The Fourth Delimitation:An Evaluation

This article critically discusses a few aspects of the recommendations of the Fourth Delimitation Commission. While on the whole the commission has done a fair job, there were certain lacunae in the delimitation and constituency demarcation exercise that need to be addressed. The presence of sitting legislators as associate members of the commission has also given cause for complaint of unfair functioning of the commission.

The Fourth Delimitation: An Evaluation

Sanjay Kumar

A ccordingly, delimitation exercises were carried out in 1952, 1963 and 1972-76. However, the fourth delimitation due in 1981-82 could not take place, as a result of a moratorium placed by the Parliament on further delimitation until the publication of 2001 Census figures.3 Thus, the Fourth

This article critically discusses a few aspects of the recommendations of the Fourth Delimitation Commission. While on the whole the commission has done a fair job, there were certain lacunae in the delimitation and constituency demarcation exercise that need to be addressed. The presence of sitting legislators as associate members of the commission has also given cause for complaint of unfair functioning of the commission.

Sanjay Kumar (sanjay@csds.in) is with the Centre for Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW
january 17, 2009

A
ll democracies require to allocate the voting electorate into spatial units called, “electoral constituencies”. The basic objective of allocating the electorate into constituencies is to ensure the principle of one-man-one-vote, that is, parity in the value of vote of each elector. It implies that each constituency must have equal number of voters. However, movement of people from one spatial unit to another for a myriad number of reasons brings about continuous changes in the constituencies and disturbs the parity of electors between and among constituencies. It thus necessitates a review of this electoral arrangement from time to time. This review might lead to the redrawing of constituency boundaries and also to create new constituencies, if required. This process, termed delimitation, is aimed at redrawing the boundaries of constituencies to minimise the discrepancies in size of constituencies in terms of number of voters. While the practice of delimiting constituencies periodically is in vogue in most democracies in the world, the methods adopted for the delimitation process and the authority in charge of c arrying out this process vary.1

In India, as in many democracies, the practice of delimiting constituencies from time to time has been in place since independence. The Constitution of India under Articles 82 and 170 lays down the provisions of delimitation for both Lok Sabha and assembly constituencies. Unlike many democratic countries, the delimitation of constituencies is done under an independent body termed the “Delimitation Commission” which is a non-party body.2 Its decision is immutable and cannot be c hallenged in any court of law. As per p rovisions of the Constitution, readjustment and delimitation of constituencies was to be carried out after every 10 years, based on the latest population census.

Delimitation Commission (FDC) was set up in 2002, after a gap of nearly 30 years. The orders of the commission were approved by Parliament in March 2008. The new boundaries of constituencies will remain unchanged until 2026 and effectively until 2031. Thus, a fresh delimitation will take place nearly after 30 years.

Since the country not only experiences different demographic changes but also faces large-scale rural to urban migration resulting in differential growth rates of population, a moratorium on periodic delimitation has expectedly caused a number of problems having far-reaching implications for the working of Indian democracy. Further, even as delimitation commissions are seen as neutral and nonpartisan in their exercise, they are not sacrosanct. Criticisms of favouring one party/ candidate or the other by delimitation commission are often made. Viewed in this context, the objectives of this paper include:

  • (a) a review of the working of the FDC;
  • (b) an examination of how well delimitation of boundaries has been carried out; and finally (c) an analysis of the implications of the ban on periodic delimitation.
  • Context and Issues

    As the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act 1976 (which amended Articles 82 and 170) had imposed a moratorium on the number of seats allocated to states and fixing of boundaries of constituencies until the publication of 2001 Census figures, the fourth delimitation was to take place only after 2001. Parliament had passed the Delimitation Act of 2002 and the FDC was set up accordingly. This commission was set up under the chairmanship of retired Justice Kuldip Singh with B B Tandon, election commissioner of India and the state election commissioners of state c oncerned as their ex-officio members. The commission was to associate some members of political parties in its work. In each state five members of the Lok Sabha elected from that state (all Lok Sabha members in case the numbers in the state were less than five) and five members of the legislative assembly of the respective state were to be incorporated as associate members of the delimitation commission. The associate members coming from the Lok Sabha and legislative assemblies were nominated by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and of the respective l egislative assemblies.

    Before the FDC was set up, there was widespread speculation that the FDC would address both inter- and intra-state disparity in the size of Lok Sabha constituencies. And that at the same time it would not suggest decreasing the share of Lok Sabha seats for any state. An effort for interstate parity in the size of Lok Sabha constituency without any state losing their share of Lok Sabha seats would have meant increasing the total number of Lok Sabha seats. This was because seats for some states were to be increased due to increases in their populations. Further, as no delimitation would take place for another 30 years, it was expected that a system of rotation of reserved seats would be introduced. However, the 84th Amendment Act of 2001 and 87th Amendment Act of 2003 gave the following mandate to the commission:

    (1) The total number of existing seats as allocated to various states in the “house of 2001 Census) of each parliamentary and assembly constituency in a state shall, so far as practicable, be the same throughout the state.

    In brief, the FDC had a limited mandate. It was not to look at interstate parity – a major constitutional and political concern. Secondly, while seats were not to be increased as a response to increasing overall population, seats for SCs and STs were to be apportioned on the basis of latest population figures resulting in increasing the number of reserved seats and reducing the number of general seats.

    Early Controversies

    The Issue of Delimitation on the Basis of 1991 Census Figures: Even as the laws seriously limited the scope of the FDC, the commission started working in a somewhat uncertain environment. Various working processes of the commission were fraught with controversies. One such controversy was on the use of “base population”. When the FDC started its work, it e lectoral boundaries in such a way as to achieve an equal population-seat ratio within the state (Kumar 2003a). This was bound to generate discomfort to many as the decision to carry out delimitation on the basis of the 1991 Census figures was taken at the time when the population figures for the latest census, that is, 2001 Census were already published. The issue was debated in the media and in other circles. Responding to the concern, the government, introduced a bill and made amendments for delimitation to be carried out on the basis of the 2001 Census figures. This was definitely a welcome step. Otherwise, we would have had delimitation based on a situation that existed nearly two decades ago. In a sense therefore, the damage that would have been done by keeping 1991 as the base year was nipped in the bud.

