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Historical Trajectory and Contemporary Relevance

The Naga Homeland Movement

This article is a critical endeavour to situate the Naga homeland movement in the present context vis-à-vis the regional politics of the North East. It attempts to understand and (re)imagine the relevance of Naga homeland politics in the light of its expectations in the neo-liberal era. By revisiting and (re)defining the movement from the establishment of the Naga Club in 1918 to the Naga Peace Accord in 2015, it highlights the policies and procedures that have intensified existing issues and suggests that the nexus of politicians, bureaucrats, contractors and underground leaders operates by exploiting the Naga issue rather than solving it, while sustaining and reproducing systemic corruption.

North East India has witnessed many ethnic conflicts and insurgency movements that are inevitable given its ethnic diversity. Ethnic groups in the North East cannot be defined on the basis of geographical–territorial cartography alone, considering the fluidity of the population in the region over centuries amidst constitutional boundaries. Although there is no unanimity about the causes of the homeland movements or insurgencies, there is consensus that homeland movements are a political problem. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Assamese people opposed the British move to make Assam a part of Bengal because the Assamese were against Bengali domination. Later on, many tribal groups in Assam itself demanded autonomy, saying that the Government of Assam had neglected them. This led to the creation of the autonomous district councils in the hill districts (except the Naga Hills) under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The Assamese language movement, which sought to make Assamese the official language, was opposed by the tribals, and this led to the formation of Meghalaya and Mizoram. These developments triggered off a series of ethnic movements like those of the Bodos, Karbis, Hmars, and other smaller tribes. Thus, ethnic movements in the North East are embedded in the very diversity of the region.

Although rooted in diversity, ethnic movements in the North East have arisen because of important historical reasons too. Ethnic groups lived in splendid and self-contented yet isolated existence from one another. The relationship between neighbouring ethnic groups was often one of enmity marked by a situation of domination and subordination. With the establishment of the colonial rule, a new trend towards integration began along with the spread of a market economy. But, such integration had not been realised with the decline of the colonial rule. Consequently, pluralism had not taken root in the North East at the time of Indian independence. Democracy turned out to be dominance by the larger groups, leading to a sense of deprivation among the smaller groups due to economic deprivation, discrimination in employment and political marginalisation. These deprivations are often exploited by leaders who have their own motivations. The worst form of deprivation is a threat to the very existence of an ethnic group as a distinct ­sociocultural community. Ethnic movements in the North East have taken different forms, such as demands for secession and independence from the Indian Union, demands for separate states, and the demand for autonomous district councils under the Sixth Schedule and Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. The means adopted ranged from “war” waged against the ­Indian Union, involving guerrilla tactics, to bandhs and demonstrations. Notwithstanding their form and means adopted, these movements are best understood as political movements (Pakem 1993). Hence, scholars of the region agree that only a political solution can bring peace and stability in the North East.

The Nagas live in relative isolation as “border communities” alongside the other North East ethnic groups. Given the sociocultural sensitivities involved and anthropological histories of the different communities living within the cloistered protections of their respective tribes and clans, have these communities been able to cope with other ethnic groups and outsiders who have migrated to their regions as labourers, job-hunters and fortune-seekers? In the past, the experience of the people in this regard has not been pleasant, and the opaque and closed nature of these societies over generations has demonstrated their instinctive dislike for foreigners and “outsiders.” Presently, the people of Nagaland are confronted with the twin issues of the denial of progress and lack of infrastructure, industrialisation, development and job creation, and the loss of identity (or creation of new identities) that has emanated with changes in environment, ecology, means of livelihood, and expropriation of land.

Conflict and Crisis

Given the current conditions, the Naga society seems to have arrived into a Weberian situation. Max Weber analysed conflict situations while contextualising the three related concepts of stratification, conflict and change, and subsequently developed the principles of conflict. Most of these principles can be found in his discussion of the transition from societies based on traditional authority to those organised around rational–legal authority, that generates conflict conditions from within, and wherein the roles of the leaders become crucial.

