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Atrocities in Norway

What is this environment in Norway in which a man like Anders Behring Breivik can go on a carefully planned killing of 77 people? Breivik developed his ideas at a time when fringe groups and thinkers were able to develop a feeling of Islamophobia in Norwegian society. Conservative political parties in Norway too argue that Islamist forces have entrenched themselves as enclaves in society. However, after the horror of 22 July, there have been concerns about Islamophobic sentiments in public media and forums. Perhaps in the end the wake-up call that Breivik sought may have the opposite effect of what he intended.

disconcerting that Behring Breivik’s main

Atrocities in Norway

source of inspiration, a blogger going by the name of Fjordman, expresses sympathy with Hindu nationalists, claiming that Kristin Hanssen they fight a common cause in battling

What is this environment in Norway in which a man like Anders Behring Breivik can go on a carefully planned killing of 77 people? Breivik developed his ideas at a time when fringe groups and thinkers were able to develop a feeling of Islamophobia in Norwegian society. Conservative political parties in Norway too argue that Islamist forces have entrenched themselves as enclaves in society. However, after the horror of 22 July, there have been concerns about Islamophobic sentiments in public media and forums. Perhaps in the end the wake-up call that Breivik sought may have the opposite effect of what he intended.

Kristin Hanssen (kristhanss@hotmail.com) is at the University of Oslo.

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW
september 24, 2011

A
friend of mine, a Palestinian, suffered minor injuries when a massive bomb exploded in Oslo’s g overnmental district on 22 July. Bleeding, he went home, turned on the TV and then learned about another horror taking place, someone shooting people dead, mainly teenagers attending the Labour Party’s youth camp on the island Utøya. Like many others, he jumped to conclusions, believing that a network of Islamists were repsonsible for the carnage. He assumed that all was lost, that he would lose his job, and be forced to leave the country. Deeply shocked but also tremendously relieved, he finished all the liquor he had in his apartment when it transpired that the killer was Norwegian.

In the week that followed, the nation was in mourning. To honour those who had been killed, red roses (the Labour P arty’s symbol), were stuck into the wire fence enclosing the governmental district. A sea of roses, but also teddy bears, handwritten notes and candles accumulated in front of the cathedral. One person that I spoke to termed the atmosphere electric. Another person said, “Perhaps it’s in my mind, but people seem much nicer”. In fact, my Palestinian friend reported that during the ensuing week a number of women and men embraced him on learning that his first name is Mohammad.

A question that arises is how could this have happened in a small and wealthy country, where unemployment rates amount to little more than 3%? The terrorist b ehind the bomb and the ensuing massacre at Utøya, called Anders Behring Breivik, grew up in a well-to-do suburb in the western part of Oslo, with all the assets that this environment presumably entails.

The ideas that inform Behring Breivik’s so-called manifesto, and which inspired him to kill are not uncommon, but reflect the rise of anti-Muslim sentiments all over Europe. Those familiar with political d evelopments in India may also find it

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I slam. Muslims are portrayed as foreigners, akin “to occupying forces”. Envisoned as a unified collective that is swiftly multiplying, Muslims are imagined to be relentlessly pursuing the goal of conquering non-Muslim populations. Those unwilling to acknowledge this are termed naive. The Norwegian left, the cultural elite and the establishment at large, dubbed “Cultural Marxists” in Behring Breivik’s manifesto, are accused of being traitors, willingly succumbing to a global Islamist conspiracy.

Immigration into Norway

Norway is a small country. Its population is approximately five million with first and second generation immigrants counting 600,900. Of these, 41% have lived in Norway less than five years, a set of circumstances which might conceivably give rise to social instability and thus explain the Islamophobic views expressed in Behring Breivik’s rambling.

Yet, most immigrants in Norway come from European countries, including Poland, Lithuania, Sweden and Germany. They arrived after the expansion of the European Union in 2004. Immigrants who came prior to this year have come from Denmark, Pakistan and Vietnam, in which six of 10, who trace their origin outside of Europe, have lived in Norway more than 20 years.