    A System of Rotation of Reserved Seats:

    With regard to reserving seats for the SCs and STs in the Lok Sabha and in the legislative assemblies, there are clear provisions in the Constitution. Seats are to be

    Table 1: The Accepted Deviation of 10%: International Practices

    Country Model of Redrawing the Frequency of Average Size of Permitted Effect of Acceptable Boundaries Redrawing Boundaries One Seat (Quota of Electors) Deviation Deviation in the Size of Electors

    Australia Commission 7 years 67,000 10% 6,700

    Canada Neutral commission 10 years 87,000 25% 21,750

    France Government Not mentioned 108,000 20% 21,600

    Germany Neutral commission 4 years Population 33%

    New Zealand Neutral commission 5 years 52,000 5% 2,600

    United Kingdom Neutral commission 12 years 69,000 As equal as possible

    the people” (the Lok Sabha) on the basis of United States Usually state legislature 10 years 600,000 Very small

    1971 Census shall remain unchanged till the first census to be taken after the year 2026; (2) The total number of existing seats in the legislative assemblies of all states as fixed on the basis of 1971 Census shall also remain unaltered till the first census to be taken after the year 2026;

    (3) The number of seats to be reserved for the scheduled castes (SCs) and scheduled tribes (STs) in the Lok Sabha and state l egislative assemblies shall be reworked on the basis of the 2001 Census; (4) Each state shall be re-delimited into territorial parliamentary and assembly constituencies on the basis of the 2001 Census and the extent of such constituencies as delimited now shall remain frozen till the first census to be taken after the year 2026; and (5) The constituencies shall be so redrawn that population (on the basis of

    India Neutral commission 10 years but suspended 1,900,000* 10 %** 190,000 since 1976

    * Figures from the new delimitation order. ** While the Constitution does not provide any provision for such acceptable deviations, the Fourth Delimitation Commission provided for themselves the acceptable limit of 10% deviation. Source: Table 1.1 “The Redrawing of Parliamentary Boundaries in Britain”, Butler and McLean (1996).

    came to be known that the new delimitation would take place on the basis of the 1991 Census figures. The argument put forward was that the final figures for the 2001 Census were not likely to be published before early 2003 and for the commission to wait that long would not be right. The delimitation carried out on the basis of the 1991 population figures would have meant that the delimitation by the time it was completed would have been more than 10 years old. Further there were serious doubts about whether the delimitation carried out on the basis of the 1991 Census would be able to redraw

    reserved for SCs and STs in proportion to

    their share in total population of the given

    state. Besides, the seats for the SCs are to

    be reserved in such a way that the seats

    are distributed in different parts of the

    state and located as far as practicable in

    those areas where the proportion of their

    population to the total is comparatively

    large. However, the seats for the STs

    are to be reserved only for those areas

    where the STs have the largest concentra

    tion of population.

    The issue of rotation of the reserved

    seats gained fresh momentum when the

    delimitation commission was appointed.

    january 17, 2009

    When seats are reserved for either the SCs or the STs, it implies that the people other than SCs and STs are not allowed to contest elections from the reserved constituencies. The issue was whether with fresh delimitation there should be a system of rotation for reserving a seat, or should we reserve the seats for the SCs and STs till the next delimitation takes place? (Kumar 2003b).

    In principle, when delimitation takes place the seats for the SCs and the STs are reserved afresh. In many cases seats continue to be reserved all through the delimitation exercises carried out in the past, while in some cases new constituencies get reserved and some other constituencies, which were reserved by the earlier delimitation, become unreserved. If the delimitation takes place on a routine basis, that is, after every 10 years as e nvisaged in the Constitution, the problem gets resolved to some extent as some rotation of the reserved seats would take place auto matically. With constituencies becoming reserved and un reserved at a certain time interval, it would have guaranteed somewhat the principle of “equal opportunity to contest election” to all (Kumar 2003b).

    But when delimitation takes place irregularly and after a period of nearly 30 years, it certainly calls for a rotation system for reserving seats. A careful study of reserved seats for SCs reveals that about 35 out of 79 parliamentary seats reserved for SCs in the previous delimitation (1976) continue to retain reserved status in the fourth delimitation and will remain so for at least next 30 years.4 It means constant denial of opportunities to people belonging to certain social categories, which otherwise constitute the majority in these constituencies. On the other hand, those belonging to SCs and STs are free to contest election in general (unreserved seats), though there have been very few cases of SC/ST candidates winning from general constituencies.5

    The argument often put against rotation is that if the sitting representatives are aware that the seat they represent will be reserved next time and that they may not be allowed to contest the next election, they would have little interest in serving the interests of the people. The

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    assumption is that, in this case, the p olitical representative would neglect his/ her own constituency. However, there are ways to overcome this problem. In order to mitigate this problem, the reservation of seats should be rotated not after every election, but may be after every two elections. If the present representative has a chance to be elected more than once he/ she is not likely to neglect his/her constituency. Further, if a political representative is a serious contender, he/she could contest election from another constituency and given his track record of work in his/ her earlier constituency he/she might c ontinue to win in other constituencies. Similarly if a reserved constituency is unreserved by the process of rotation of seats, a candidate belonging to a reserved category is still free to contest election from that constituency.

    One cannot deny that looking at the past record and given the present sociopolitical situation, it is unlikely that a SC or a ST candidate would manage to win e lection from an unreserved constituency, but nevertheless if the rotation of reserved seats becomes a routine feature, it is possible for candidates belonging to the reserved category to win elections even from unreserved constituencies. This would take time, but certainly this would provide signals of maturing of democracy when the weaker sections no long require legislation to ensure their political representation. They would achieve it by themselves. At the same time, when a reserved constituency is unreserved, it would give an equal

    o pportunity to all adults living in that constituency to c ontest elections.

    However, now the question arises: should rotation be applied to all constituencies regardless of the proportion of SCs and STs in the population? There is, in fact, no need to bring all the constituencies under the purview of rotation. Instead, the need is to rotate the reservation of seats only among those constituencies, which have a fairly high proportion of the population of whom the constituency is being reserved. Once the total number of seats to be reserved for a particular community is decided, a list of constituencies needs to be drawn, having certain cut-off point for the proportion of population of that community. It should be taken care that the threshold point should be so decided that the list should have more than twice the number of seats needed to be reserved. In the first instance, as per the provisions of the act, the constituency having the highest proportion of population of a certain community should be reserved, and in the next rotation the constituency having the second largest proportion of population from a certain community should be reserved, after dereserving the constituency which was reserved earlier. In the process, there would be constituencies, which would remain unreserved forever, but we need not think of reserving all constituencies one by one. The reservation of seats had been done to ensure adequate representation to people belonging to certain deprived communities. It would be only sensible to have rotation only among those constituencies, which have some concentration of those people for whom the c onstituency is being reserved.

