DISCUSSION
Rise of ‘New Landlords’
A Rejoinder
Bhim Reddy, Abhishek Shaw
ownership holdings (NSSO Reports 331, 407, 419, 492, 500).
Did Agricultural Conditions Affect Tenancy?
The year 2002-03 witnessed a decline in the total cropped area. Vijay uses this re-
Disagreeing with R Vijay’s “Structural Retrogression and Rise of ‘New Landlords’ in Indian Agriculture: An Empirical Exercise” (EPW, 4 February 2012), the authors argue that the explanation for declining tenancy may not hold and that the hypothesis on the emergence of “new landlords” and the importance of tenancy can be explained by the changing terms of tenancy in the country.
Bhim Reddy (bhim.hyd@gmail.com) is a PhD student at the department of anthropology, University of Hyderabad and Abhishek Shaw (abhishekshaw@gmail.com) has completed an MA in economics from University of Hyderabad.
I
The longitudinal evidence (the NSSO’s decennial rounds on assets and liabilities between 1981-82 and 2002-03), however, does not support his hypothesis, while the data presented in a crosssectional village study of 10 villages in Andhra Pradesh reveals the signifi cance of tenancy in cultivation. Based on evidence from the village studies, he contends that the declining trend in tenancy suggested by NSSO’s data is counterfactual. He attributes this inconsistency to a decline in the land lease market due to inconducive agricultural conditions in the survey year (2002-03). We argue that his explanation for declining tenancy may not hold and that his hypothesis on the emergence of “new landlords” and the importance of tenancy can be explained by the changing terms of tenancy. The following discussion on tenancy is based on the NSSO’s decennial data on assets and liabilities and its reports on operational holdings and
may 26, 2012
duction to account for a decline in the land lease market. But, first, if one looks at the decline in tenant holdings in total operational holdings, it was higher in 1991-92 over 1981-82, at 4.2%, while it was only 1.1% in 2002-03 over 1991-92. Despite a higher decline of tenant holdings in the former decennial survey, the area under tenancy increased by 1.1% and fell by 1.8% in the latter one, due to an increase and a decrease respectively of large tenant holdings. This variation was caused by signifi cant fl uctuations in reverse tenancy. Further, we argue that the lease market may decline after a bad agricultural year but not in the same year. This is because lease contracts are made at the end of an agricultural year (tenancy for each year is decided after the previous year’s harvest), not after seeing if agro-climatic conditions are favourable or not. If 2001-02 is examined, the cropped area and the production were similar to that of the previous couple of years, which witnessed higher agricultural production compared with the decadal average production for 1991-2000.
Therefore, we do not see a possibility of decline in the survey year, but it could have affected the lease market the next year. If, for the sake of argument, the decline in cropped area indicates a decline in tenancy, then, stretching the same logic, one may infer a decline in cultivators as well. Owing to non-cultivation of land, a section of cultivator households should have declared that they were not operating any land. If this was so, the decline in cultivators and a relative increase in NCPHs based on the same survey are questionable. This would imply that the relative increase in NCPHs is not signifi cant enough for Vijay’s argument to hold.