Pakistanis constitute the largest number of first and second generation immigrants with roots outside Europe (21,600 all in all). Responding to an invitation from the government, they came as guest workers towards the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Immigration on the basis of employment was, however, halted in 1975. The second wave of immigration involved family reunions, and took place in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, those with roots outside E urope have been required to enter as r efugees seeking political asylum. Most are from Somalia, Iraq, Iran and the Baltic nations.

The largest group of immigrants in N orway, then, comprise Europeans who self-identify as Christian, secular or both, and who despite their numbers are not considered problematic. By contrast, Muslims are assigned the burden of being carriers of difference, reminding the majority that the nation is not whole, which is to say that their very presence, albeit small, signifies the nation state’s incompleteness, creating an anxiety of vulnerability and fragmentation (Appadurai in Boe and Hervik 2008: 215), as the following comment posted on a net edition of a major newspaper makes clear:

The point about today’s Oslo is that its current population is slowly dying out, and that new strangers are replacing the older population. A lot of people do not like this. What is wrong with saying so? (An anonymous reader of the paper Dagsavisen: 28 August 2010).

Most messages are harsher. Muslims are explicitly accused of exploiting the welfare system, and Islam is represented as an ideology comparable to Fascism and Nazism, in which left winged politicians (particularly Labour Party politicians) as well as the establishment at large are faulted for withholding information about the actual number of immigrants and refugees entering the country.

The Internet

The internet constitutes the main site where Islamophobic views are voiced, and corresponds to what Susan Dewey calls a “parallel public sphere”, a concept she has introduced to illuminate the ways in which marginal groups participate anonymously in popular culture forums to resolve and exchange views on issues held to be taboo (Dewey 2009: 125). Seeking advice or voicing one’s opinion anonomously provides a person with a sense of group b elonging, which “can be empowering”, but which also serves to reinforce already entrenched values and opinions (ibid).

Of course, anti-Muslim views extend beyond the parallel public sphere. Authors such as Bat Ye’or (a pseudonym) and a host of others (including Oriana Fallaci, Bruce Bawer, Mark Steyn, Melanie Phillips, Walter Laqueur, and Bruce Thornton), have all had their books issued by renowned publishers.

These writers represent themselves as whistle-blowers, in which their publications are supposed to be a wake-up call, alerting people to the scenario that west Europe, is slowly being conquered by Muslim immigrants.

Although their books are rarely read by the Norwegian mainstream, bloggers such as Fjordman successfully promote and disseminate Islamophobic views to a larger audience. Judging from the style of their postings, the aim is not to refine their arguments but to produce as many online messages as possible. By airing them in public, their opinions set the tone, which means that boundaries are pushed. At the same time, writers, editors and politicians have increasingly (in some cases perhaps even unwittingly) adopted a rhetoric of Muslims as a potentially violent homogeneous collective. The portraits drawn give little room for nuances and variation, and contribute indirectly to influence and shape mainstream views of Muslim immigrants.

Norway’s counterpart to writers such as Melanie Phillips is Hege Storhaug. A prolific

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PERSPECTIVES

spokesperson for a Norwegian think tank called The Human Rights Service, she purports to be concerned with safeguarding the rights of Muslims, particularly the rights of Muslim women whom she identifies as victims of Islamic oppression. She takes an active part in media d ebates, but has also published several books on issues that she frames as Muslim, focusing on practices like veiling, circumcision, forced marriages, and freedom of speech.

To legitimate her anti-Muslim views, Storhaug, like other writers, makes extensive references to Somali born Hirsi Ali and Ibn Warraq of Pakistani origin. Having publicly rejected their prior ways in order to embrace “our” western values, the two are represented as role models for succesful integration, where to integrate is to renounce Islam (Boe and Hervik 2008: 227, 228). Islam is represented as e ssentially alien, the implication being that to be at once Muslim and European is unfeasible, even unthinkable.

