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Tata Motors in Singur: A Step towards Industrialisation or Pauperisation?

The Singur "model" of industrialisation as represented by the now abandoned Tata Motors project in West Bengal has a number of regressive features. The Left Front government in West Bengal, in competition with other states for the location of Tata Motors' Nano automobile complex, fell overboard in offering subsidies to the company. Further, the government did not scrutinise the quantum of land demanded by the company, blundered by offering highly fertile land in Singur, and compounded its mistake by invoking the Land Acquisition Act, thereby compelling landowners to surrender their land at a low price. Its compensation formula was biased in favour of non-cultivating absentee landowners, and grossly unfair to the actual cultivators, bargadars and agricultural labourers, giving rise to concerted opposition from peasants and their supporters.

nirmal@iimcal.ac.in

SPECIAL ARTICLEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW december 13, 200837
SPECIAL ARTICLEdecember 13, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly38
SPECIAL ARTICLEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW december 13, 200839
SPECIAL ARTICLEdecember 13, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly40

250,000 cars a years with an ex-factory value of Rs 100,000 per car against an investment of Rs 1,500 crore.

The advice fell on deaf ears, and the scheme was extended to Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh. Other

The Telegraph, 16 March 2007, and The Hindustan Times, Kolkata Live, 16 March 2007