NCPHs and New Forms of Tenancy
Independent of Vijay’s explanation of the decline in tenancy indicated by NSSO
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to the evolving fixed-rent norms if he has we argue that these two forms are qualito lease in land. The feudal character that tatively different and the trends have to persisted in sharecropping may not be be seen separately. explicitly entwined in the new tenancy It should be noted that fi xed-rent tenrelation, but it may continue to be exploit-ancy was a dominant form compared to ative. Even reverse tenancy has been sharecropping until the 1960s, a characknown to be reverse exploitative. Thus, teristic of absentee landlordism. In 1961,
Table 1: Percentage of Area Operated by Terms of Lease
State | Survey Years | Fixed Money | Fixed Produce | Share of Produce | Other* |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
(% share) | (% share) | (% share) | (% share) | ||
Andhra Pradesh | 2002-03 | 31.6 | 37.9 | 24.0 | 6.5 |
1991-92 | 25.9 | 26.8 | 28.9 | 18.4 | |
1981-82 | 13.0 | 11.1 | 8.8 | 67.1 | |
Assam | 2002-03 | 15.8 | 3.6 | 55.0 | 25.6 |
1991-92 | 17.0 | 4.0 | 27.8 | 51.2 | |
1981-82 | 15.4 | 8.4 | 35.3 | 40.9 | |
Bihar | 2002-03 | 12.0 | 17.5 | 67.0 | 3.5 |
1991-92 | 9.5 | 12.8 | 43.5 | 34.2 | |
1981-82 | 6.5 | 3.6 | 73.3 | 16.6 | |
Gujarat | 2002-03 | 10.7 | 46.3 | 37.9 | 5.1 |
1991-92 | 39.9 | 1.6 | 23.7 | 34.8 | |
1981-82 | 5.1 | 0.5 | 9.7 | 84.7 | |
Haryana | 2002-03 | 71.2 | 9.8 | 15.8 | 3.2 |
1991-92 | 61.4 | 5.2 | 19.9 | 13.5 | |
1981-82 | 24.2 | 10.8 | 41.2 | 23.8 | |
Karnataka | 2002-03 | 32.4 | 41.1 | 24.8 | 1.7 |
1991-92 | 20.4 | 14.7 | 28.6 | 36.3 | |
1981-82 | 3.6 | 4.7 | 29.3 | 62.4 | |
Kerala | 2002-03 | 39.9 | 7.5 | 12.0 | 40.6 |
1991-92 | 15.9 | 0 | 2.1 | 82 | |
1981-82 | 3.4 | 0 | 13.2 | 83.4 | |
Madhya Pradesh | 2002-03 | 18.3 | 32.5 | 39.0 | 10.2 |
1991-92 | 15.3 | 21.4 | 24.9 | 38.4 | |
1981-82 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 27.8 | 69.4 | |
Maharashtra | 2002-03 | 26.2 | 9.0 | 37.5 | 27.3 |
1991-92 | 36.2 | 6.5 | 20.9 | 36.4 | |
1981-82 | 11.0 | 2.3 | 48.5 | 38.2 | |
Orissa | 2002-03 | 11.1 | 7.8 | 73.0 | 8.1 |
1991-92 | 19.7 | 4.7 | 50.9 | 24.7 | |
1981-82 | 5.1 | 8.1 | 42.0 | 44.8 | |
Punjab | 2002-03 | 79.2 | 1.5 | 15.3 | 4 |
1991-92 | 49.2 | 18.2 | 11.3 | 21.3 | |
1981-82 | 42.1 | 4.6 | 39.9 | 13.4 | |
Rajasthan | 2002-03 | 35.0 | 17.7 | 39.3 | 8 |
1991-92 | 15.2 | 19.4 | 23.4 | 42 | |
1981-82 | 3.5 | 1.4 | 21.6 | 73.5 | |
Tamil Nadu | 2002-03 | 32.0 | 30.0 | 22.9 | 15.1 |
1991-92 | 32.4 | 20.5 | 16.1 | 31 | |
1981-82 | 19.2 | 19.9 | 36.5 | 24.4 | |
Uttar Pradesh | 2002-03 | 23.8 | 28.5 | 34.9 | 12.8 |
1991-92 | 9.2 | 15.2 | 46.5 | 29.1 | |
1981-82 | 8.6 | 4.9 | 50.1 | 36.4 | |
West Bengal | 2002-03 | 23.7 | 28.5 | 34.9 | 12.9 |
1991-92 | 8.6 | 11.7 | 46.5 | 33.2 | |
1981-82 | 2.8 | 11.9 | 55.6 | 29.7 |
data, his assertion that NCPHs are increasing in importance is convincing. This also reaffirms the importance of tenancy as a method of cultivation. This assertion, we argue, is convincing not when one looks at tenancy as a whole but at the emerging forms of tenancy along with the coming of NCPHs. One finds a decrease in tenancy as a whole but an increase in fixed-rent tenancy forms. The decrease in tenancy is because of a signifi cant decrease of sharecropping. But there is a substantial increase in fi xed-rent tenancy. The move from sharecropping to fi xed tenancy agreements is growing and seems to be linked to the emergence of “new landlords” who are moving out of cultivation due to alternative opportunities.