Yet, Europe and Islam are not completely separate; they share a common history, reaching back to the eighth century. Southern Spain, Sicily, and central and south-eastern Europe were all subsumed within Islamic empires. The Renaissance in Europe emerged in part from an interchange of views between Christian, J ewish and Muslim scholars who worked in southern Spain. After “Muslims lost Granada in 1492”, vast areas of Europe were ruled by the Ottoman Empire, from the 15th to the 19th centuries, when “it managed multiple religious populations according to Islamic principles” (Özyürek 2005: 511). Esra Özyürek notes that to better current ties between “Muslims, Jews, and Christians in Europe and in former colonies, it is necessary for hegemonic Christians” and persons who identify themselves as secular, to r ecognise this common ground by attending to “the integral relationship between European and Islamic cultures” (ibid).

Lack of Historical Insight

The utter lack of historical insight of writers such as Storhaug constitutes a problem insofar as no attempt is made to deal with and make sense of the “particular historical encounters and struggles that generate specific forms of (oppositional) politics”.

Economic Political Weekly

EPW
september 24, 2011

Nor is there any interest in “the specific i nstitutional structures that house those forms of politics and their historical regime” (El Haj 2005: 542). Exclusive attention is devoted to the universal aspect of Islam, while the numerous religious bodies, Sufi coalitions, the teachings of particular shaykhs, scholars and saints, and Islam’s division into different schools and separate sects is overlooked. So too are the multitude of contexts in which Muslims are embedded. Whether Somalian, Iraqi or Indonesian, Muslims are described as inherently identical.

Storhaug writes: “The Western world has managed to secularise Christianity and thus create democracies with elected governments and human made laws”. She asks, “Is there something crucial in the nature of Christianity that is lacking in Islam?” Not surprisingly she states that something crucial is indeed amiss, that in contrast to Islam, Christianity has paved the way for the reformation, the Renaissance, and the enlightenment, and by implication the creation of secular democracies (Storhaug 2006: 183).

To elaborate her point, Storhaug writes,

I will limit this discussion to some central i ssues. One concerns the question of consciousness and guilt, the other is about r esistance – beginning with resistance to God. God ordered Abraham to sacrifice his son Isac, Abraham becomes uncertain, and struggles with himself and with God’s decree. What this means is that in Western religious traditions a space has been established for uncertainty and scepticism. But this space was not created in Islam. The Koran tells the same story about Abraham, but lays no stress on Abraham’s resistance and uncertainty [since] in Islam submission and surrender is everything (Storhaug 2006: 184).

Storhaug employs the Bible to exemplify her views, even as she notes that she is not particularly fond of Christian conservative thought, nor is she a personal believer (Storhaug 2006: 247).

“Nevertheless” [she says], “I could not help but sympathise with Vebjørn Selbekk, the editor of the Christian journal Magazinet”... He has never posed a threat to secular democracies, yet the government behaved as though he was extreme when requesting him to apologise to the Islamic Council Norway for printing the Mohammad cartoons. Having made his apology, the Council then assured him their protection. In other

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words, he would not be assasinated. In so doing, the Council assumed the role of a judicial authority operating from within the state. The government did not interfere. Instead it was appeased. The government surrendered to Islam, an Islam which in itself signifies surrender (Storhaug 2006: 248).

Although overly simplistic and preposterous, I believe that the persuasiveness of Storhaug’s argument lies in her depiction of Islam and Christianity as culturally distinct. As indicated by the quote just cited, the logic is: Because Islam requires Muslims to surrender, it leaves no scope for rationality, resistance and modernity, v alues which she claims emanate from Christianity.

Matti Bunzl’s observations are instructive. He notes that Islamophobic views in Europe “are filtered through a specifically Christian lens”. As such, the difference that Muslim immigrants evoke and represent is not “somatically essentialised” (Bunzl 2005: 536). Even as the discourses unfolding echo “traditional religious antagonism”, concerns are framed as cultural, rather than religious (Bunzl 2005: 535), pace the now familiar notion that Europeans are “culturally Christian” which is to say that they embrace Christian values without being believers.

The portrayal of Islam and Christianity as incompatible and separate is moreover premised on the notion that cultures and religions are pure and bounded wholes. Muslim practices and customs are defined as culturally contingent, the assumption being that since culture can be learned it can also be unlearned, and that the key to successful integration lies in one’s willingness to shed one’s cultural identity.