Most conflict theorists seek to find out the consequences of conflict. George Simmel did not view social structure as domination and subjugation (as Karl Marx did), but he held that it was an inseparable mingling of associative and dissociative processes, which are separable only in analysis. Thus, Simmel held an organismic view of the social world. This subtle organicism led Simmel to seek out the consequences of conflict for social continuity rather than change (Simmel quoted in Ritzer 2013). Drawing from this discussion, one can ask: Is the Naga society in a conflict situation, and if so, why? Is conflict an inevitable element in the case of the Nagas?

Weber argues there are three conditions why conflict becomes a crisis. And we can situate the present Naga context using the same conditions. One condition is a situation where there is a high degree of correlation between power, wealth and prestige, or incumbency in positions of political power (party), occupancy in advantaged economic positions (class), and membership in high-ranking social circles (status groups). This is a situation when economic elites, for example, are also social and political elites and vice versa. This group corresponds to the “Naga elites” of today constituting politicians, contractors and bureaucrats who have become capitalists of the state. The general Naga public, who constitute the second group, resent the concentration of power, wealth and prestige in the hands of a few Naga elites and subsequently become receptive to conflict alternatives. Another condition is dramatic discontinuity in the distribution of rewards, or the existence of divisions in social hierarchies that give privileges to a few. Tensions and resentments emerge when only a few hold or hoard power, wealth, and prestige, and the rest are denied these rewards, leading to fight against the capitalists. A final condition encouraging conflict is the relative lack of social mobility. When those of lower rank have little chance to move up the social hierarchies or enter a new class, party, or status group, resentment starts accumulating. Those who are denied opportunities to increase their access to resources become restive and willing to challenge the existing system. The critical force that galvanises the resentments inhering in these three conditions is leadership. Leaders emerge to challenge the existing system and mobilise resentments over the hoarding of resources and the lack of opportunities to gain access to wealth, power, or prestige. This results in the beginning of a structural change (Turner 2011: 146–47).

The problem is further intensified with the impact of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism involves the priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the system of competition and a strong and impartial state (Plehwe 2016). There is a transition from laissez-faire (that is, without the intervention of the state) towards a market economy under the guidance and rules of a strong state (Bonefeld 2017). In other words, the corporate elites or the tribal elites (as in the case of the Nagas) need the “state” to protect their wealth. I posit that a corrupted system involving a parasitic government and a subsequent parasitic society has been institutionalised in Nagaland with the advent of neo-liberal policies. Therefore, I ask: Who or what constitutes this state in Nagaland? What are the mechanisms by which it becomes an unjust apparatus? Is this condition a perfect Althusserian situation where the state is used by the elites as an oppressive apparatus to exploit the common masses? Furthermore, if the state is not self-reliant in terms of revenues, can it sustain such a parasitic economy, and if so, for how long?

Chasie (1999) views that even after decades of the Indo–Naga conflict everyone has heard about the “Naga insurgency,” little attempt has been made to provide the more-psychological underpinnings of the movement and the undercurrents that continue to play an important role in the conflict. Chasie (2017) has also argued how the Nagas have failed to realise the ­undercurrents that have been at work in the Naga society. Some of his points are—first, the Nagas have become disappointed with the failure of the Indo–Naga talks (referring to ceasefire talks). Second, most Nagas have realised that they need to defend whatever little protections they have under the Constitution. This is where Article 371A becomes so important for them. Also, while the state government is composed of Naga politicians, most Nagas have lost faith in them and cynically think all of them are there only for the money and would align with the central government as long as they get money. Third, taxation has always been a contentious issue in Nagaland. Taxation was responsible for the rise and sustenance of Naga nationalism, although other reasons were there too. Ura Uvie (loosely translated as “my home-it belongs to me”) encapsulated the basic idea behind their views on taxation. The new Indian law about attaching personal assets for failure to pay taxes would seem to give credence to this original fear of the Nagas. The Nagas have been vehemently opposing the forcible taxations imposed by the Naga political groups (NPGs) ­although the NPGs claim that they are fighting for the cause of the Naga people. The Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland’s (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN[IM]) manifesto about nationalising private property, particularly land, only gives rise to more apprehensions about their leadership. Land, particularly village land, gives identity to the Nagas, and without this, they would become non-entities (Chasie 1999, 2017 qtd in Kikhi 2017).

Parasitic Government, Parasitic Public?