Separating the emerging forms of tenancy from the older forms in agriculturally developed states that are witnessing a higher rate of increase in NCPHs is imperative because these forms are qualitatively different. In sharecropping, the landowner partly shared the burden of uncertainties in agricultural production arising from climatic and market conditions. If he undertook any capital investment, he was at risk of low returns and
losses. It also required monitoring cultivation to ensure maximum returns. Tenants, on the other hand, had feudal obligations to the landowner. Sharecropping was in many cases found to be similar to systems that entailed attached labour (Bardhan 1976); to maximise indirect exploitation of tenants’ family labour (Bharadwaj and Das 1975). In the new form of fixed-rent tenancy, the landowner is ensured a fixed rent, mostly in advance if it is in the form of money, without any of the burden that was involved in sharecropping. The “new landlords” who are engaged in other economic activities may not want to supervise agricultural production and may prefer being paid a fixed rent in money. If they are involved in agricultural processing and trading, with interlocked markets, they may prefer a fixed rent in kind (Vakulabharanam et al 2011). A tenant in
the new fixed-rent form, especially in India 2002-03 29.5 20.3 40.3 9.9the case of reverse tenancy, may refuse to 1991-92 19.9 14.5 34.4 31.2
1981-82 10.9 6.3 41.9 40.9
conform to the obligations involved in the
* Other includes (i) under service contract; (ii) for share of produce together with other terms; (iii) under usufructuary
old form and prefer acting independently.
mortgage; (iv) from relatives under no specific terms. Or, a poor tenant may be forced to adhere Source: Data compiled from NSSO reports 407, 492.
Economic & Political Weekly
EPW
DISCUSSION
the area under fixed-rent tenancy and | tenancy continued to rise. One possible |
sharecropping was 38.5% and 38.2% re | explanation for this is the high incidence |
spectively. Because of land reforms, the | of reverse tenancy in these two states. Of |
fixed-rent form decreased drastically | the total area leased-in, tenant holdings |
and sharecropping emerged as the main | operating five hectares and more are |
form in India. The new form of fi xed | 55% in Punjab and 43% in Haryana, |
rent tenancy corresponds to the emer | whereas they constitute only 21% of the |
gence of “new landlords”. We do not | total leased-in area at the all-India level. |
suggest a replacement of tenancy con- | Reverse tenancy in the fi xed-rent form |
tracts involving sharecropping with the | has been growing in agriculturally |
new forms. Those that are involved in | developed regions (Singh 1989). The |
the new forms may be different in their | area under fixed-money rent increased |
class character from those involved in | from 24% in 1981-82 to 71% in 2002-03 in |
sharecropping. Statistics reveal that | Haryana and from 42% to 79% in Punjab |
sharecropping is mainly among margin | during the same period. Besides, there |
al tenant holdings, while fi xed forms | has been a shift towards fi xed-rent |
are mostly among larger holdings. This | tenancy in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu |
suggests that marginal tenants are un | and West Bengal, which have a higher |
able, due to lack of capital, to enter into | number of non-cultivating households, a |
fi xed-rent tenancy. | growing share of NCPHs and an increas |
ing concentration of land in their hands. | |
Rise in Fixed-Rent Tenancy | The area under fixed rent (money and |
As mentioned, we see a correlation | produce) has increased from 24% to |
between the emergence of the “new | 70% in Andhra Pradesh, from 39% to |
landlords” and the appearance of new | 62% in Tamil Nadu and from 14% to 52% |
forms of tenancy in India. Vijay shows | in West Bengal. It is important to note |
that households in the farm sector | that even West Bengal, a state known for |
declined between 1981-82 and 2002-03 | sharecropping and strict tenancy laws, |
at the all-India level. Simultaneously, | conforms to the trend. Karnataka is no |
there was an increase in NCPHs. We | exception, with an increase in fi xed-rent |