Cultural Relativism

As an anthropologist who has conducted research in West Bengal, some friends of mine, both European and American, a ssume that I am a “cultural relativist”. While this puzzled me at first, I have since realised that the term has been appropriated by the mainstream to signify a stance which postulates that all cultures and religions should be rated as equally valid – that one custom is as good as any other – an understanding that does not take n otice of the context in which the concept of cultural relativism developed.

In fact, the term cultural relativism was initially employed to counter scientific racism and ethnocentric evolutionism which posited that western culture is superior and more evolved than other cultures. The concept, then, was never meant to be a vehicle for evaluation. On the contrary, its usefulness lay in viewing culture in its own terms, allowing scholars to elucidate a given custom by analysing it in light of other local practices and norms. Thus, contemporary dowry practices in, e g, West Bengal, make sense when they are examined in terms of patriarchal structures. It does not follow that to clarify the meaning of a custom is to condone it. The point is to explain, “not judge”, a given practice with reference to other local practices and norms (Barnard and Spencer 1996: 136, 138).

But since the concept easily gives rise to the assumption that cultures constitute homogeneous coherent wholes, its usefulness has long been questioned and critiqued,

beginning with the 1980s. Indeed, given its heuristic limitations, the term is seldom used by anthropologists. Nonetheless, a distorted reading of the term figures

centrally in popular imagination, in media debates, and in books that criticise Islam and Muslim immigrants. As Boe and Hervik note, cultural relativists are identified as traitors who naively dismiss all efforts to critique Islam as racist and Islamophobic (Boe and Hervik 2008: 226).

Another problematic term is “multiculturalism”. Those favourably disposed view it as a model that is supposed to further integration by seeking to accommodate minorities. The rationale behind it is that group belonging is important, but that this is harder to achieve for immigrant m inorities. The State, however, may facilitate a sense of group belonging, e g, by providing people with the opportunity to learn about their heritage in schools, “by showing flexibility regarding dress codes, and by serving food that is halal, kosher or vegetarian in hospitals and prisons” (Døving 2009).

Exercising leniency in order to accommodate minorities would seem a reasonable straightforward aim. What complicates the issue is the mistaken view that cultures are made up of discrete and bounded wholes, that a multicultural society constitutes “a mosaic of communities”, where each and every culture is essentialised and pure (Philips and Nossek 2008: 245). Consistent with this view, immigrants are not perceived as individuals entangled in and grappling with dynamic, shifting and diverse realities, but as specimens or representatives of distinct, essentialised and static cultures (ibid). It follows, then, that to provide immigrant minorities with specific rights, will serve to strengthen already existing boundaries between these different cultures, which will ultimately overshadow and replace the culture held by the majority.

In an article called “Multiculture: A Dream from Disneyland”, the Oslo Progress Party politician Tybring-Gjedde claimed that the Norwegian Labour Party aims to rid the country of Norwegian culture, substituting it with multiculture, in order to establish a miniature UN, a process that will rip our country into shreds (Tybring-Gjedde, Aftenposten, 25 August 2010).

Tybring-Gjedde asks the government: “What is wrong with the Norwegian

culture, since you are determined to replace it with what you call multiculture?

PERSPECTIVES

Why stab our own culture in the back? Which country are you using as a model for the multicultural experiment?” He then a ccused the Labour Party of having opened up the country’s borders, stating:

It is the Labour Party that gives us thousands of new Norwegians from different cultures every single year. It is the Labour Party that ensures that people with a Norwegian culture flee from Oslo’s neighbourhoods, leaving enclaves in which Muslim ignorance, dogmatism and intolerance proliferate (ibid).

Implying that Islam resembles right winged Nazi ideology, Tybring-Gjedde has suggested that Muslim children wear the Star of David annually on 26 November to commemorate the day when 500 Norwegian Jews were sent to Auschwitz in 1942 (Verdens Gang, 3 March 2010). To further underscore the point that Islam comprises an extremist right winged ideo logy, he stated that to dress one’s daughter in a head scarf is comparable to giving her the head gear worn by the Ku Klux Klan (Tybring-Gjedde in Verdens Gang, 27 March 2010).

