Panglong Conference and Independence

In March 1946, a meeting was convened at Panglong to discuss the possible formation of a unified Burma. Representatives from colonial British, Burma Proper (ethnic Burmans) and Frontier Areas (ethnic minorities) attended the meeting, which became a precursor to the 1947 Panglong agreement. Although the representatives were there to discuss possible formation of a union, the frontier leaders were suspicious about the motives of the Burman leaders. In an attempt to persuade the frontier leaders to join the Union of Burma, ethnic Burman leaders proposed the idea of granting autonomy, which means that the Burmans would not interfere, among others, with the customs and religious practices of the Frontier Areas. Despite the proposition, leaders of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan refused to take part in forming the Union of Burma, and instead discussed the idea of establishing a “Frontier Areas Federation” (Sadan 2008: 388).

The year 1947 was a crucial one for ethnic minorities because they were to decide on their future, that is, whether to join the Union of Burma or not. Some frontier leaders were ready to trust the Burman leaders, but some were still reluctant to do so, fearing that they may lose their identity, culture, and freedom to the majority. Most frontier leaders had a lingering fear about possible domination by the Burmans. Despite suspicion and anxiety, some frontier leaders (the Chins, the Kachins, and the Shans) decided to participate at Panglong conference. When these frontier leaders were invited to write the constitution of

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

the Union of Burma, they were still uncertain about their future (Silverstein 1998: 21).

The ethnic Burman leadership was fully aware that without the cooperation of the frontier areas, there would not be a unified Burma. In order to prove their sincerity about the future of the frontier peoples, the Burman leadership had to persuade both the leadership of the frontier areas and the British administration. There were doubts in the minds of the frontier leaders and the British as to whether or not the Burmans would treat all e thnic nationalities equally in the post-independence era. To clarify the lingering concerns, Aung San, a Burman leader, made a historic statement that reads, “If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat”. This was an assurance that every ethnic group within the Union of Burma would receive equal treatment. Such reassuring remarks from a prominent Burman leader persuaded representatives from the Chin hills, the Kachin hills, and the Shan states to cooperate with the interim Burmese government. Subsequently, 22 representatives from the Frontier Areas (three from the Chin hills, six from the Kachin hills, 13 from the Shan states) and Burma proper represented by Aung San signed the Panglong agreement on 12 February 1947. Four Karens attended the conference as observers. The agreement to form the Union of Burma was a significant achievement and a great success for the lobbying team of the Burman leadership. However, this historic agreement was not meant to end the traditional self-rule of the frontier peoples (Smith 1999: 79).

The expectation at the Panglong conference was that the Chins, the Kachins, and the Shans would attain freedom sooner by cooperating with the interim Burmese government (Universities Historical Research Centre and Innwa Publishing House 1999: 270). However, the spirit of 1947 Panglong agreement is yet to be fulfilled. The demand for autonomy/federalism is an ongoing struggle for minority groups even after 60 years of independence. To continue their movements, ethnic minorities use different forms of campaigns: armed struggles or through non-violent means by lobbying the international community. They establish several advocacy networks to communicate among themselves and with the international community. These organisations include, among others, the Kuki International Forum, the Chin Human Rights Organisation, the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, the Karen Human Rights Group, Human Rights Foundation of Monland, the Shan Women’s Action Network, and the Ethnic Nationalities Council.

Insurgency and Demand for Autonomy/Federalism

Many of the surviving wars today are ethnic conflicts and have a history of persistent battles that have been simmering for decades (Sadowski 1998: 13). U Nu became the first prime minister of independent Burma in 1948 under a volatile political environment. Insurgency problems came along with the country’s independence. The central government was unable to fully integrate the different ethnic minorities, many of whom did not like to join the Union of Burma in the first place. Even the minorities who signed the P anglong agreement were suspicious about the sincerity of ethnic Burmans. The minorities demanded a federal government in which each natio nality would enjoy autonomy (Scherrer 1997: 11).

Civilian Administration

During the first decade of independence, the civilian government led by U Nu made sincere efforts to implement the Panglong agreement and the 1947 constitution. Initially, the U Nu government did not (or interfered very little) in the internal affairs of local governments. For example, each year during Independence Day and Union Day celebrations, representatives from the states

may 14, 2011 vol xlvi no 20

were transported to the capital Rangoon at the expense of the central government. Different ethnic groups dressed in their t raditional attire performed cultural dances on those important occasions. The union government leaders occasionally visited the states and participated in locally organised functions. When u nion leaders were sojourning in the states, they wore local dresses and followed their customs.