This section examines the position that a parasitic government and a parasitic society has been institutionalised in Nagaland. This has resulted in a regime of systemic corruption where the state government seems to have no vision to generate any revenue, relying on central grants that serve as pacifying packages to neutralise the Indo–Naga issue. These funds are appropriated by the so-called new Naga elites (politicians, bureaucrats and contractors in nexus with Naga underground groups’ leaders). Perhaps, the so-called Naga intelligentsia are failing to realise that this corrupt wealth or capital cannot be sustained while the common people are quiet about the corruption for now.

Furthermore, Naga identity has to be critically analysed in the context of neo-liberalism. Today, the state is needed by the elites to accumulate and protect their wealth, which ultimately results in wealth inequality. The pertinent question has to be amplified: Can we trust the state? “The state” instead of ­being the problem solver has itself become a problem, with an institutionalised corrupted system. In the absence of any mechanism to generate enough income for self-sustenance and self-sufficiency, what will happen when “our parasitic government” and “parasitic society” stop receiving the so-called “economic packages” from the central government?

There is no doubt that the movement for Naga identity started with good intentions but it has been reduced to a “bait,” intensifying the parasitic system and encouraging nexus among the elites. The state has turned into an Althusserian oppressive apparatus and the public has also become weak, both seeming to feed on each other. The masses have become too dependent on the elites, or rather the elites have prepared the masses to act this way. Therefore, the need for the Nagas to realise the importance of self-reliance has to be channelised. The Nagas need to propose various areas that can be developed and improved upon to achieve the goal of self-sustenance like indigenous handicrafts, pottery, forest resources and agro- or forest-based industries apart from other prospects (Morung Express 2017).

Question and Politics of Identity

This section attempts to understand how the conceptualisation of social identities helps us situate the Naga identity movement. In The Power of Identity, Manuel Castells (2010) argues that identity, as it refers to human beings in society, is “the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes that is or are given priority over other sources of meaning.” Thus, an individual or a collective actor can have a “plurality of identities.” It is well-known that identities can originate from the dominant institutions of a society. However, they become identities “only when and if social actors internalise them, and construct their meanings around this internalisation” (Castells 2010).

Since social relations are also relations of power, the social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relationships. There are three forms and origins of identity formation. First, there is legitimate identity that is introduced by the dominant institutions (groups) of society to extend and rationalise their domination vis-à-vis social actors. Second, there is resistance identity generated by those actors who are in positions or conditions devalued and/or stigmatised by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society. Third, there is project identity wherein social actors, on the basis of cultural materials available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by doing so, seek the transformation of social structures (Castells 2010).

Although these forms are analytically different, in reality, identities that start as resistance may induce projects, and may also, along the course of history, become dominant in the institutions of society, becoming legitimising identities to rationalise their domination. For instance, the Naga identity is one movement that started as a resistance identity, became a project identity in the process and got transformed into a dominant-legitimised identity. It can be interpreted as a legitimised identity, when the Indian government more recently recognised it as a unique culture or identity.

However, one cannot solely depend on the state for resolving the inconsistencies and problems of power dynamics as the state itself is enmeshed in neo-liberal policies and ideology. Neo-liberal ideology works through the state promoting the market, rather than suppressing it. The state ensures that contracts are enforced by instituting a legal system, prevents theft and crime in the form of the police, and establishes uniform systems of weights and measures, and currency. Without these arrangements, there would be no free market, no market forces and no resulting market society. Following from this logic, Neiphiu Rio (present Nagaland chief minister) or T R Zeliang (ex-chief minister of Nagaland) need the state to protect their wealth. State force defends a market society, capitalists and the political establishment in Nagaland equally in pursuance of power.

The Naga Identity Movement

This section traces the history of the Naga struggle and argues that a fear of interference by plains people as well as the danger of infringement upon their “cultural autonomy” instigated the homeland struggle. It explores if the homeland movement is justified and lays emphasis on the need to introspect the very construction of the Naga society. It probes about the emerging challenges in the Naga society and the ways in which one could respond to those challenges.