The idea that society is submitting to Islam is also a scenario invoked by the Progress Party leader Siv Jensen. Like Storhaug, she maintains that Islamist for ces have entrenched themselves as enclaves in society, pressuring the government into giving in to their demands. In a speech delivered three years ago she stated:

If we give in to the demand of serving food that is halal in prisons, if we give in to the demand that Muslim girls should be exempt from taking part in co-gender school gymnastics with Norwegian children, integration will be greatly weakened, creating difficulties 10 years from now.

In the same speech Jensen made a reference to the Swedish city Malmö, claiming that Swedish laws may be replaced by sharia-laws, adding that the police force hardly dares to venture into certain neighbourhoods in Malmø (Dagbladet, 21 February 2009).

Morality Police Force

What is known as the “Morality Police” – allegedly involving older Muslim men patrolling an eastern neighbourhood in downtown Oslo – harassing Muslim youth, created headlines in a number of Norwegian newspapers. No evidence substantiates the claim that a Morality Police actually existed. Even so, Aftenposten stated that the

Economic Political Weekly

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september 24, 2011

problem was a real one insofar as the attention that the topic has received, not least by Muslims, shows that the issue is important (Almlid 2010).

The idea first materialised when Abid Raja (a lawyer and Liberal Party politician) told the media that young Pakistani women had confided that older men were chiding them for dressing scantily (Raja in Aftenposten, 1 January 2010). Soon after, his assertion was confirmed by the comedian Zahid Ali who stated in an interview that the Morality Police has pestered him since he was a teenager. If he lit a cigarette, his relatives were soon informed by tram and taxi drivers with a Pakistani background. “Norway’s greatest intelligence service is Oslo’s transportation system” he said, adding that because he had been threatened on a number of occasions, he fears entering the down-town neighbourhood called Grønland (Aftenposten, 13 January 2010).

Adding fuel to fire, Raja said that some high-rise neighbourhoods outside of downtown Oslo are about to be tranformed into immigrant ghettoes similar to what one finds in France and England, with separate judicial authorities informed by patriarchal attitudes, serving to create a space where Muslims are increasingly becoming radicalised. “All the signs are there”, he said describing the phenomenon as a ticking clock (sic) which will literally explode (Aftenposten, 20 March 2011).

Allowing for some minor friction, there is little evidence that Pakistanis have had difficulties integrating. Indeed Raja himself is an example of success in this regard. That the community of Pakistani immigrants is small, with numbers drawn primarily from Gujrat in north Pakistan, indicates that what Raja and Ali are referring to is somewhat provincial, a case of “elderly ladies behind lace curtains” preoccupied with gossip. In any case, no evidence has surfaced showing that the Morality Police is an organised activity.

Not Unique?

As I stated at the outset, Behring Breivik grew up in the western part of Oslo, in a wealthy suburb. Many have described him as a lone wolf. He claims to have planned his actions for nine years, during which he seems to have retreated to a bubble world,

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self-identifying as a Templar Knight (a Medieval Christian military order). He was a member of the youth section of the Progress Party, but resigned because he thought their attitude towards Muslims lax. He then became a member of the Freemasonry, dressing up in uniforms, and pinning medals on his chest purchased on the net. His dealings with others appears to have been largely confined to online interaction with like-minded people. Not surprisingly, far right winged politicians, bloggers and other writers, whose views Behring Breivik has endorsed, immediately denounced the carnage that he committed.

Since the 22 July incident the website, where messages are in Norwegian, removed a number of extremist postings. But predictably, the Gates of Vienna, where the medium is English, is unaffected by events in Norway.

Anticipating that his identity would be revealed, the blogger Fjordman, whose name is Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen, turned himself in to the police and then stated in an interview that he would henceforth use a different pseudonym. He has however, resumed his writing, leaving yet another message at the Gates of Vienna, complaining of the manner in which he was interrogated, that the police behaved as though he was complicit in the killings.