    Interstate Parity in Constituency-Population Ratio: As the essence of representative democracy is to ensure an equal value of vote of all citizens, it is essential that the constituency-population ratio, as far as possible, remains same across the country. A constituency with greater number of voters would mean lower value of a vote compared to one having a relatively smaller number of voters. During last 30 years, there has been a growth in the disparity in the size of parliamentary constituencies across states as a result of differential rate of population growth in Indian states. Based on 2001 population, an average member of Parliament (MP) now represents a population of little less than 19 lakh people. But this varies a great deal from state to state. Taking the state population into account, it appears that an MP elected from Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh would be representing larger numbers of people in comparison to MPs elected from Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Uttarakhand. For example, a MP from Rajasthan as of now represents a population of more than 22 lakh people. In contrast, on an average a MP from Kerala represents a population of 15.9 lakh people. The net result is that the value of the mandate of each voter across the c ountry varies differentially. This gap in the size of the Lok Sabha constituencies would be much sharper in the coming years. Not only this, with the freeze imposed on the number of seats till the year 2026, the average size of a constituency would be huge. Based on projected p opulation, by 2026, on an average a MP would be representing a population of nearly 25 lakh people. The corresponding figure might be even larger for those MPs coming from states like Rajasthan, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and UP. It is definitely a matter of c oncern.

    It was expected that the FDC would address the distortion in the constituencypopulation ratio. But the Delimitation Act 2002 allowed this problem to exist for another 30 years. The rationale of deferring fresh allocation of Lok Sabha seats to states based on the 2001 population was that it would create a regional (northsouth) imbalance in representation. Once population growth stabilises, which is expected by 2026, it would be fair to make a reallocation of seats. Had the allocation of parliamentary seats to states been made based on 2001 Census figures, four southern states together would have lost as many as 15 Lok Sabha seats (Andhra Pradesh 3, Tamil Nadu 7, Karnataka 1 and Kerala 4). And, four northern states, namely, Uttar Pradesh (including Uttarakhand), Bihar (including Jharkhand), Madhya Pradesh (including Chhattisgarh) and Rajasthan would have gained 5, 3, 3 and 4 seats, respectively. Sensing the c urrent political situation and fearing protest from the southern states, Parliament bypassing the 91st constitutional amendment bill decided to impose a ban on any increase in the total number of seats in the Lok Sabha based on the 2001 C ensus. However, it is argued that the problem could have been addressed in a better way. The requirement was just to increase a few seats in Parliament. By keeping the number of seats alloted for the southern states unchanged, the increase in number of seats could have accommodated the additional population in the northern states. It would have been better if serious thought had been given to increasing the number of total seats in the Lok Sabha to such an extent that at least a uniform population seat ratio was maintained throughout the country without having any effect on the existing number of seats in the Lok Sabha for the southern states.

    Rigour of Delimitation

    As mentioned earlier, the FDC was not given a mandate to look into the interstate parity of constituencies in terms of size of voters. The basic objective of the commission was to redraw the boundaries in such a way that constituencies within the state, as far as practicable, would be equal in terms of number of electors. However, a closer examination of the size of c onstituency within the state seems to suggest that there still remains inter- constituency disparity within a state, despite the fact that the commission considered 10% plus or minus variation as acceptable. Before we go into the matter let us first discuss the implication of the commission’s internal decision of accepting a 10% variation.

    Neither the previous delimitation Acts nor the present one laid down any p rovision of a “deviation norm”. Unlike in other countries, the delimitation Acts in India have laid emphasis on a notion that “so far as practicable, constituencies must be equal in size” (Table 1, p 42). True, it is not possible to put equal number of people in all the constituencies, yet ambiguity in laws in this connection c ertainly paves the way for distorting the whole process. Allowing a deviation of the magnitude of 10% in the size of constituencies raises a few questions. First, how valid was the decision of the FDC to accept a 10% deviation norm? Second, were the constituencies purposively divided into smaller and bigger size to favour any particular party? In other words, is the variation in the size of constituencies even after the recent delimitation, a result of local politicians influencing the commission for redrawing the boundaries in ways which suits him or her? Or is deviation in the size of the c onstituencies just a result of inefficiency of the officials associated with the work of delimitation? One can argue that there are many countries where such deviations are permitted and, in fact, in some countries the deviation exceeds even 10% (Table 1), and therefore it is no big deal if the FDC decided to do so. However, such an argument seems to ignore the fact that in a densely populated country such as India, a 10% deviation is too large. If a deviation of 10% is allowed for a parliamentary constituency, it would mean that the population size allowed could exceed or be less than the norm by about two lakh (considering an average constituency size of about 19 lakh people). Further, if the size of one constituency is larger by 10% and that of another is 10% lower than the prescribed average, in effect the larger constituency in relation to the smaller one is larger by 20% ( cor responding to about four lakh and more people).6 Permitting this amount of i nter-constituency disparity is certainly against the spirit and purpose of delimitation.

    Yet another implication of allowing a 10% variation is that it could be used to serve an unfair purpose. Political parties in power or influential leaders might take advantage of this permissible deviation to redraw the boundaries in a way that it would maximise their number of

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    s upporters and minimise the number of those supporting the opponents.

    Constituencies of Equal Size?

    Even though the commission allowed a 10% deviation while redrawing boundaries, it seems that even this norm has been violated in many cases. As mentioned earlier there are about 17 parliamentary constituencies that exceed 10% variation in relation to the state average. Such discrepancies appear to be even more glaring in the case of assembly constituencies.

    Let us take up Andhra Pradesh and Bihar to illustrate how the commission failed to fulfil its mandate. Post-delimitation, A ndhra Pradesh has 294 assembly constituencies out of which 22 assembly constituencies are much larger than allowed by the 10% deviation norm and nearly 18 constituencies are smaller by more than 10% of the state average. Thus about one-seventh of assembly constituencies in the state face anomalies. The s ituation in Bihar is no better. Out of 240 assembly constituencies, 13 assembly constituencies were larger and 16 assembly constituencies were smaller than the average size of an assembly c onstituency. Similarly in Gujarat, while 16 assembly constituencies are larger by more than 10% of the average size of an assembly constituency, there were another 17, which were smaller by more than 10% of the average size of an assembly constituency in the state.

    Associate Members

    As mentioned earlier, boundaries of c onstituencies can be drawn in various ways, namely, by partisan, bi-partisan and non-partisan ways. The Indian system f ollows the non-partisan method as the delimitation commission though appointed by the Parliament, functions as an independent authority.