Pre-independence history of the Nagas: There are two broad phases of the pre-independence history of the Nagas. First, there was a protracted period during which endemic head-hunting and warfare prevailed among different tribes in the Naga Hills area. The second phase began with the advent of the British who brought “local warfare, blood-feud and head-hunting” to a gradual end. To ensure peace, the British slightly modified the existing pattern of village political system and tribal leadership, formalised the judicial functions of tribal leaders, avoided altering the customary basis of law, and imposed their own administrative system only slightly at the top (Das 1993: 24). The Naga Hills district, then a part of Assam, was a “scheduled” district, which meant that it was excluded from the general operation of laws enforced in the rest of India. Later, the Naga Hills district was declared an “excluded area” within the Assam Province by the Government of India Act of 1935.

A major phenomenon which generated the Naga movement was the growing discontent among the Nagas on account of their inability to adjust themselves to the emerging socio­political situations on the eve of India’s independence and the impending withdrawal of British administration. The fear of interference and exploitation by the “plains people” and an assumed danger of encroachment upon their “cultural autonomy” were linked to a fear of losing their land and forests. After the withdrawal of the British Raj, the Naga movement got intensified at the political level (Das 1982, 1993: 33 qtd in Kikhi 2017: 599).

The origin of the Naga movement can be traced to the formation of the Naga Club in 1918, the first organisation of its kind that brought the various Naga tribes under its umbrella. When the Simon Commission visited Kohima, the Naga Club submitted a memorandum and requested that the Naga Hills should be kept outside the scheme of political reforms. It shows that a collective consciousness of Naga identity and solidarity had grown among the Naga tribespersons. The next landmark in the historical background of the Naga movement was the formation of the Naga Hills District Tribal Council in 1945 whose title was changed to the Naga National Council (NNC) in 1946. The NNC is said to have given a sense of ethnic and geopolitical unity to the Naga tribes. In 1946, the British government planned to carve out a trust territory comprising Naga Hills, the then North-East Frontier Agency area and a part of what was then Burma (now Myanmar) as a “crown colony” under the control of London. Coupland proposed joint responsibility of the British and independent Indian and Burmese governments for their territory after the transfer of power from the British. However, the NNC opposed this idea of extended British colonisation (Das 1982, 1993: 33 qtd in Kikhi 2017: 599–600).

The goals and objectives of the Naga movement from 1947 onwards had developed through a number of phases. From 1947 to 1954, the Naga Hills remained comparatively peaceful. In 1948, when Phizo was elected president of the NNC, its goals and temper had changed in favour of “independence.” Thus, in opposition to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, the 1951 elections, to constitute the district councils, and the general elections of 1952 were boycotted. However, it was in 1954 that violence became widespread. In March 1956, certain sections of the Nagas established a “Naga Federal Government” while a section of the liberal Nagas resigned from the NNC and sought to bring the conflict to an early end through peaceful negotiations. In 1957, the Baptist Church came out with a condemnation of the violence. As a result of these new developments, the All Tribes Naga People’s Convention was constituted.

The Naga struggle encompasses a unique history and an extensive track of ethnic–political mobilisation. The Nagas have argued that Naga nationalism is a political issue, and not an issue of economic egoism or internal economic colonialism. The demand for the change of status is political, and therefore, a political framework is required to resolve it. Ethnic nationalist movements, such as Naga nationalism, persist ­because their objective is to determine the future of ethnic communities, whether it be autonomy within states, or as a separate independent state. What is important is not the amount of power one has, but the limitation of power. Assertions or negations of this political power have motivated and sustained ethno-nationalist movements in many parts of the world.

Naga nationalism in post-independent India: The evolution of Naga nationalism after Indian independence has to be ­understood by exploring how the Indian government has ­managed the conflict (Lotha 2009, 2013). Thus, Nagas have been seen as a threat to Indian nation-building. India claims it inherited the Naga Hills from the British and considers the Naga conflict as a law and order problem led by misguided persons. From the beginning, India has approached the Naga issue with a colonial mindset towards minorities and ethnic groups and has perpetuated the conflict. From the nine-point agreement signed between the Government of India and the NNC on 9 June 1947 to the constitutional amendments, ceasefire political talks and the latest framework agreements, the ­Indian government has tried to manage the Indo–Naga conflict. But, the question is: Has India been able to manage it correctly and successfully (Kikhi 2010: 149, 2017: 601–02)?