www.wbidc. com

SPECIAL ARTICLEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW december 13, 200843On the soft loan of Rs 200 crore for a period of 20 years at 1% rate of interest from the WBIDC, the PV of repayments over the next five years is again calculated at different rates of discount in Table1.The main item in the calculation of TML’s benefit is the soft loan (at 0.01% interest) against the VAT and CST dues of TML. If the car’s ex-factory value is Rs 1,00,000, the retail price of the car is likely to be Rs 1,30,000; the VAT (currently, 12% or Rs 15,600 per car) would amount to Rs 390 crore per year (=Rs 15,600 × 2,50,000), if all cars were sold in West Bengal. For sales in other states the state will obtain CST, but for export (the volume is expected to be significant) the state will not realise any indirect tax from TML. West Bengal’s share in all-India sales was last reported at around 5% in 1998 (see Table 1, p 42), and is unlikely to exceed 10% pres-ently. However, all inputs supplied to the plant from local or other sources will attract VAT; these will be set off only against the VAT on cars sold locally. On a rough estimate, West Bengal is unlikely to collect more than Rs 175 crore in VAT, though for the numerical exercise below, I put it higher at Rs 200 crore.8 In Table 1 are shown the PV of benefits to TML over 60 years at different rates of discount; the benefits have a positive sign, while receipts by the exchequer have a negative sign. At the rate of 11% specified in theMOU, the loans on account of VAT andCST con-tinue till the 31st year and repayment stretches from the 31st to the 60th year, resulting in a net outflow over the entire period of Rs 2,044 crore from the exchequer.Now, in Tamil Nadu’s Ultra Mega Automobile Projects (see Section 1), soft loans against the VAT andCST dues over a maxi-mum of 21 years are offered, totalling no more than the value of initial investments, and all flows are calculated at a zerorate of discount. Broadly the same is true for the new industrial policy announced by Andhra Pradesh (The Hindu Business Line, 5 Octo-ber 2008, p 3). Had West Bengal insisted on a zero rate of dis-count, but other clauses remained the same as in the MOU, the state exchequer would have a net inflow of Rs 8,921 crore over 60 years, as shown in Table 1. In particular, TML would obtainVAT loans for just 17 years, or 13 years less than in the MOU.There is hardly any logic behind the choice of 11% as the dis-count rate. As seen in Section 1, the cost of capital for giant firms is only 6%, and that for the state governments is 8%. Alternative estimates of net loss for the exchequer are presented using these discount rates; it is also assumed that repayment ofVAT loans starts as soon as the benefit for TML has reached the targeted amount. At the discount rate of 6% the exchequer would provide VAT loans for 21 years, and its overall loss would be Rs 614 crore; at 8% discount rate, the corresponding figures would be 28 years and Rs 1,737 crore. It seems that the LFG failed to do elementary homework in a bargaining situation, and allowedTML to fix the rate of discount to its own advantage.Again, on compensation for land acquired, the LFG could “afford” to pay much more since the MOU does not specify any figure. Higher compensation would mean a corresponding reduction in VAT loans to TML; at any positive rate of discount, the state exchequer would gain in consequence. In other words, the LFG’s vigorous defence of the initial and revised compensation was pointless, and did not serve the interest of either the peasants or the exchequer.Further, and this is outside the centre’s package for Uttara-khand, the government of West Bengal, according to the MOU, “will provide electricity for the project at Rs 3.00 per kwh. In case of more than Rs 0.25 per kwh increase in tariff in every block of five years, the government will provide relief through additional compensation to neutralise such additional increase”. The current rate for other users in the state is reported to be Rs 4.15 (Business Standard, 9 September 2008). What is the likely extent of subsidy?From TML’s web site one finds that power consumption per vehicle (passenger cars as well as commercial vehicles) at the Pune factory came down from 752.6 kwh in 2000-01 to 580 kwh in 2003-04.9 Elsewhere, one finds that for the Indigo car power consumption per unit also decreased from 1,174 to 851 kwh be-tween 2000 and 2002.10 Since Nano is a small car, per unit con-sumption could be as low as 700 kwh; when the plant operates at full capacity, the annual subsidy (Rs 1.15 per kwh) would then amount to Rs 20 crore. The total would go up over time with a rise in the retail price of electricity, and an increase in plant capacity from 2.5 to 3.5 lakh cars. One may recall that the centre’s commitment to supply power at a fixed price in the 1960s to Hindalco’s aluminum plant in Uttar Pradesh led to a huge drain from the exchequer. I must add (see Section 1) that the company would have obtained in Uttarakhand a similar incentive.To sum up: The LFG’s claim of an increase of Rs 400-500 crore from the Singur project in the distant future is misleading as it ignores the time discount. The state exchequer would end up as a bigloser. 3 Tata’sBusinessLogicIn the last two decades automobile manufacturing all over the world has become increasingly footloose as witnessed by the decline of Detroit in the USA or the Midlands in Britain on the one hand, and the rise of new centres in China, India and south-east Asia on the other. When Volkswagen or General Motors goes to China, their component suppliers follow suit. The same thing happened in Pantnagar after 2003, and many inputs into the in-dustry are fabricated locally. However, more complex compo-nents with large economies of scale in production like engines are sourced from established centres near Chennai and Pune. Since Singur will also have ancillaries, the transportation costs for all the inputs taken together should be the same as between Singur and Pantnagar. The other major concern for a car manu-facturer is the distance from the consumer markets. In the sale of passenger cars, northern India dominates. In 1998, the latest year for which data are available, 44% of cars were sold in the north, 25% in the west, 19% in the south, and only 11% in the east, including 5% in West Bengal.11 It is possible that Bengal’s share has gone up a little since then. Even then Pantnagar should have been the preferred site for domestic sales. However,TML is bank-ing on substantial exports. As Pantnagar is quite far from any port, the company had to find a suitable coastal site.Had the LFG considered these factors, it should have offered like Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, less by way of concessions. Among the coastal states in the east, only Orissa could compete with West Bengal; the latter’s advantage lies not only in much

The Telegraph, 7 June 2008, p 8

The Hindu Business

Line, 21 March 2008, p 11

a bargadar has a heritable right over the land under his/her possession, and is entitled to 75% of the gross output if some of the material costs of cultivation are borne by the former, or only 50% if the costs are entirely met by the landowner. Most studies show that absentee owners rarely contribute to the costs, and very often do not receive even their legal share of 25%. If material costs are roughly one-quarter of the gross output, the net income of the bargadar should be about twice that of the owner. Now, if Rs 100 is paid as compensation per unit of land, the owner-cultivator should receive the full amount, while for land under barga the owner is entitled to only Rs 33 as against Rs 66 for the bargadar. Actually, the state awarded too little to the bargadar (Rs 25) and too much to the landowner (Rs 100). It is no wonder that the bargadars were quite agitated. Apparently,

Hindustan Times, 13 May 2008

Narayana Murthy, the iconic chief mentor of Infosys, has spoken in the same vein.19

All India Reporter, June 2007, SC1414). It seems to me that the LFG made mistakes, even in September 2008, identical to those of the Goan government.