    The presence of associate members in the delimitation commission who are themselves political actors could initiate the process. Article 82 of the Indian Constitution states that delimitation shall be c arried out “by such an authority and in such a manner as Parliament may by law determine”. This is quite in contrast to the details mentioned in the Constitution regarding the structure and authority of the Election Commission under Article 324. The details of the composition and the functioning of the delimitation c ommission were left in the hands of p oliticians. Since the process of delimitation, which is to be carried out by the delimitation commission, affects the prospects of an MP or an MLA (member of legislative assembly), there was always a temptation on the part of the politicians to have some kind of control on it. Since the details of composition and functioning were to be worked out by the Parliament, the politicians are in a position to actively intervene and influence the process by changing the principles and methods of law by which the commission is created. Though the procedural and methodological aspects which guide the process of delimitation explicitly prevent any manipulation of the delimitation process, the presence of the politicians in the commission as associate members has always led to criticism about political influence on the process of delimitation.7 The first delimitation was carried out under the office of the president with the help of the Election Commission, but even that commission has provision of two to seven associate members from each state. The process of carrying out the first delimitation was rather unsatisfactory and the union minister of law C C Biswas commented,

    The President’s Order which were laid before the Parliament, were simply torn inot pieces by Parliament, whose decision seems to have been actuated more by the convenience of individual Members of the House rather than by the considerations of general interest (Jha 1963:132)

    The system of having associate members on the delimitation commission continued even in successive commissions. The second commission increased the number of associate members to nine for each state, four from Lok Sabha and five from the legislative assembly. It was suggested that the MPs wanted to keep a close eye over changes in electoral boundaries. This continued even in the Fourth Delimitation Commission with the provision for having 10 associate members in each state, five MPs and five MLAs.

    The Micro Picture

    Until November 2008, the country had witnessed only one assembly election based on the new delimitation order and more elections based on the FDC’s recommendations may unfold more controversies. However, looking at some constituencies closely, one can sense that there is some controversy involved in keeping constituencies much smaller or bigger compared to the average size of an a ssembly or Lok Sabha constituency in that state.

    Let us first look at Gopalganj Lok Sabha seat, which has been reserved for SCs by the FDC. As per the provisions, seats for SCs are to be reserved keeping in mind the principle of a sizeable population of people belonging to SCs and also keeping in mind the principle of geographical spread. While reserving seats for SCs, it has to be taken care of that these are not concentrated in one part or the other of the state but spread across different regions. Gopalganj is located in the north-western part of Bihar, and has 12.4% SC population. Gopalganj was preferred for being reserved over constituencies like Valmiki Nagar, Purvi Champaran and Sheohar, having proportion of SC population amounting to 14.9%, 14.2% and 13.5%, respectively and all of them are located in the same region. Of the total of six Lok Sabha seats reserved for SCs in Bihar, none have been reserved in the northern and the eastern region even when there are many constituencies in this region having fairly significant proportion of SCs in the overall population. Parliamentary constituencies such as Madhepura (15.7%), Dharbhanga (15.5%), Purnia (14.5%), Supaul (15.7%) and Jhanjharpur (13.7%) can be cited as examples. Despite the availability of so many constituencies to reserve for SCs, the decision for reserving Gopalganj Lok Sabha seems to indicate that the commission was guided by other factors. (Tables enumerating population variance among assembly and parliamentary constituencies, before and after delimitation are posted on the EPW web site along with this article.)

    Conclusions

    The spatial division of electors into constituencies is useful for administrative purposes and for making it convenient for the legislators to identify and serve their electors where they live, and the exercise of delimitation has to be done every 10 years. This would ensure that the discrepancy in seat-population ratio could be rectified from time to time. As discussed earlier, the uneven seat-population ratio goes against the principle of equal value of the vote of each individual. While dividing the constituencies, the authorities responsible for carrying out this need to keep twin objectives in mind – equality of suffrage and administrative convenience. At times there are conflicts in these two objectives while carrying out the exercise of dividing the state into different constituencies, which results in differential size of constituencies even after the delimitation exercise has been carried out.

    Overall, it seems, there is need for greater attention to be paid to the issue of delimitation of constituencies. There is a need for carrying out delimitation at r egular intervals as envisaged by the framers of the Constitution. There is also a need for laying down rules about the composition and role of the delimitation commission. This may be done by some amendments in the C onstitution. There is need for greater role of the E lection Commission in handling the issue of redrawing the boundaries of the constituencies.

    Notes

    1 Boundaries of constituencies may be drawn in many ways. However, there are three popular ways to do so. They are termed, partisan, bipartisan or non-partisan ways. A partisan way of drawing boundaries is when the party in power draws boundary to suit itself. In bipartisan method, major parties agree on the scheme of things. Finally, the non-partisan one occurs when the whole exercise of delimitation is carried out by an independent non-partisan and non-party body/authority. Also see D Butler, Iain McLean (1996).

    2 Though the Delimitation Commission associated a number of members belonging to different political parties as associate members, these members did not have voting rights and were mostly unlikely to influence the functioning of the Commission.

    3 It was argued that delimitation on the basis of 1981 population would have caused southern states loss of seats in the Lok Sabha, for unlike the northern states, they had successfully implemented the family planning programme and brought down the growth rate substantially. As the basis of allocation of Lok Sabha seats to each state is size of population, the northern states would gain a number of seats at the expense of southern states. It would, therefore, have created political furore and the government thought it best to avoid it. However, critics argue that though the official argument was to some extent valid, the delimitation exercise could still have been carried out in order to address the problem of intra-state disparity between and among constituencies, if not the interstate parity.

    4 As of now, there are 85 seats reserved for the SCs and 46 seats are reserved for the STs. Of these, 35 and 28 Lok Sabha constituencies for the SCs and STs respectively had remained reserved all through the previous delimitations and will remain so until the next delimitation to be held after 2031 Census.

    5 For example, B R Ambedkar won the Lok Sabha election in 1952 from Bombay (North East) constituency. B P Maurya won the Lok Sabha election in 1962 from Aligarh constituency. In the recent years Prakash Ambedkar won the Lok Sabha e lections of 1998 and 1999 from Akola, an unreserved seat.

    6 As shown later in this section that there are about 17 parliamentary constituencies, which violates even the prescribed norm of 10% variation. These constituencies are much bigger or smaller than the acceptable deviation of 10%.

    7 Jaya Prakash Narayan complained in the 1950s that the task of delimitation has been practically left in the hand of single party, Congress (Bhalla 1973:50).

    References

    Butler, David and Ian McLean (1996): “The Redrawing of Parliamentary Boundaries in Britain” in Ian McLean and David Butler (ed.) Fixing the Boundaries: Defining and Redefining Single-Member Electoral Districts (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited).

    Jha, Nagesh (1963): “Delimitation of Constituencies: A Plea for Some Effective Criteria”, Indian Journal of Political Science, 24: 129-14.

    Kumar, Sanjay (2003a): “Delimitation: Old and New Issues”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol XXXVIII, Nos 12-13: 22-29 March.

    – (2003b): “Delimitation: Old and New Issues”, E conomic & Political Weekly, Vol XXXVIII, No 19, 10 May.

    Unbound Back Volumes of Economic and Political Weekly from 1976 to 2008 are available.