Both the Nagas and the central government have failed to understand or rather, have underestimated each other. On the one hand, bureaucrats in Delhi failed to appreciate the wishes and stand of Naga pioneers for separate regulation on the basis of its unique history and identity. On the other hand, Nagas misjudged Delhi’s interpretation of its demands, whereby India sees Nagas as a colonial legacy and the Naga territory as an integral part of the Indian state. Before the Nagas realised what was happening, the struggle gave birth to the state of Nagaland, which was not agreeable to a majority of the Nagas. The state was Delhi’s response to the challenge and crisis the Nagas presented to the newly established Indian republic. B K Nehru, speaking from his experiences as the governor of Nagaland, said that the state was hastily conceived. Today, both Delhi and the Nagas need the state equally, pending a settlement (Iralu 2009: 22–23).

Ceasefire and its impact on the Naga struggle: Ceasefire and ceasefire talks have brought peace in the state, and yet, ceasefire and extortion are intertwined today, discouraging private investment and development. Extortion has become a serious issue affecting the economy of every household. Statements like “they” are extorting from the “outsiders” or “non-locals” are not rational. No businessperson (irrespective of being an outsider or insider) is foolish to run their business at a loss but rather will have to revise the price of every commodity in their shop to make up the extorted money besides making profit. The question is: Who is actually paying for the extorted money? It is understood that ceasefire has “ground rules,” it legitimises the cessation of hostilities and gives dialogue a chance. But, does it serve any purpose and whose purpose does it serve? When the ground rules are not maintained, it appears like the Indian government is trying to buy more time or apply delay tactics to neutralise the issue or expecting it to die naturally. On the other hand, the underground factional groups should not use ceasefire as a means to openly extort money (Kikhi 2009: 358–59).

In the midst of the ceasefire, factions of the Naga struggle have been criticising one another through newspapers, carrying out mutual assassinations and ceaselessly collecting taxes, each group sequestered in their hate and their respective camps. The rest of the Nagas continue to wait and watch helplessly, not knowing how to transform these conflicts into honest conversations and dialogues to evolve the solutions they need. Because non-combatants are used to the traditional securities of their tribes, they are not transparent in their interactions with one another. Reaching out to one another across divides of distrust, uncertainties and ill-will to create the envisioned Naga identity is ineffective. Given that “the broad-based political package” offered by the Government of India, declared by then Union Home Secretary G K Pillai, seems to have vanished, we need solutions as soon as possible.

Framework accord and new situations: The latest “Naga Peace Accord” or the popular Framework Accord signed on 3 August 2015 after 80 rounds of talk between the Indian government and the NSCN(IM) has been stated as the beginning of a new future and an end to the Indo–Naga problem. This pact gives hope of a solution giving Naga identity a legitimacy, whereby both the Indian government and the group appreciate and respect each other’s positions and difficulties. While some scholars have stressed that there is an urgent need to end the Naga problem, some scholars have raised questions on whether this pact has the best possible offer for both India and the Nagas.

The pact has not made it0 clear whether the agreement meets the demand of the NSCN(IM) for integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the North East stretching across Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. This claim has counterclaims, which eventually evoke deeply resentful responses from other ethnic groups in the North East. For that matter, Tarun Gogoi and Okram Ibobi Singh banked on the Assam and Manipur territorial integrity issue respectively as the main factor to garner support for their three consecutive chief ministerial terms. A group of Naga scholars are of the opinion that “integration” or “no-integration” should be decided by the people themselves through a plebiscite as in the case of Scotland voting for departure from the United Kingdom. In the words of V S Atem, there is no “Greater Nagaland or Smaller Nagaland.” He maintained that the Nagas were divided by “arbitrary orders” of the British government and subsequently, the Indian government, and called for returning the land belonging to the Nagas. On the opposition raised by the chief ministers of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur on the integration of all Naga inhabited areas, the NSCN(IM) leader said the Nagas’ problem could not be solved through “Manipuri interest or Assamese interest.” Atem added, “We are not trying to grab any Manipur land or Assamese land,” nor was NSCN(IM) infringing on the life of the Assamese or Manipuris or any other people, but “we (the Nagas) were fighting for our right” (Nagaland Post 2015).