Moreover, local governments were given certain control of their educational systems. They were allowed to teach in their local languages or dialects up to the fourth grade in schools. The freedom to teach and use their own languages gave the younger students the opportunity to simultaneously learn their own culture and that of the majority-Burman culture. This was an indication that the Union of Burma had a diverse culture and yet maintained unity. However, this unity in diversity was threatened by a presidential proclamation of the transfer of the Shan state’s power to the army from 1952 to 1954 (Silverstein 1959: 101).

The unity in diversity was further devastated by unequal treatments meted out to ethnic minorities on the issue of the state, as well as by the introduction of nationalised policies. The Karens, who formed the majority group in the Frontier Areas and the largest minority in Burma proper, were unhappy with the size of the state demarcated for them. The Burmans were reluctant to give up the territories they jointly occupied with the Karens. The Karens protested that the size of the state allotted to them was enough only for a fraction of their population. The greater threat to unity in diversity emerged when the policy of mandatory use of the Burmese language in educational institutions and government offices were regulated. Subsequently, all students were required to learn the Burmese language (along with English) in middle schools, high schools, and universities. Burmese was the only language permitted inside parliament for bringing up any agenda for formal discussion. The costume of ethnic Burmans used in Rangoon and Mandalay were informally adopted as the pattern for the national dress. “Temporary residents or visitors wearing the traditional clothing of their birthplace, on days other than holidays, are viewed as rustics”. A serious threat to unity in diversity developed when Buddhism was made the state official religion (Silverstein 1959: 102-03).

Response of Non-Burman Groups

All these gradual but deliberate changes were difficult for the non-Burman ethnic groups to accept for a number of reasons. First, these changes were against the spirit of the Panglong agreement, which promised autonomy for each ethnic group. Second, the non-Burman groups considered the changes as a mischievous Burmanisation policy (to impose ethnic Burman culture and religion on minorities) of the majority. Third, by adopting these new policies, the non-Burman groups were concerned that they would lose their culture, language, and tradition. Fourth, since not all the non-Burman groups were Buddhists, they construed that making Buddhism a state religion was against religious freedom, and, therefore, threatened the survival of their own religion.

Some form of elections were held in 1947, 1951, 1956, and 1960. The first three elections were won by the AFPFL as a single unified

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

party. The AFPFL was formerly a resistance organisation spearheading the fight for Burma’s independence from the British, and was led by general Aung San. With the assassination of Aung San on 19 July 1947, the leadership was taken over by U Nu. The split of the AFPFL into two factions in 1958 paved the way for the 1960 general election that was decisively won by U Nu’s “Clean” or Pyidaungsu (Union) faction. The other AFPFL group was called “Stable” faction and was backed by the military (Calla han 1998: 51).

Statistics in Table 1 provide the results of the 1956 election. The AFPFL entered the fray as a single party. In both houses of parliament, the AFPFL won a landslide, with a total of 162 seats in the chamber of deputies (lower house) and 85 seats in the chamber of nationalities (upper house).

Table 1: Burma General Election I956 (Results for Both Houses as on 3 June 1957)

Source: Fairbairn(1957: 301-02).

With the break-up of the AFPFL into two factions, the 1960 general election was held under the caretaker military government. About 72% of Rangoon residents voted for the Clean faction, and 22% voted for the Stable faction. The Clean faction and its allies secured 168 seats in parliament, while the Stable faction and its allies won 45 seats. Table 2 (p 52) also shows the distribution of seats in the chamber of deputies after the election.

Despite a landslide victory, the U Nu led government was not able to win the loyalty of ethnic minorities. The government could not guarantee equal distribution of national resources to ethnic minorities and the Burmans (Callahan 1998: 59). Such a lack of political maturity often leads to divisions between the government and the general public. In such circumstances, some see the

Military Institution

The military played an important role in the history of Burmese politics. Among others, the military had to suppress insurgent activities. It took the military years to develop its institution. A year before independence, Aung San expressed his dissatisfaction on the condition of the military, which reads:

Look at the national defence, our military is just enough for suppression of internal unrest. For national defence [against external threat], it is not sufficient. Army [infantry] is not enough. There are no armour[ed] battalions. [The] Navy is just for show. In reality, there is no way to defend this country. [The] Air force is just in the formative

may 14, 2011 vol xlvi no 20

stage. In [the] air force, for this country, there should be at least 500 combat aircrafts [sic] for [the] first line of defence. That is not sufficient. While these 500 aircrafts [sic] are in frontline combat action, each aircraft should have three or four aircrafts [sic] in [the] rear for [sic] reserve. At least another 500 combat aircrafts [sic] is [sic] needed. Overall, this country needs at least one million soldiers at the time war begins. It is better to have an army of [a] million soldiers. Right now, we have just 20,000 soldiers (Myoe 2009: 193).