point out that terms of lease were chang | tenancy from 8% to 74%. Uttar Pradesh, |
ing at the all-India level during the same | Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan also show |
period and they had to do with the | clear shifts towards fi xed-rent tenancy. |
various tenancy forms – fi xed money, | On the other hand, while there was a |
fixed produce, share of produce (share | 7% fall in sharecropping between 1981 |
cropping) and others (Table 1, p 127). | and 1991, it increased by 6% between |
There was a growth of 9% in the area | 1991 and 2002. This increase was be |
operated under fixed-money tenancy in | cause of trends in Odisha, Bihar, Maha |
both decennials (1981-91, 1991-2002) and | rashtra, Gujarat and Assam. However, in |
a growth of around 8% and 6% in fi xed- | Bihar, fixed-rent tenancy also rose dur |
produce tenancy respectively. So there | ing this period. Gujarat had a rise in |
was a clear rise of fi xed-rent tenancy | sharecropping and fi xed-produce tenancy, |
(money and produce) in the states | but a fall in fixed-money tenancy. While |
known to be agriculturally developed. | Odisha showed a clear trend of growing |
A closer look shows that states where | sharecropping and a decrease in other |
the farm sector declined between 1981 | forms, Maharashtra and Assam fl uctua ted |
and 1991 such as Punjab, Tamil Nadu | between fixed tenancy and sharecropping. |
and Kerala had a growth in fi xed-money | The specifics of each region must be |
and fixed-produce tenancy. Kerala is a | looked at to find reasons for these |
special case, with tenancy moving to kin | trends. In most states, the area under |
groups without specific terms of lease. | sharecropping as well as under other |
This could be due to the strict tenancy | forms of tenancy has fallen. But there |
regulations in the state. In Punjab and | has been a clear rise in fi xed-money and |
Haryana, there was a decline in non | fixed-produce tenancy in states where |
cultivating households between 1991 and | there has been a rise in NCPHs. This |
2002, unlike other states. Yet, fi xed-money | reaffirms the growing signifi cance of |
128 | may 26, 2012 |
the “new landlords” in the land lease market, as emphasised by Vijay.
New Landlords?
One must bear in mind that the increase in landed non-cultivating households could indicate agrarian distress. For instance, a section of small and marginal landowning households may move to non-farm wage employment in a rural area. This may have been the case in some semi-arid regions that show an increase in fallow land. It would be more meaningful to examine the phenomenon of increasing non-cultivating landowners by region and class. Given the variation within and between states, using only the criterion of “value of land” to identify NCPHs as “new landlords” may be an overgeneralisation. While the category of “new landlords” exists in most agriculturally developing states, there is, interestingly, no explanation about the peculiar character of NCPHs in Punjab and Haryana. Both states have a high number of NCPHs, but a relatively low concentration of land in their hands and an increasing number of cultivators. Why is this so in the most agriculturally developed states in India? Could it be due to widespread reverse tenancy? Can the NCPHs in Punjab and Haryana be termed “new landlords” because they seem to be the marginal landowners catering to tenancy of the reverse kind?
References
Bardhan, P (1976): “Variation in Extent and Forms of Agricultural Tenancy – II, Analysis of Indian Data across Regions and Over Time”, Economic & Political Weekly, 18 September, pp 1541-46.
Bharadwaj, K and P K Das (1975): “Tenurial Conditions and Mode of Exploitation – Study of Some Villages in Orissa: Further Notes”, Economic & Political Weekly, June, pp A49-A55.
National Sample Survey Organisation (1996): “Operational Holding in India 1991-92: Salient Features”, 48th round, Report 407.
Singh, I (1989): “Reverse Tenancy in Punjab Agriculture: Impact of Technological Change”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 24, No 25, pp A86-A92.
Vakulabharanam, V et al (2011): “Understanding the Andhra Crop Holiday Movement”, Econo mic & Political Weekly, Vol 46, No 50, pp 13-16.
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