There are other scholars who have argued that the journey of the Naga struggle is a difficult one and mention that sustaining the movement itself is a success. The Nagas, while striving for a unified Naga identity, had witnessed several shifts and changing phases. The procedure has spilled over to many other problems or, at the least, has intensified some existing issues. The Naga Hoho, the apex civil society body of the Nagas, and its constituent Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) have been unsuccessful in bringing about a reconciliation among the several factions of Naga militias divided along the tribal lines or factional loyalties that override ethnicity. Much more than man-made lines on maps, the major challenge towards building a cohesive political unit is a fragmented identity engaged in internecine strife with bloodied consequences, which is in opposition to the larger Naga identity.

There are several models, both old and new, that could serve as examples on a comparable scale for political solidarity amongst geographically neighbouring people with similar but subtly varied cultures. Most of these cultures are also in a disadvantageous juxtaposition due to external impositions of state administrations and territorial demarcations, with serious implications for the traditional homeland set-up of these ethnic groups. There are instances of affiliated ethnic groups and tribal clans seeking common ground for collective political goals. For instance, the six nations in North America, also called the Iroquois, was a confederacy of different Native American ethnic groups. Today this powerful super group has unified independent governance, and live both in the United States (US) and Canada. Like the Iroquois, the Nagas can form a common supranational or transnational structure that provides a common platform to their way of life and traditions (Goswami 2014).

In contrast to the success of the Iroquois was the Great Sioux Nation made up of several ethnic groups whose traditional homeland once spanned across thousands of square kilometres in the Great Plains of the US and Canada. The Sioux, being formidable warriors but divided along loyalties, lost a major chunk of their territories to the invading US military, including the Black Hills, which have been sacred grounds since ancient times for the Sioux and remains lost to them even today. Currently, they live in scattered reservations on the land of their ancestors. In 2007, a group of Sioux travelled to Washington DC to reassert their independence and sovereignty. More ­recently, the multinational struggle of the Kurds in West Asia (the Kurds of Kurdistan) is currently a nation in the making in a transborder conflict zone contiguous with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Bhutan, which has several ethnic groups with one dominant group controlled by the absolute monarchy, made a successful transition from monarchy to a constitutional democracy (Goswami 2014). Some of these models with further insightful research can be referred to as exemplary models for the Indo–Naga solution to bring permanent peace to this region of the North East.

What Do Nagas Negotiate For?

The contents of the “framework pact” or what has to be negotiated needs to be thoroughly and critically examined. If the framework solution is bargained or negotiated with just special economic packages, then the Nagaland government’s experience has not been good. For that matter, the closure of Dimapur Sugar Mill and Tuli Paper Mill in Nagaland clearly reflects that Nagas have failed to sustain or manage the small number of small-scale industries they had. More generally, one can question how many governmental projects could be sustained at present, and whether the state in Nagaland can adopt its own development models.

It is in this context that it is necessary to critically question the flow of money in the form of special economic packages earmarked for the state from the successive central governments. The state continues to decelerate despite several special economic packages, such as the `365 crore Peace Bonus Package by the National Democratic Alliance-I government. These huge funds from the federal exchequer were pocketed by local elites who have emerged as the alternative competing elites. As stated earlier, this abundance of money injected into the economy without due accountability has created a regime of corruption that has institutionalised a corrupted system, engendering a parasitic government and a parasitic society (Kikhi 2009: 356).

The special economic packages have also affected the agricultural economy. Today, the Nagas have incorporated a culture of dependency in their everyday lives. The Nagas are told that their forefathers were very hard-working and that every family was self-sufficient. But are they self-reliant today? Many full-time farmers of the day are not cultivating enough to feed themselves for the entire year, let alone generating a surplus. Can the Nagas survive if food supplies coming into the state from the other states are clogged? Even if it survives, how long can it sustain? We cannot trust the state when it ­itself has become a problem. Given the situation, the common public and present youth seem to be frustrated with multiple issues that have manifested at several occasions. Nagaland urgently needs a vision for the public, especially the educated unemployed youth, and their future.

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Updated On : 9th Jun, 2020

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