At first sight, this last order may have no relevance for West Bengal, as the LFG has not formulated a rehabilitation scheme comparable to that for the Narmada oustees. If the “land for land” formula is valid for Madhya Pradesh, and the LFG has been s eeking land for private investors on a large scale, there is no reason why the state cannot make similar efforts for displaced peasants. The LFG claims that there is too little of non-agricultural land to satisfy investors’ demand. Land use statistics show that out of a total geographical area (in million acres) of 21.9 in the state, agriculture and forestry account for 17.3, while “area not available for cultivation” and “other uncultivated area” take up respectively 4.0 and 0.7 (WBHRD 2004). Is it not possible to find some land from the last two categories? The “area not available for cultivation” includes land utilised for infrastructure (e g, roads, irrigation, etc), mining, urban area, etc. It is difficult to believe that land for industry cannot be found if one is willing to pay an appropriate price, significantly higher than the pittance the state has been paying to acquire peasant land for industries. In exceptional cases, one may concede that some agricultural land may be converted into other uses, provided the full cost of rehabilitation the displaced persons is borne by the buyer. This will by itself reduce the investors’ demand for such land.

In view of the concern about food security, one must also explore the possibility of augmenting the supply of cultivable land. Not only in Israel that has been commended for converting deserts into arable lands, large chunks of land in Rajasthan have been brought under the plough thanks to massive public outlays. The district of Hughli that includes Singur became agriculturally prosperous after several hundred crore of rupees were invested in the last 4-5 decades (Sinha 2007). Actually, the LFG has implemented a number of small-scale projects for land development. NABARD (2005) gives an account of one scheme in Bardhaman for land levelling that led to an increase in crop output; actual outlay on levelling 29 acres belonging to 57 farmers amounted to less than Rs 14,000 per acre, and the rate of return on investment was quite high at over 30%. The cost would certainly be much higher in an area without any farming. Even if one multiplies the figure by an ad hoc factor of 10 to Rs 1,40,000 per acre for land levelling as well as irrigation and drainage, it would still be a fraction of the LFG’s compensation award for Singur. Hence the LFG’s contention that there is too little of non-agricultural land merely reflects a lack of planning and a desire for a quick-fix solution.

(The Telegraph, 9 March 2007,

p 5)