Debates have recently revolved around freedom of speech. Should one exercise self-censorship, or should one use the freedom to express oneself wisely and responsibly? There is of course no easy answer. Tybring-Gjedde wrote in Aftenposten that he regrets the wording of his prior a rticle on multiculturalism, that he will henceforth modify his formulations. Yet he maintained that his ideas concerning immigration are unchanged (Tybring-Gjedde in Aftenposten, 11 August 2011).

And this it seems to me, is the crux of the debate. Is it the phrasings of one’s a rguments

– moulding discourses – that produces people such as Behring Breivik? Or are their actions primarily prompted by ideas?

In his manifesto, Behring Breivik writes about the usefulness of online networks such as Facebook when attempting to reach out to an ever larger audience, sympathetic to the cause of battling Islam and multiculturalism, in which one’s message should be hammered out repeatedly en masse. The problem is that views reflecting those of Behring Breivik have grown comparatively commonplace. They have been given ample space in mainstream medias and forums, reflected in the views voiced by the centre right in Germany and England as when Angela Merkel and David Cameron recently declared that multiculturalism is a failure. It is the frequency and magnitude with which such views are voiced that is distressing. They generate a twisted picture of reality, creating an imaginary barrier between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslims, which as we have seen, can lead to violence.

What if the man behind the killings had turned out to be a Muslim? Would people have dismissed him as a madman which is how many people choose to view Behring Breivik? Was my friend Mohammad overreacting when he thought that he might have to leave the country? He was. Nevertheless, judging from the tone of the debates prior to the carnage, it seems likely that intolerance towards Muslim immigrants would have grown stronger.

A nationwide poll conducted in July 2009 by Statistics Norway, revealed that attitudes towards immigrants had grown more negative than what had been the case the year before. These data however, were collected at a time when the escalating number of refugees seeking asylum was vigorously debated in the public sphere, which may explain the findings. Long-term developments give room for optimism. They show that in the last nine years, the level of benevolence towards Muslim immigrants increased, suggesting that prejudice is linked to negative portrayals in the public phere. Since 22 July many people have expressed their concern about Islamophobic sentiments in public media and forums. Perhaps the wake-up call that Behring Breivik sought may have the opposite effect of what he intended?

References

Almlid, Ole Erik (2010): Editorial in Aftenposten, 2 February.

Barnard and Spencer (1996): Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Barnard and Spencer (ed.), (London and New York: Routledge).

Boe, Caroline and Peter Hervik (2008): “Integration through Insult?” in Eide, Kunelius and Phillips (ed.), Transnational Media Events: The Mohammed Cartoons and the Imagined Clash of Cvilisation (Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg).

Bunzl, Matti (2005): “Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe”, American Ethnologist, Volume 32, Number 4.

– (2005): “Methods and Politics” in American Ethnologist, Volume 32, Number 4.

Dewey, Susan (2009): “‘Dear Dr Kothari...’: Sexuality, Violence against Women, and the Parallel Public Sphere in India” in American Ethnologist, Volume 36, Number 1.

Døving, Cora Alexa (2009): Gjør deg kjent med islamofobien (Get to know Islamophobia) in: Dagsavisen, 27 March.

El Haj, Nadia Abu (2005): “Edward Said and the Political Present” in American Ethnologist, Volume 32, Number 4.

Philips, Angela and Hillel Nossek (2008): “Ourselves and Our Others: Minority Protest and National Frames in Press Coverage” in Eide, Kunelius and Phillips (ed.), Transnational Media Events: The Mohammed Cartoons and the Imagined Clash of Cvilisation (Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg).

Storhaug, Hege (2006): Men størst av alt er friheten, Kagge Forlag, Oslo.

Tybring-Gjedde in Aftenposten, accessed http://www. aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article4196795.ece

Özyürek (2005): “The Politics of Cultural Unification, Secularism and the Place of Islam in the New Europe” in American Ethnologist, Volume 32, Number 4.