When Burma gained independence from the British in 1948, the Tatmadaw (armed forces) was weak and faced numerous challenges. The military had to confront the rising insurgent problems of communists and ethnic minority groups. Another important task of the military was to maintain law and order. Over the years from independence to the military coup in 1962, the number of infantry battalions considerably increased.

Despite an increase in the number of infantry battalions and efforts to improve the Tatmadaw, the institution still lacked important facilities. For example, until 1953, there was neither a military directorate nor a training policy in place. Many military officers were sent to overseas for training in countries such as the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan. Although those officers could join junior officer course trainings, they were unable to s ecure admissions in staff colleges or artillery schools. Commenting on the situation of the military during the Tatmadaw conference on 24 August 1953, Ne Win, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, said:

…the most serious weakness of the General Staff Office is the training area. Because of the weakness in training programmes, operational drawbacks become more and more common in battles. Difficulties in training programmes are lack of time and shortage of training materials – both manuals and equipment…Because of the lack of skills in battlecraft and operation of weapons, fire power does not match enemy casualties. The war office has been trying hard to get materials for training. As we do not think the existing training facilities and schools are sufficient or of international standard, we plan to establish a combat forces school and a military academy in the near future. The training programmes of these schools will determine the future course of the Tatmadaw. In order to run these training schools on our own, we have sent out trainees not only to England, India and Pakistan, as happened in the past, but also to the United States, Australia and Yugoslavia (Myoe 2009: 136).

The commander-in-chief noted that the military was on its way to improving skills and capabilities. Ne Win first pointed out the weakness of the military instituion and then encouraged the armed forces by announcing new initiatives such as building combat force school and military academy, and sending more trainees to more countries who upon return will run the military institution more efficiently.

Military Coup

Before delving into the events leading up to the 1962 military coup, it is important to understand who general (Bogyoke) Ne Win was and how he managed to garner the support of his military subordinates to carry out the coup. Steinberg (1990: 9) writes Ne Win’s influence in Burmese politics as under:

Ne Win has been in the limelight since the early 1940s, when he was trained by the Japanese for anti-British activities as one of the

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

“30 comrades” along with Aung San – the father of Burmese independence, who was assassinated in 1947 and whose memory is perpetuated through portraits in every government office and on some of the currency, and through carefully selected reprints of his writings. Ne Win’s close association with Aung San and the latter’s continuing legacy have been themes of government propaganda since 1962; Ne Win has been portrayed as having been handed the mantle of leadership from Bogyoke Aung San, which gave him popular legitimacy.

In the years following independence, the civilian government underwent a tumultuous period. Due to a split within the ruling AFPFL into the Clean (led by U Nu and Thakin Tin) and Stable (led by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein) factions in 1958, Prime Minister U Nu invited Ne Win, head of the army, to form a caretaker government and hold a new election. Ne Win’s caretaker government lasted for 16 months and U Nu returned to power after winning the 1960 election in a landslide. With his comeback to power, the prime minister realised that a strong and stable union government cannot be established without addressing the problems of ethnic minorities. In an attempt to amicably resolve the minorities’ grievances, the prime minister planned to convene a meeting. Before U Nu could announce his recommendation for peace initiatives, Ne Win seized power on 2 March 1962 (Human Rights Documentation Unit 2000: 8).

Maung (1989: 40) discussed another reason for the military coup. According to him, Ne Win felt that the Union of Burma had not only become a factionalised and ultranationalist state, but also veered away from the path of socialism, which the late Aung San had always stood for throughout the independence struggle. As “a patriotic soldier”, Ne Win thought it was his duty to take over the responsibility of government. Although the 1962 military coup has generally been described as a bloodless coup, a 17year old son of the country’s first president Sao Shwe Thaike who belonged to the Shan ethnic group was killed. Prime Minister U Nu, his entire cabinet, and leading members of the opposition were taken into custody. Maha Devi, the grieving widow of Sao Shwe Thaike, and her family left Rangoon for Shan state to lead the Shan revolutionary movement against the military dictatorship. Following the coup, Ne Win dissolved parliament and banned all political parties and related activities. That was the end of parliamentary democracy and the beginning of military dictatorship in Burma, under the leadership of ethnic Burmans.

Suppressing ethnic unrest and preventing the country from disintegration were given as the justification for the military coup (Rajah 1998: 135). The military’s justification for the coup makes one to think that Ne Win was a Burman nationalist (if not ultranationalist) whose intention was to establish a unitary state, which was diametrically opposed to ethnic minorities’ demand for autonomy/federalism. The Burman nationalists viewed autonomy/federalism as tantamount to disintegration of the Union of Burma. Insurgency problems gave the military an e xcuse to say that the civilian government was incapable of provi ding stability to the country.