SPECIAL ARTICLEdecember 13, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly48and Japan. Later, several developing countries, including India, have become important centres of manufacturing catering to domestic and foreign markets.A bright future is predicted inThe Automotive Mission Plan 2006-2015: A Mission for Development of Indian Automotive Industry, 2006 (AMP), published by the Minsitry of Heavy Indus-tries and Public Enterprise23 with large inputs from the industry lobby. Described as a sunrise sector, the industry in 2006, AMP claimed, directly employed 4,50,000 persons in the manufacture of vehicles and components; indirect employment captures, among others, feeder and supplier industries such as repair services, tyre industry, dealers in vehicles and components, vehicle financing and insurance; vehicle drivers are also included. Total employment in all these areas was put at 13.1 million, while the output of motor vehicles stood at $34 billion. Output in 2016 was slated to rise to $145 billion, and total (direct and indirect) employment to 38.1 million. The industry would make a major contribution to incremental GDP, exports and employment. The LFG wanted Bengal to become a preferred destination for new ventures, capturing some of the benefits.Official statistics broadly corroborate the AMP’s base year estimate of direct employment. The “factories” manufacturing vehicles and components, engaged 3,40,000 workers in 2004-05, while “non-factory” units in the unorganised sector, according to the National Sample Survey (NSS), employed (often on a part-time basis) 92,000 persons in 2005-06, as shown in Table 3. While production more than tripled in respect of automobiles as well as two-and three-wheel-ers over the previous decade, factory jobs rose by less than 10%; including the unor-ganised units total workforce rose by 19%. Or, a 1% rise in output led to 0.1% increase in jobs. The incremental employment/output ratio was far lower than the projection in the AMP.Stephen Roach (2004), head of Morgan Stanley Asia and a highly respected business economist, was critical of India’s auto-mobile policy. “I have long felt that there is another glaring short-coming of India’s manufacturing solution – a mistaken impres-sion of its job-creating potential.” He visited two major plants in Pune. Bajaj Auto in the previous decade doubled its output from one to two million two-wheelers while the size of the workforce was pruned to 10,500 from 24,000. At Tata Motors production rose from 1,29,000 to 3,11,500 vehicles over the same period, but the number of jobs was cut from 35,000 to 21,000. Within two years of Roach’s visit, Bajaj shifted the entire production of two-wheelers to Uttarakhand employing no more than 2,000-3,000,ora fraction of what Roach had reported. Taking advan-tage of the centre’s subsidies, it laid off the workforce in Pune. The lavish subsidy, from the centre or the states, reduces the cost ofcapitalto a vanishing point intensifying the trend towards labour-displacing technologies.Global trends are quite similar. An oft-quoted 2001 study by the University of Michigan, prepared for the Alliance of Automo-bile Manufacturers and the Association of International Automo-bile Manufacturers24 found that while 6,31,000 Americans were directly employed in automotive manufacturing, the jobs of more than 6.6 million workers in various sectors were linked in some way to the industry that produced annually about seven million commercial vehicles and six million cars during 2000-02.25 Roughly, each production worker turned out 20 vehicles in a year. Labour productivity in new units shot up in the next few years. Toyota’s Texas plant to manufacture 200,000 full-size Tundra pick-up trucks per annum was set up after 2003 with just 2,000 workers, each producing 100 trucks a year (Vogel 2008). The Nano factory will also use state-of-the-art technology, and as a small car needs less of labour, the projected manpower (in main and auxiliary units) is 2,700 for 2,50,000 cars, i e, 93 cars per worker. Clearly, the AMP’s employment forecast was based on certain norms of “workers per vehicle” that were conjured out of thin air and fly in the face of contemporary evidence.Could the Nano plant in Singur transform Bengal into another hub for automobile manufacturing in the country? Across the world relocation is taking place at a fast pace. The emergence of China, India and other developing countries has already been noted; tariff protection against imports and the existence of a sufficiently large domestic market were the main factors. Unlike China where scores of auto firms still survive thanks to local gov-ernment support against major domestic competitors, Bengal does not have the option. Nor does Bengal or the eastern region have a large market for a big plant. A third factor behind reloca-tion of auto plants is the availability of cheap labour that prompted Japanese and US firms to set up production facilities in China, India, etc, on a massive scale to cater to their respective home markets. Somewhat lesser known is the fact that over 50 new plants in theUSA built by Korean and Japanese firms after 1990 are situated in the “globalised auto plant corridor” in the South, in close proximity to Mexico. The Toyota factory just men-tioned is a good example. While hourly wage in the Midwest’s assembly plants averaged $26 in 2007, these were $13.26 or about one-half in the South (ibid). However, interstate wage differences for large manufacturing plants in India are comparatively small, and Bengal in any case hardly offers any advantage. Like most other states Bengal has to rely on the market forces. Half a century ago it was at the forefront in manufacturing, espe-cially in engineering industries, and the leading auto producer, Hindustan Motors, set up its plant near Kolkata. However, no new plant came up in the state since then. The “old” left in Bengalsquarely blamed the central government for three policy changes. First and foremost, Delhi adopted in the mid-1950s the “socialist” formula of uniform pricing of two key raw materials, steel