was very bitter that India should support the Security Council's decision on Korea when in her own case—or for the matter of that, in the case of India herself—the Security Council studiously refused to pronounce judgment. The British troops have not yet been removed from Egyptian territory. The Security Council has not declared Pakistan an aggressor in Kashmir. Many such aggressions and violations of the sovereignty and unity of territory of States which are members of the United Nations have been submitted to the Security Council which has not taken any action to put an end to them as it has done in the case of Korea.

If the argument on which India has declared North Korea an aggressor is stretched a bit farther, India will get involved in an extremely embarrassing manner in Indo-China to begin with, and in many other Asian countries. By the same token, she may have to declare Bao Dai's Government as an aggressor or alternatively, impose sanctions against Viet Minh. This points to the wisdom and the inevitability of her resuming her previous stand in an unequivocal manner that civil wars and internal disputes should be solved internally in all Asian countries without outside intervention of any sort.

There are, however, signs and portents, and hopeful ones, too, of a reorientation of policy which, if carried out successfully, may enhance India's chances of retaining or regaining her leadership. The foreign policy of any government, as Pandit Nehru has been prone to say time and again, is an extension of its internal policy. The manner in which the Government of India have handled the communists so far and have sought to meet the communists' challenge could leave little room for doubt what her foreign policy would be. Today, there are

signs of a change and indications of a new approach. There has also been a change in the line taken by the communists in this country, as far as it can be judged from their declarations and the utterances of their party leaders. The great lesson of the Chinese revolution was the strength it demonstrated, of the agrarian elements in the shaping of a country which is predominantly agricultural. It also proved the power of a movement which is broad based and has wide popular support. While the extreme left has realised that terroristic methods lead to left sectarianism and eventual political suicide, there is also a growing recognition, both among the rank and file of the communists as well as among party leaders that the urge for national revival and for a better deal for the masses is bound to be dissipated and weakened unless it can be reinforced by broad popular appeal. Whether it will vitalise public life and bring a new

awakening to the people, only the nature will show. But by giving evidence of their intention to welcome such a development, the Government have undoubtedly shown an appreciation of the need for a healthy outlet for popular urges rather than driving them underground.

These internal developments taken in conjunction with what is happening elsewhere in the South East Asia cannot be lost on America. If the latter still remains adamant in her refusal to recognise Chinese representation on the Security Council and holds up thereby not only a settlement of the Korean problem, but also the progress of collective security, it is she who will put herself out of court in the counsels of nations. And however ardent may be republican aspirations for establishing the American way of life in Asian countries, Washington can ill afford to be so unrealistic as to refuse to move with the times.

The Locust Menace

WE are in the grip of a new locust cycle. According to the latest report, in addition to large swarms of foreign locusts flying over northern India, breeding has started at Bharatpur in Rajasthan. The breeding is expected to increase with the setting in of the rains.

India has been subject to the locust pest from times immemorial. Locusts, one of the major enemies of agriculture, were referred to in ancient literature as *pangapal*. Locusts are said to appear in cycles. Since the middle of the eighteenth century, there have been eight such cycles in 1863-67, 1869-73, 1876-81, 1889-98, 1900-1907, 1912-1920, 1926-31 and 1940-46. The current cycle is the ninth and began early last year when swarms developed in certain regions of Eastern Arabia. The first invasion to India started in the middle of May this year when about half a dozen swarms from the West crossed over to Rajasthan. Since then about two dozen swarms have come into the country.

To control the menace effectively, the anti-locust work in India, Pakistan and Iran is being co-ordinated under a Convention. A conference was held last year in Karachi under the auspices of this Convention and this year a similar conference will be held in India.

The control organisation in India is under the overall supervision of the Director of Locust Control. The desert areas of about 1,50,000 sq. miles in Rajasthan, Saurashtra and certain parts of the adjoining States are looked after directly by the central organisation. The soundest, cheapest and the most effective method of control is to destroy the eggs or the hoppers, which can be done by trenching and burning. The insects can be destroyed either by chemical or mechanical methods. Mechanical methods include burying the hoppers alive or burning them. Chemical methods include spraying with insecticides and dusting with poisons such as *benzoin hexachloride*.