Ne Win’s perception was similar to general Jose Maria Tornel’s frustration with Mexican politicians. Tornel was of the view that Mexican politicians were weak and incapable of maintaining peace and stability since the country’s independence. Tornel believed that a robust central government or dictatorship was the

Conclusions

Deliberations and meetings finally brought together leaders of different ethnic groups (the Chins, the Kachins, the Shans, and the Burmans) at the Panglong conference, which culminated in the signing of a historic agreement that became the hallmark of the Union of Burma. Unfortunately, the attainment of independence did not end the country’s problems. Instead, it became the genesis of a series of conflicts, which continue today. One important reason why leaders of ethnic minorities agreed to sign the Panglong agreement was regarding the question of autonomy. The signatories agreed on full autonomy to the internal administration of the Frontier Areas, an agreement that has not materialised after many decades of independence. Successive military governments have tried to suppress the minorities’ movement with the use of coercion and intimidation, but the struggle continues (Kipgen 2010: 172).

Some may argue that factors such as communists’ insurgency or the U Nu-led weak civilian government led to the military coup. This author, however, argues that although other factors may have contributed to the circumstances, the ethnic minorities’ demand for political autonomy/federalism was the primary reason for the military’s intervention. This argument is supported by the fact that the minorities’ demand for autonomy/federalism is still an ongoing struggle, while the communists’ insurgency movement ended many years ago. Communism was the movement led by ethnic Burmans. The military coup was carried out when U Nu planned to meet the federalists for discussion. Leaders of ethnic minorities were working on finalising the constitution for a federal Burma when the coup took place.

During the process of negotiation for independence in England, no representatives from the Frontier Areas were included in the Burmese delegation. Many ethnic minorities doubted the motive of ethnic Burmans, and, therefore, did not sign the Panglong agreement. Autonomy (some synonymously use the term selfdetermination) was the primary objective why the leaders of the Chins, the Kachins and the Shans agreed to cooperate with the interim Burmese government to form the Union of Burma. The Burman nationalists, particularly the military leaders, saw the minorities’ demand for political autonomy/federalism as an attempt to disintegrate the Union. The 1947 constitution in fact had a clause on secession rights for ethnic minorities. Greater responsibility and representation of their own affairs was something the

may 14, 2011 vol xlvi no 20

References

Ball, Desmond (1998): Burma’s Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second World War to Civil War and Cyber Warfare (Bangkok: White Lotus).

Bigelow, Lee S (1960): “The 1960 Election in Burma”, Far Eastern Survey, 29 (5): 70-74.

Brown, Michael E (1997): “The Causes of Internal Conflict” in Michael E Brown, Owen R Cote Jr, Sean M Lynn-Jones, and Steven E Miller (ed.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge: The MIT Press), 3-25.

Butwell, Richard and Fred von der Mehden (1960): “The 1960 Election in Burma”, Pacific Affairs, 33 (2): 144-57.

Callahan, Mary P (1998): “On Time Warps and Warped Time: Lessons from Burma’s Democratic Era” in Robert I Rotberg (ed.), Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press), 49-67.

Fairbairn, Geoffrey (1957): “Some Minority Problems in Burma”, Pacific Affairs, 30 (4): 299-311.

Fink, Christina (2001): Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule (New York: Zeb Books).

Fowler, Will (1996): “The Repeated Rise of General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna in the So-Called Age of Chaos (Mexico, 1821-55)” in Will Fowler(ed.), Authoritarianism in Latin America Since Independence (Westport: Greenwood Press), 1-30.

Guilmartin Jr, John F (1997): “Light Troops in Classical Armies: An Overview of Roles, Functions, and Factors Affecting Combat Effectiveness” in James C Bradford (ed.), The Military and Conflict between Cultures: Soldiers at the Interface ( College Station: Texas A&M University Press), 17-48.

Human Rights Documentation Unit (2000): Burma Human Rights Yearbook 1999-2000 (Nonthaburi, Thailand: Government Printing Office of National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma).

– (2003): Burma Human Rights Yearbook 2002-03 (Nonthaburi, Thailand: Government Printing Office of National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma).

Kipgen, Nehginpao (2010): “Fifty Years of Conflicts in Burma: Problems and Solutions”, Asian Profile, 38(2): 163-73.

Lambert, Jacques (1967): Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions, translated from Spanish by Helen Katel (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press).

Liang, Chi-shad (1990): Burma’s Foreign Relations: Neutralism in Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers).

Maung, Shwe Lu (1989): Burma, Nationalism and Ideology: An Analysis of Society, Culture, and Politics (Dhaka: The University Press Limited).

Myoe, Maung Aung (2009): Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).

Onwumechili, Chuka (1998): African Democratisation and Military Coups (Westport: Praeger Publishers).