and coal, across the country to encourage regional disper-sion of industry. But that formula was not extended to other key industrial materials, domestic or imported, on the ground that the “efficiency” of these other industries would be impaired. Thanks to the peculiar cocktail of “socialism” and market-based “efficiency”, Bengal lost out not only in engineering, but also in several others like cotton textiles, chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Table 3: Production and Employment in Motor Vehicles Manufacturing (1994-2005;Number in Thousand) 1994-952004-052005-06Production Automobiles 505 1,565 1,702 Two-and three-wheelers 2,190 6,455 7,602Employment Factories 322 337 na Unorganised units 38 na 92Sources: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) for production; Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) for factory employment; and National Sample Survey (NSS) reports for employment in unorganised establishments.
SPECIAL ARTICLEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW december 13, 200849Further, following again the “socialist” model, public investments were spread across the country, especially in industrially back-ward regions. This objective was no doubt commendable. But it is difficult to explain why, apart from resource-based steel plants and the locomotive workshop in Chittaranjan, no major central manufacturing investments with strong backward and forward linkages took place in Bengal or the neighbouring states. In addi-tion, under the “licenceraj”, the political clout of a state mattered in the location of new industries. Bengal and the eastern regiongot a disproportionately low share in respect of sunrise industries in the private sector (Dutt Committee 1969). This discrimination continued till the early 1990s when the policies of price equalisation for steel and coal, and of industrial licensing, were abandoned. By then steel plants of various descriptions had sprung up in dif-ferent parts of the country, imports of coal and oil became much freer, but the eastern region had lost its comparative advantage.Table 4 shows the shares of some states and regions in the net output of “registered manufacturing” in India from 1958 to 2004-05, and in the country’s population in 2001. Most striking are two features. One, present-day Bihar had an abysmally low share of 0.4% in 2004-05, while her population share was more than 8% in 2001. Two, the percentage share of Bengal in manu-facturing fell monotonically over the same years from 26 to 4, the last being around one-half of the population share. There is no explanation other than that of discrimination owing to industrial licensing policy and the bias in public sector investments up to 1990, deforming the competitive advantage of these two states.Bengal’s fate reminds one of an important paper by Krugman (1987). He showed the long-term impact of short-or medium-term policy changes on domestic firms competing with foreign rivals in industries enjoying large dynamic economies of scale. Marga-ret Thatcher’s tight monetary policy stretching several years pre-vented British firms from making necessary investments, and they yielded the ground to foreign rivals. By the time the policy was reversed, it was too late for local firms to reclaim their old status. Conversely, protection against imports enabled Japanese firms in many industries to expand production and become globally competitive in barely two decades after the mid-1950s and they began to export to the very countries from which they had imported know-how and equipment. As Krugman put it: “Likea river that digs its own bed deeper, a pattern of specialisation, once established, will induce relative productivity changes that strengthen the forces preserving that pattern. Clearly, history matters here even for the long run” (p 112).Ignoring all these factors, the present leaders of the West Bengal CPI(M) distanced themselves from the “old” left, and endorsed the media propaganda about militant trade unionism from the late 1960s onwards as the root cause of industrial stagnation in the state. Actually, Maharashtra in the 1980s had a worse record, but it still garnered the largest share of industrial investment in the country. Following the advice of global consultants, the LFG embraced the neoliberal catchword of public-private partnership whereby the state provides fiscal incentives and facilitates the venture in various forms (land acquisition, etc) for private inves-tors to “deliver” results. TML’s Singur plant was projected as a show-case of this new approach. But the site was chosen by the company for the exception-ally generous subsidies, overt and covert. Can Bengal offer the same for all big investors, given the fiscal constraint? Even if it did, there may not be many takers. After all, Uttarakhand attracted only a handful of big investors; much larger units are coming up in the established regions around Delhi, Chennai, and Pune, althoughthe local subsidies fall far short of those available in Uttarakhand.On the other hand, the employment impact of big-ticket invest-ments in manufacturing has hardly been encouraging for India as a whole, despite the big spurt in investment since the late 1990s. In the public sector total manufacturing employment (in million) reached the peak of 1.85 in 1991, came down to 1.53 in 2000 and further to 1.13 in 2005; in the organised private sector the peak of 5.24 was attained in 1997, and the number came down to 5.09 in 2000 and 4.49 in 2005 (Economic Survey 2007-08, Appendix Table 3.1).In short, theLFG’s industrialisation strategy is thoroughly misconceived.9 ConclusionsThe paper has highlighted two major social costs of the Singur project, and contested one benefit claimed by the LFG.(a) The LFG, in trying to match central bounties available in Uttarakhand, fell overboard in offering subsidies well in excess of those provided to new vehicle manufacturers in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.