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    Appendix

    Table 1: Interstate Deviation in Size of Parliamentary Constituencies Table 3: (Continued)
    State/UT Number of PC* Average Size of PC Deviation Deviation (%) State/UT Av Size of AC % Deviation (+10-32%) % Deviation (-10-25%)
    India 543 1894544 Kothapeta 11.77 Pedana -13.46
    Andhra Pradesh 42 1814524 -80020 -4.2 Bhimavaram 11.75 Wyra (ST) -13.06
    Bihar 40 2074838 180294 9.5 Musheerabad 11.57 Banswada -12.82
    Chhattisgarh 11 1893982 -562 -0.03 Alur 11.44 Jukkal (SC) -12.37
    Delhi 07 1974319 79775 4.2 Mummidivaram 11.34 Pinapaka (ST) -11.80
    Goa 02 670771 -1223773 -64.6 Palamaner 11.30 Kamalapuram -11.42
    Gujarat 26 1948885 54341 2.9 Giddalur 11.22 Elamanchili -10.73
    Haryana 10 2114456 219912 11.6 Vijaywada West 11.16 Serilingampally -10.53
    Himachal Pradesh 04 1519475 -375069 -19.8 Mancherial 11.10 Kovvur (SC) -10.47
    Jharkhand 14 1924702 30158 1.6 Etcherla 11.10 Mantralayam -10.46
    Karnataka 28 1878927 -15617 -0.8 Nizamabad (Rural) 11.05 Bellampalle (SC) -10.26
    Kerala 20 1592069 -302475 -16.0 Ichchapuram 11.00 Bhongir -10.19
    Madhya Pradesh 29 2090065 195521 10.3 Tirupati 11.00 Nellore Rural -10.14
    Maharashtra 48 2018305 123761 6.5 Nizamabad (Urban) 10.78 Aswaraopeta (ST) -10.08
    Meghalaya 02 1159411 -735133 -38.8 Kovur 10.71
    Mizoram 01 888573 -1005971 -53.1 Guntakal 10.34
    Orissa 21 1752603 -141941 -7.5 Quthbullapur 10.17
    Pondicherry 01 974345 -920199 -48.6 Kothagudem 10.13
    Punjab 13 1873769 -20775 -1.1 Bihar 341537 Raghopur 16.29 Bihpur -18.59
    Rajasthan 25 2260288 365744 19.3 Pipra 16.25 Fatwah -14.48
    Sikkim 01 540851 -1353693 -71.4 Dhaka 16.02 Raja Pakar (SC) -12.47
    Tamil Nadu 39 1600146 -294398 -15.5 Matihani 13.98 Hayaghat -11.27
    Tripura 02 1601268 -293276 -15.5 Valmiki Nagar 13.22 Kochadhaman -11.13
    Uttarakhand 05 1697870 -196674 -10.4 Balrampur 12.62 Kalyanpur -11.10
    Uttar Pradesh 80 2076807 182263 9.6 Pirpainti (SC) 12.53 Buxar -11.10
    West Bengal 42 1908352 13808 0.7 Masaurhi (SC) 12.14 Madhuban -11.03
    Average size of the Parliamentary Constituency has been calculated on the basis of total population of the country and the total number of Parliamentary Constituencies (PC) Total Kahalgaon 11.34 Mohiuddinnagar -11.02
    Population 1,028,737,436, Total number of PC 543, Average size of PC 1894544 Patna Sahib 11.32 Belaganj -10.65
    * PC refers to Parliamentary Constituency. Chainpur 11.08 Kesaria -10.63
    Table 2: Intra-state Deviation in the Size of Parliamentary Constituency Sasaram 10.38 Gopalpur -10.56
    State/UT Number Average Name of PC 10% Bigger Name of PC 10% Smaller Rosera (SC) 10.32 Cheria Bariarpur -10.31
    of PC Size of PC Compared to Average Compared to Average Benipatti -10.18
    Andhra Pradesh 42 1814524 Ziradei -10.12
    Bihar 40 2074838 Nalanda 14.3 Katihar -10.01
    Begusarai 13.2 Chhattisgarh 231486 Kasdol 10.38 Bastar (ST) -12.79
    Jharkhand 14 1924702 Bokaro 11.9 Lohardaga (ST) -11.1 Bindranawagarh (ST) 10.25 Lundra (ST) -11.03
    Karnataka 28 1878927 Bangalore Central -11.8 Keshkal (ST) 10.15 Raipur Rural -10.17
    Kerala 20 1592069 Delhi 197431 New Delhi 17.33 Chhatarpur -17.84
    Madhya Pradesh 29 2090065 Jabalpur 15.5 Chhindwara -11.5 Karol Bagh (SC) 13.60 Tughlakabad -14.41
    Mandla (ST) 11.1 Satna -10.5 Rohtas Nagar 10.38 Malviya Nagar -11.48
    Maharashtra 48 2018305 Dwarka -10.95
    Meghalaya 02 1159411 Shillong (ST) 25.0 Tura (ST) -25.0 Uttam Nagar -10.48
    Mizoram 01 888573 Tilak Nagar -10.36
    Orissa 21 1752603 Kandhamal -14.8 Goa 33538 Canacona 12.51 Sanguem -23.65
    Uttar Pradesh 80 2076807 Unnao 30.0 Vasco-Da-Gama 12.17 Cumbarjua -12.74
    Shahjahanpur (SC) 18.7 Pernem (SC) 12.14 Navelim -12.53
    Jhansi 11.7 Tivim -10.31
    Uttarakhand 05 1697870 Fatehpur Nainital 11.2 Gujarat 278412 Viramgam 14.06 Bapunagar -14.72
    Udhamsingh Nagar 10.7 Bhiloda (ST) 12.78 Morwa (Hadaf) (ST) -13.82
    Source: CSDS Data Unit. Kadi (SC) 12.66 Mangrol (ST) -13.58
    Table 3: State-wise Deviation in the Size of Assembly Constituencies State/UT Av Size of AC % Deviation (+10-32%) % Deviation (-10-25%) Kapadvanj Dwarka 12.29 Jamjodhpur 12.04 Katargam -12.75 -12.40
    Andhra Pradesh 259217 Bhadrachelam (ST) Chintalapudi (SC) 15.65 Narasapuram 13.82 Rampachodavaram -16.31 Dhrangadhra Nandod (ST) 12.00 Limkheda (ST) 11.55 Dediapada (ST) -12.18 -11.66
    (ST) -16.03 Amreli 11.52 Mahudha -11.02