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6JG 5QWVJ #UKCP 0GVYQTM HQT GXGNQROGPV CPF 'PXKTQPOGPVCN 'EQPQOKEU 5#0'' KU C TGIKQPCN PGVYQTM VJCV RTQXKFGU TGUGCTEJ UWRRQTV VQ 5QWVJ #UKCP TGUGCTEJGTU CPF KPUVKVWVKQPU KPVGTGUVGF KP VJG KPVGTEQPPGEVKQP COQPI FGXGNQROGPV PCVWTCN TGUQWTEG WUG CPF VJG GPXKTQPOGPV 5#0'' KU EWTTGPVN[ KPXKVKPI TGUGCTEJ EQPEGRV PQVGU QP VJG 'EQPQOKEU QH 0CVWTCN 4GUQWTEG 7UG CPF 'PXKTQPOGPVCN %JCPIG KP 5QWVJ #UKC %QPEGRV PQVGU KH CEEGRVGF YKNN NGCF VQ CP KPXKVCVKQP VQ UWDOKV C HWNN TGUGCTEJ RTQRQUCN

5#0''TGSWGUVUTGUGCTEJEQPEGRVPQVGUKPVJGCTGCUQHPCVWTCNTGUQWTEGUCPFGPXKTQPOGPVCNGEQPQOKEU4GUGCTEJ VQRKEU ECP EQXGT C XCTKGV[ QH KUUWGU TCPIKPI HTQO VJG GEQPQOKEU QH ENKOCVG EJCPIG
OKVKICVKQP CPF CFCRVCVKQP VQ RQNNWVKQPOCPCIGOGPVXCNWCVKQPQHGPXKTQPOGPVCNUGTXKEGUVQGEQVQWTKUOCPFWTDCPCPFEQCUVCNTGUQWTEGOCPCIGOGPV VQHTCIKNGOQWPVCKPEQPEGTPU4GUGCTEJQPOCETQEQPUKFGTCVKQPUUWEJCUVTCFGCPFVJGGPXKTQPOGPVEQORTGJGPUKXG YGCNVJ CPF KPEQOG CEEQWPVKPI CPF GXCNWCVKQP QH GEQPQOKE CPF GPXKTQPOGPVCN RQNKEKGU YKNN CNUQ DG EQPUKFGTGF 9JKNG5#0''ŏUHQEWUKUQPGPXKTQPOGPVCNOCPCIGOGPVRTQRQUCNUUJQWNFKPENWFGCUVTQPIGEQPQOKEUEQORQPGPV /WNVKFKUEKRNKPCT[RTQLGEVUCTGGPEQWTCIGF+PUVKVWVKQPCNCHſNKCVKQPKUTGSWKTGFHQTTGEGKXKPIUWRRQTV%QPEGRVPQVGUYKNN DG GXCNWCVGF QP VJGKT CECFGOKE OGTKV CPF RQNKE[ UKIPKſECPEG

5#0'' YKNNEQNNGEVRTQRQUCNU VJTQWIJQWV VJG [GCT *QYGXGTVQDG EQPUKFGTGFHQTQWTPGZVTGUGCTEJ EQORGVKVKQP RNGCUGUGPFEQPEGRVPQVGUD[0QXGODGTVJ6JGCXGTCIGITCPVUK\GKPTGEGPV[GCTUJCUDGGP75 HQT QPG VQ VYQ [GCT RTQLGEVU .CTIGT ITCPVU YKNN CNUQ DG EQPUKFGTGF QPN[ KH C OWNVKFKUEKRNKPCT[ VGCO QH PCVWTCN CPF UQEKCNUEKGPVKUVUCTGKPXQNXGFCPFVJGTGKUCENGCTKFGPVKſECVKQPQHTQNGUCPFVCUMU2NGCUGWRNQCFEQPEGRVPQVGUQP 5#0''ŏU YGDUKVG CV YYYUCPFGGQPNKPGQTI YJGTG C UGV QH IWKFGNKPGU HQT FGXGNQRKPI TGUGCTEJ EQPEGRV PQVG KU RQUVGF (QT CFFKVKQPCN SWGTKGU RNGCUG EQPVCEV WU CV KPHQUCPFGGQPNKPGQTI

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