(b) The government did not scrutinise the quantum of land demanded by the company, blundered by offering highly fertile land in Singur, and compounded its mistake by invoking the dra-conian Land Acquisition Act and compel landowners to surrender their land at a low price. It ignored the fact that the concept of “eminent domain” has been under the scanner even of official agencies, including the Supreme Court, and also the fact that the court had already decided on a much higher compensation for land acquired elsewhere, considering the end-use of the land. Moreover, the LFG’s compensation formula was biased in favour of non-cultivating absentee landowners, and grossly unfair to the actual cultivators, bargadars and agricultural labourers. As a result, the state failed to foresee the depth of opposition from peasants and their supporters.(c) The LFG’s “unique selling point (USP)” of the Singur plant that it would have a ripple effect on the automotive industry, and on Table 4: The Percentage Shares of Selected States in India’s Net Output of “Registered” Manufacturing at Current Prices, in Population(2001) Shares in Net Output Population 1958 1980-81 1990-91 2004-05 2001West Bengal 25.8 11.9 6.8 4.1 7.8Bihar 9.9 2.2 4.4 0.4 8.1Jharkhand nanana6.52.6Orissa 0.91.71.42.33.6Sub-Total 36.615.812.613.222.1Gujarat na10.19.613.95.9Maharashtra na29.724.619.79.4Sub-Total 34.539.834.233.615.3Andhra Pradesh 2.3 4.4 6.5 6.1 7.4Tamil Nadu 7.4 11.0 11.3 8.3 6.0Sub-Total 9.715.417.814.413.4Source: CSO,National Accounts Statistics.
SPECIAL ARTICLEdecember 13, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly50other sectors, with a multiplier effect over time on investment, output and employment, is flawed.From a national or global perspective, however, the Nano rep-resents a significant innovation in the field of passenger cars. As the world’s cheapest car with the lowest running cost, it can effec-tively displace some of the bigger cars that are more costly in terms ofsocial overheads. Environmentalists rightly apprehend that streets in urban India are already choked and the induction of a large number of new cars would make matters worse. Instead of blaming the Nano, one should rather explore ways of restricting the circulation on the roads of all cars, including the Nano. For instance, the State can promote more vigorously public transport. The State can also adopt a variant of the current laws in Singapore (a car can be on the road on alternate days) and London (a steep entry tax into central London with exemption for pollution-free cars).If one grants that the Nano is useful from a social perspective, there is a case for subsidising TML’sR&D outlays (as well as those of other firms that might follow) to a greater extent than is al-lowed under the centre’s income tax laws. But the incentive must come from the centre, and not any state government since the country as a whole will gain. Hence my case is not against the Nano as such, but against the terms of the LFG’sMOU with Tata Motors, and the location of the plant.There is no justification, however, for promoting big industry in private hands through central or state subsidies exceeding investment outlays as in Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and several other states. It is interesting that the Toyota plant in Texas mentioned earlier, received till March 2007, subsidies to the extent of 40% at most of the investment outlays and had adverse consequences for the state’s social sectors (Vogel 2008). In the Indian context, these subsidies are harm-ful for the national exchequer at the present juncture for several reasons.(a) Elsewhere I have shown (Chandra 2008) that India’s fiscal deficit in the last few years is nearly as high as in the late 1980s, when the government succumbed to theIMF and the World Bank. For the past several years the country has been on the brink of a financial crisis.(b) According to the Union Budget, the incentive scheme (see Section 1) led to a loss in 2007-08 of Rs 1,947 crore in corporate taxesfrom Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, while excise duty relief for all privileged regions, including the two states, was Rs 8,500 crore. Along with numerous other schemes, the overall tax loss exceeded 50% of the actual tax (direct and indirect) revenue of the centre. The situation is likely to worsen as more and more of SEZs take shape in coming years.(c) While the centre dotes on big capital, it has been invoking fiscal discipline to cut savagely since 1991 budgetary outlays on capital formation, and on health, education and other “social sectors”, as numerous studies have shown, e g, Ramakumar (2008). Consequently, “shining” India continues to have a lowly rank in the Human Development Index of the UNDP.THE MALCOLM & ELIZABETH ADISESHIAH TRUSTMalcolm Adiseshiah Award for Distinguished Contributions to Development StudiesThe Malcolm and Elizabeth Adiseshiah Trust invites nominations for the Malcolm Adiseshiah Award for Distinguished Contributions to Development Studies, 2009. Aim:To recognize significant achievements in research in the field of development studies and to encourage further contributions.Eligibility:Indian and foreign scholars ordinarily working in India and around the age of 50.Modalities:The Awardee will be selected by an independent jury of eminent academics primarily on the basis of the quality of published research work. The Award carries a citation and a cash prize of Rs.2 lakhs. Further research assistance will be made available to the scholar when required.The Awardee will be expected to deliver the Adiseshiah Memorial Lecture, 2009.The Trust invites academics from universities, research centres/institutes, as well as those presently enjoying no institutional affiliation to nominate eligible scholars for the award. Applications will not be entertained.Nominations with the CV of the nominee/s may be sent to the Executive Trustee of the Trust before28 February 2009 to the following address:The Executive Trustee,Malcolm & Elizabeth Adiseshiah Trust,No.17, (New No.4) I Cross Street, Second Floor, Indira Nagar, Adyar, Chennai – 600 020. Phone: 044 2445 6225; Fax: 0091-44-24456225. E-mail nominations are accepted at: meatrust@dataone.in