    Araku Valley (ST) 13.46 Bapatla -14.09 Sankheda (ST) 11.01 Gondal -10.91
    Malkajgiri 12.42 Srisailam -13.58 Dhoraji 10.80 Mahuva -10.70
    Economic & Political Weekly january 17, 2009
    EPW
    Table 3: (Continued) Table 3: (Continued)
    State/UT Av Size of AC % Deviation (+10-32%) % Deviation (-10-25%) State/UT Av Size of AC % Deviation (+10-32%) % Deviation (-10-25%)
    Jhagadia (ST) 10.58 Dabhoi -10.65 Mizoram 22214 Tuichawng (ST) 18.26 Lawngtlai East (ST) -15.23
    Sayajigunj 10.57 Jalalpore -10.60 Tuivawl (ST) -12.50
    Ellisbridge 10.43 Karjan -10.43 Orissa 250371 Dhenkanal 10.64 Jayadev (SC) -11.91
    Choryasi 10.31 Vejalpur -10.31 Jajpur 10.01 Baliguda (ST) -11.72
    Khambhalia 10.30 Vagra -10.28 Barachana -11.13
    Kamrej 10.03 Gariadhar -10.16 Jagatsinghpur -10.64
    Mangrol -10.13 Kendrapara (SC) -10.39
    Haryana 234939 Mahendragarh 12.47 Narnaul -12.86 Satyabadi -10.24
    Narnaund 11.19 Punahana -12.79 Aska -10.01
    Panipat City 11.18 Naraingarh -11.18 Pondicherry 32478 Kamraj Nagar 10.66 Lawspet -14.26
    Badshahpur 10.21 Nuh -10.26 Punjab 208196 Phagwara (SC) 19.76 Guru Har Sahai -13.31
    Israna (SC) -10.05 Phillaur (SC) 12.76 Khanna -11.65
    Himachal Bathinda Urban 10.16 Bholath -11.43
    Pradesh 89380 Sullah 12.91 Dharampur -13.37 Jalalabad 10.10 Ajnala -11.36
    Darang 12.46 Jaswan-Pragpur -11.76 Raikot (SC) -11.26
    Jogindernagar 12.14 Jubbal-Kotkhai -10.98 Talwandi sabo -10.17
    Chamba 11.81 Banjar -10.46 Rajasthan 282535 Asind 11.90 Bassi (ST) -12.69
    Jawali 10.80 Jai Singhpur (SC) -10.41 Bali 10.35 Ahore -10.20
    Nadaun 10.75 Jawalamukhi -10.11 Sardarshahar 10.31
    Kullu 10.56 Sikrai (SC) 10.15
    Jharkhand 332664 Pakaur 11.01 Chhatarpur -13.03 Hawa Mahal 10.02
    Daltonganj 10.87 Silli (SC) -11.54 Sikkim 17446 West Pendam (SC) 14.52 Gyalshing-Barnyak -14.9
    Bokaro 10.76 Maheshpur (ST) -11.01 Upper Tadong 12.33 Poklok –Kamrang -12.9
    Dhanbad 10.64 Ratu (ST) -10.55 Barfung (bl) 11.19 Yangthang -12.2
    Thethaitangar (ST) 10.28 Simdega (ST) -10.28 Martam-Rumtek (bl) 10.72
    Jamshedpur 10.28 Jharia -10.03 Rhenock 10.31
    Karnataka 235940 Gulbarga Rural (SC) 15.57 Hosadurga -13.26 Tamil Nadu 266690 Poompuhar 20.54 Kilvelur (SC) -15.83
    Sarvagnanagar 14.05 Jayanagar -11.44 Kancheepuram 14.33 Vedaranyam -12.78
    Shorapur (ST) 13.76 Hirekerur -11.42 Kanniyakumari 13.59 Nagapattinam -12.18
    Gokak 12.51 Kudachi (SC) -10.82 Gudiyattam (SC) 12.97 Peravurani -11.19
    Arabhavi 12.18 Yeshvanthapura -10.75 Thoothukkudi 11.62 Oddanchatram -10.65
    Kolar 11.92 Hadagalli (SC) -10.62 Tiruttani 11.39 Kolathur -10.47
    Malavalli (SC) 11.85 Malur -10.21 Manapparai 11.19 Ottapidaram (SC) -10.39
    Homnabad 11.48 Mayiladuthurai 10.58 Tittakudi (SC) -10.37
    Bhadravati 11.42 Sholingur 10.28 Kilvaithinankuppam
    Rajarajeshwarinagar 11.01 (SC) -10.10
    Karwar 10.56 Mylapore 10.25 Madathukulam -10.01
    Byndoor 10.09 Tripura 53375 Kanchanpur (ST) 31.75 Chawmanu (ST) -12.61
    Kerala 227438 Balusseri (SC) 10.72 Ernad -11.63 Badharghat (SC) 23.00 Karbook (ST) -11.73
    Aranmula 10.16 Vadakara -10.21 Pratapgarh (SC) 16.70 Golaghati (ST) -11.31
    Beypore 10.09 Town Bordowali 12.11 Banamalipur -10.38
    Madhya Pradesh 263529 Neemuch 12.33 Rau -13.06 Kakraban Salgarh (SC) 10.33 Jubarajnagar -10.34
    Banda 12.20 Tarana (SC) -11.13 Bagma (ST) 10.19 Ampinagar (ST) -10.12
    Ashta (SC) 11.22 Huzur -11.05 Dhanpur 10.09
    Dr Ambedkarnagar-Mhow 11.09 Chitrakoot -10.40 Uttar Pradesh 412269 Kapilvastu (SC) 16.44 Sikanderpur -13.55
    Jaora 10.32 Tendukheda -10.33 Kaimganj (SC) 15.50 Itwa -12.59
    Harda 10.32 Timarni (ST) -10.32 Bansdih 15.03 Rampur Khas -12.19
    Kurwai (SC) 10.30 Hatpipliya -10.12 Paniara 13.87 Bilsi -11.76
    Maihar 10.25 Raigaon (SC) -10.07 Jalalpur 13.54 Ayah Shah -11.52
    Mehgaon 10.18 Kasganj 12.09 Meja -11.12
    Pawai 10.13 Bishwavnathganj 11.41 Amritpur -10.71
    Maharashtra 336384 Deglur (SC) 11.38 Jat -12.07 Bithari Chainpur 11.29 Koil -10.53
    Dhule Rural 10.67 Bilhaur (SC) 11.22 Chamraua -10.42
    Jalgaon City 10.10 Kerakat (SC) 10.84 Kasta (SC) -10.29
    Meghalaya 38647 Mawkynrew (ST) 12.58 Mowkaiaw (ST) -13.42 Karhal 10.71 Dhanghata (SC) -10.20
    Jirang (ST) 12.21 West Shillong -11.93 Bidhuna 10.49 Phoolpur-Pawai -10.18
    Mawlai (ST) 11.67 Resubelpara (ST) -11.64 Mathura 10.14 Saharanpur -10.15
    Sohra (ST) -10.05 Saharanpur Nagar 10.13
    january 17, 2009 Economic & Political Weekly
    EPW