5 “New Mega Integrated Auto Policy in TN”, The Hindu Business Line, 8 March 2007. “Uttarakhand Announces New Industrial Policy”, Business Standard, 28 January 2008.

6 Iris News Digest, 23 August 2007, http://myiris.com 7 “CAG Indicts WBIDC for Excess Expenditure on Singur Land”, 27 March 2007. www.outlookindia. com/pti_print.asp?id=557420 8 VAT on cars sold locally is Rs 39 crore. If components purchased by Tata Motors cost 50% of the ex-factory value, the VAT on inputs to cars sold outside the state is Rs 135 crore (=50,000 × 2,25,000 × 0.12). 9

10 www.bee-india.nic.in/sidelinks/EC%20Award/ Download/Automobile2004/Tata_Motors_PCBU %5B1%5D.ppt#356,13,Capacity Utilisation.

11 Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) stopped publishing state-wise sales figures after 1999. The data were obtained from the CMIE.

12 CMIE, and www.bee-india.nic.in/sidelinks/EC%20 Award/eca06/Award2006_CD/02Automobile/Tata MotorsPCBUCarPlant.pdf

13 Hindustan Motors at Uttarpara, close to Kolkata, obtained leasehold rights in 1942 over 714 acres of land for the factory and employees’ housing, but never made full use of it. With the approval of the state, it has sold 314 acres for Rs 295 crore to Shriram Properties, Bangalore, for a variety of new projects. “Singur Public Hearing”, Frontier, 4 February 2007; and “Hindustan Motors Ties Up with Shriram Properties”, The Hindu Business Line, 28 February 2007. The LFG probably charged a small “conversion fee” of Rs 40-45 crore. The original lease required the surplus land to be handed back to the state.

14 “Health City at Revived Batanagar”, The Telegraph, 16 May 2007; The Hindu Business Line, 28 October 2005. and Nerve News: www.nerve.in

15 “Rajarhat Farmers Spurn Compensation”, H industan Times: Kolkata Live, 26 April 2007; and “Writers’ Stick to Rajarhat Land Rate”, The T elegraph, 1 May 2007.

16 Chandra, N K (2008): “

Economic & Political Weekly, 5 April.

Fernandes, W (2007): “Singur and the Displacement Scenario”, Economic & Political Weekly, 20 January.

Kumar, A (2007): “

http://sanhati. com/articles/132/

Task Force Report on Indirect Taxes (2002): finmin.nic. in/KELKAR/prilmidt.pdf.

http://mrzine. monthlyreview.org/vogel200808.html WBHRD (2004): West Bengal Human Development Report, Kolkata, Government of West Bengal.

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