    Table 3: (Continued) Table 4: (Continued)

    State/UT Av Size of AC % Deviation (+10-32%) % Deviation (-10-25%) State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies

    New Delimitation For Column 2 For Column 3

    Uttarakhand 121276 Khanpur 15.54 Laksar -11.32 Gangotri 14.36 Yamkeshwar -10.52

    Delhi Karolbagh Dereserved redrawn as

    Srinagar 13.20 New Delhi

    Bajpur (SC) 10.57

    constituency -West Bengal 272621 Behala Paschim 12.57 Kalimpong -16.02

    -North West Delhi Drawn afresh

    Balurghat 12.14 Baruipur Paschim -12.94

    Total 1 1

    Bandwan (ST) 12.08 Kulpi -11.01

    Gujarat Dhandhuka Merged with Chunchura 12.01 Uluberia Uttar (SC) -10.74

    Surendranagar Kaliaganj (SC) 11.82 Rajarhat Gopalpur -10.73 (new) and Ghatal (SC) 11.68 Malatipur -10.59 Bhavnagar const Daspur 11.39 (Both General).

    Dum Dum Uttar 11.19 Patan Dereserved Chandrakona (SC) 10.95 Kachchh Earlier General Salboni 10.88 Ahmedabad West Carved out of Gandhinagar

    Sreerampur 10.65 and part of

    Nanoor (SC) 10.37

    Ahmedabad

    Egra 10.32

    const Sagar 10.30

    Total 2 2

    Darjeeling 10.10

    Haryana Ambala Ambala Retains as SC Minor territorial Source: CSDS Data Unit.

    variation Sirsa Sirsa Retains as SC Minor territorial variation

    Table 4: Variation in Scheduled Caste Reserved Seats: Old and New Delimitation

    Total 2 2

    State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies

    Himachal Shimla Shimla Retains as SC Minor territorial

    New Delimitation For Column 2 For Column 3

    Pradesh variation

    Andhra Pradesh Nellore, - Dereserved -Total 1 1Siddipet -Dereserved;

    Jharkhand Palamu Palamu Retains as SC Minor territorial Renamed as variation Medak (General) -

    Chatra - Earlier General

    -Warangal, - Earlier Generalredrawn with

    -Chittoor, - Earlier Generalmajor territorial

    -Bapatla - Earlier General

    variation Nagar Kurnool, Nagar Kurnool, Retains as SC Minor territorial

    Total 1 2 Gain of 1 seat

    variation

    Karnataka Bidar Dereserved

    Tripathi, Tirupati, Retains as SC Minor territorial (minor territorial variation variation)

    Amalapuram, Amalapuram, Retains as SC Major territorial Chikkodi Dereserved

    variation (minor territorial

    Pedapalli Pedapalli, Retains as SC Major territorial variation) variation

    Kolar Kolar Retains as SC Minor territorial Total 6 7 Gain of 1 seat

    variation Bihar Bagha Dereserved

    Chamarajnagar Chamarajnagar Retains as SC Minor territorial (Renamed as

    variation Valmiki Nagar)

    Chitradurg Earlier General; Rosera Merged with

    Minor territorial Samastipur

    variation Araria Dereserved

    Gulbarg Earlier General; Nawada Dereserved Major territorial Jamaui Carved out of

    variation Monghyr Bijapur Earlier General; constituencyMinor territorial

    -Samastipur Earlier Generalvariation

    -Gopalganj Earlier General Total 4 5 Gain of 1 seat Gaya Gaya Retains as SC Minor territorial Kerala Ottapalam Omitted.Partvariation merged with Hajipur Hajipur Retains as SC Minor territorial Alathur;major variation territorial

    Sasaram Sasaram Retains as SC Minor territorial variation variation

    Adoor Omitted.PartTotal 7 6 Loss of 1 seat merged with Chhattisgarh Bilaspur Dereserved Mavelikkara Sarangarh Omitted Alathur Carved out of

    Janjgir-Champa Earlier Janjgir Ottapalam (General); Mavelikkara Earlier General; Reorganised as Major territorial Janjgir-Champa variation

    Total 2 1 Loss of 1 seat Total 2 2

    Economic & Political Weekly

    EPW
    january 17, 2009

    Table 4: (Continued) Table 4: (Continued)
    State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies
    New Delimitation For column 2 For column 3 New Delimitation For column 2 For column 3
    Madhya Pradesh Morena Dereserved Hoshiarpur Earlier General;
    Sagar Dereserved Redrawn with
    Major territorial minor territorial
    variation variation
    Shajapur Dewas Retains as SC Fatehgarh Sahib Carved out of
    Renamed;Minor Ropar const
    territorial Faridkot Earlier General;
    variation Major territorial
    Ujjain Ujjain Retains as SC variation
    Bhind - Earlier General; Total 3 4 Gain of 1 seat
    Major territorial Rajasthan Bayana Omitted;Part
    variation merged with
    Tikamgarh - Carved out of Tonk Bharatpur const Dereserved
    Khajuraho Redrawn as Tonk
    Total 4 4 Sawai-Madhopur
    Maharashtra Buldhana Dereserved Jalore Dereserved
    Minor territorial No territorial
    variation variation
    Osmanabad Dereserved Ganganagar Ganganagar Retains as SC No territorial
    Major territorial change
    variation Bikaner Earlier General;
    Pandharpur Omitted Minor territorial
    Part merged variation
    with Madha Bharatpur Earlier General;
    (a new const) Minor territorial
    Amravati Earlier General; variation
    Minor territorial Karauli-Dholpur Carved out of
    variation Swai-Madhopur;
    Ramtek Earlier General; a ST const
    Minor territorial Total 4 4
    Shirdi variation Earlier Kopargaon- a Tamil Nadu Sriperumbadur Dereserved Major territorial variation
    General seat; Minor territorial variation Rasipuram Omitted Part merged with Namakkal
    Latur Earlier General; Pollachi Dereserved
    Minor territorial Minor territorial
    variation variation
    Solapur Earlier General Perambalur Dereserved
    Minor territorial variation Major territorial variation
    Total 3 5 Gain of 2 seats Chidambram Chidambaram Retains as SC Minor territorial
    Orissa Bhadrak Bhadrak Retains as SC Minor territorial Nagapattinum Nagapattinum Retains as SC Minor territorial
    variation variation
    Jajpur Jajpur Retains SC No territorial Tenkasi Tenkasi Retains SC Minor territorial
    variation variation
    Phulbani - Dereserved Triuvallur Carved out of
    Renamed as Sriperambadur
    Kandhamal; Minor territorial variation Kancheepuram Viluppuram Drawn a fresh Carved out of Tindivanam
    Jagatsinghpur Earlier General; Nilgiris Earlier General;
    Minor territorial Minor territorial
    variation variation
    Total 3 3 Total 7 7
    Punjab Phillaur Omitted;Part Uttar Pradesh Bijnor Dereserved
    merged with Major territorial
    Jallandhar variation
    Ropar Omitted;Part Akbarpur Dereserved
    merged with Major territorial
    Fatehgarh sahib variation
    Bhatinda Dereserved Basti Dereserved
    Minor territorial Major territorial
    variation variation
    Jallandhar Earlier General; Saidpur Omitted Part
    Redrawn with merged with
    minor territorial Ghazipur and
    variation Machhlishar
    january 17, 2009 Economic & Political Weekly
    EPW

    Table 4: (Continued) Table 4: (Continued)

    State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies

    New Delimitation For Column 2 For Column 3 New Delimitation For Column 2 For Column 3

    Chail Omitted Part Birbhum Dereserved merged with Minor territorial Fatehpur, variation Kaushambi and Balurghat Dereserved Phulpur Major territorial

    Ghatampur Omitted;Part variation merged with Nabdwip Ranaghat Retains as SC; Jalaun and

    Renamed and Fatehpur

    redrawn as Firozabad Dereserved

    Ranaghat; minor Major territorial

    territorial variation variation

    Jalpaiguri Earlier General; Khurja Dereserved

    Minor territorial Renamed and

    variation redrawn as

    Bangaon Carved out of Gautam

    Barasat and Buddha Nagar

    Bashirhat const Mohanlalganj Mohanlalganj Retains as SC Minor territorial

    Arambagh Earlier General; variation

    Minor territorial Misrikh Misrikh Retains as SC Major territorial

    variation variation

    Bolpur Earlier General; Hardoi Hardoi Retains as SC Major territorial

    Minor territorial variation

    variation Barabanki Barabanki Retains as SC Minor territorial

    Bardhman Purba

    variation

    Total 8 10 Gain of 2 Seat

    Bansgaon Bansgaon Retains as SC Minor territorial variation: Where less than or equal to one-third of total assembly segments in a

    Lalganj Lalganj Retains as SC Major territorial

    given PC inducted/excluded/exchanged with other PC.

    variation

    Major territorial variation: Where more than one-third of assembly segments in a given PC Robertsganj Robertsganj Retains as SC Major territorial inducted in/excluded from/exchanged with other PC. variation

    Source: CSDS Data Unit.

    Jalaun Jalaun Retains as SC Minor territorial variation Table 5: Variation in Scheduled Tribes Reserved Seats: Old and the New Delimitation Hathras Hathras Retains as SC Major territorial State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies variation New Delimitation For Column 2 For Column 3 Nagina Carved out of

    Andhra Pradesh Bhadrachalam,Bijnor

    Parvatipuram

    Bulandsahar Earlier General; Minor territorial

    Adilabad, Earlier General

    variation Mahbubabad, Drawn afresh Agra Earlier General;

    Araku Drawn afresh Major territorial

    Total 2 3 Gain of 1 seat

    variation Shahjahanpur Earlier General;

    Chhattisgarh Sarguja Sarguja Retains as ST

    Minor territorial Raigarh Raigarh Retains as ST variation

    Bastar Bastar Retains as ST Etawah Earlier General;

    Kanker Kanker Retains as ST

    Major territorial Total 4 4

    variation Gujarat Mandvi Bardoli Renamed as Earlier Mandvi;

    Kaushambi Carved out of Bardoli, retains Redrawn with

    Chail as SC minor territorial

    Bahraich Earlier General; variation

    Major territorial variation Dohad Dohad Retains as ST

    Machhlishhar Earlier General; Chhota Udaipur Chhota Udaipur Retains as ST Minor territorial Major territorial variation variation Bulsar Valsad Retains as ST Minor territorial

    Total 17 17 (Renamed) variation

    Uttarakhand Hardwar Dereserved Total 4 4 Major territorial Jharkhand Rajmahal Omitted;part variation merged with

    Almora Earlier General; Godda and Major territorial Dumka PCs variation

    Dumka Dumka Retains as ST Major territorial

    Total 1 1 variation Khunti Khunti Retains as ST Major territorial variation

    West Bengal Coochbehar Coochbehar Retains as SC No territorial

    variation

    Lohardaga Lohardaga Retains as ST Major territorial

    Joynagar Joynagar Retains as SC

    variation Mathurapur Mathurapur Retains as SC

    Singhbhum Singhbhum Retains as ST Minor territorial Vishnupur Bishnupur Retains as SCvariation

    Durgapur Total 5 4 Loss of 1 seat

    Economic & Political Weekly

    EPW
    january 17, 2009

    Table 5: (Continued) Table 5: (Continued)
    State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies State Existing Based on Changed Status of SC Constituencies
    New Delimitation For Column 2 For Column 3 New Delimitation For Column 2 For Column 3
    Karnataka Raichur Dindori Carved out of
    Bellary Malegaon
    Total 0 2 Gain of 2 seats Palghar Carved out of
    Madhya Pradesh Sidhi Dereserved; Major territorial variation previously Dhanu- a ST Const
    Shahdol Shahdol Retains as ST Major territorial Total 4 4
    variation Meghalaya Nil Shillong Earlier General
    Mandla Mandla Retains as ST Major territorial Nil Tura Earlier General
    variation Total 0 2 Gain of 2 seats
    Dhar Dhar Retains as ST Minor territorial Mizoram Mizoram Mizoram Retains as ST
    Jhabua Ratlam Khargone Betul Name changed; Retains as ST variation Minor territorial variation Earlier General; Major territorial variation Earlier General; Minor territorial variation Total Rajasthan 1 1 Swai-Madhopur Salumber Banswara Banswara Dausa Merged with Tonk-Swai Madhopur Omitted;Merged with Udaipur Retains as ST Minor territorial variation Earlier General;
    Total 5 6 Gain of 2 seats Major territorial
    Maharashtra Dahanu Omitted;Part variation
    merged with Udaipur Earlier General;
    Bhiwandi;Palghar Major territorial
    and Nasik const variation
    Malegaon Omitted; Part Total 3 3
    merged with Dhule and Dindori Const Tripura Tripura East Tripura East Retains as ST No territorial variation
    Dhule Dereserved Total 1 1
    Nandurbar Nadurbar Retains as ST Minor territorial variation West Bengal Alipurduars Alipurduars Retains as ST
    Gadchiroli- Earlier Chimur; Total Jhargram 2 Jhargram 2 Retains as ST
    Chimur A General Const Source: CSDS Data Unit.

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