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Japan, the United States and Yasukuni Nationalism

This paper considers the Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese war memory and representation in relationship to contemporary nationalism and its implications for the future of the Asia-Pacific. It emphasises three aspects about the "Yasukuni Problem" and contemporary nationalism that are absent in much of the discussion in Japan, the Asia-Pacific and internationally. The first is the need to transcend an exclusively Japanese perspective by locating the issues within the framework of the Japan-US relationship. The second locates war nationalism in general, and Yasukuni in particular, within the broader purview of competing nationalism in the Asia-Pacific. The third recognises deep fissures among the Japanese people with respect to Yasukuni, nationalism and the emperor in whose name Japan fought, and memories of colonialism and war.

The contentious issues that continue to swirl around war, memory, and representation are central to shaping nationalist thought, the future of Japan, the Asia-Pacific region, and the US-Japan relationship. Why do issues such as the role of Yasukuni Shrine repeatedly and explosively resurface six decades after J apan’s defeat even as the generation that experienced the war is passing from the scene? This seems all the more counterintuitive at a time when the economies and even the cultures of China, J apan and Korea are deeply intertwined.

I will emphasise three points about the “Yasukuni Problem” and contemporary nationalism that seem absent in much of the discussion in Japan, the Asia-Pacific, and internationally. The first is the need to transcend an exclusively Japanese perspective by locating the issues within the framework of the Japan-US relationship that has dominated Japanese politics for more than six decades. The second locates war nationalism in general and “ Yasukuni nationalism” in particular within the broader purview of competing nationalism in the Asia-Pacific, including Chinese, Korean and US nationalisms. The third recognises deep fissures among the Japanese people with respect to Yasukuni, n ationalism, the emperor in whose name Japan fought, and memories of colonialism and war. Each of these has implications for moving beyond the present political impasse and reflecting on approaches that could contribute toward tension reduction in the Asia-Pacific.

Yasukuni Jinja both is and is not a “Japanese” problem. As a Shinto shrine with enduring historical links to the emperor – esta blished in 1869 “to commemorate and honour the achievement of those who dedicated their precious life for their country” – and with a deep a ssociation with every Japanese war from the Meiji era through the Asia-Pacific war, it evokes Japanese tradition linking Shinto, emperor and war.1 Yet to see it simply as Japanese is to neglect a range of f eatures characteristic of contemporary nationalisms. This view i gnores important regional and global forces, particularly the role of the United States, in shaping p olitics and ideology from the Japanese occupation to today.

Yasukuni, Commemoration and the -Japan Relationship

As Yomiuri Shimbun’s editor Watanabe Tsuneo commented t artly of the exhibits at the Yūshūkan museum on the shrine grounds, “

SPECIAL ARTICLEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW november 8, 200873create a unified military-centred war memory for both Japanese and Okinawans. That memory highlighted loyalty to the emperor and rei-fication of the war mission as exemplified by the choice of suicide over surrender.The Japanese government, displaced from Okinawa byUS forces, worked to lay claim not only to the souls of mainland Japanese soldiers who died, but also to those of Okinawan soldiers and even civilians. The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) documents record the fact that in January 1964 “the Japanese cabinet decided to confer court ranks and decorations posthumously to World War II war dead, includ-ing approximately 52,700 Ryukyuan (Okinawans).”8Who were the Ryukyuans chosen to receive court ranks and decorations, and did they, in fact, receive them? Were Okinawan civilians among those enshrined at Yasukuni...hitherto reserved for the military dead? Figal does not provide definitive answers and further research has yet to resolve the issue. It seems likely, however, that Ryukyuan civilians, notably the 580 members of the Himeyuri (Maiden Lily) student nurse corps and the 2,000 strong Blood and Iron Corps, comprised junior high and high school students, called up during the battle of Okinawa and mythologised by the Japanese government for their loyalty, were among those who were slated for honours.9In short, even while Okinawa remained aUS military colony, albeit with recognition that Japan possessed residual sovereignty, Japanese authorities moved to lay claim to the souls of the Okinawan war dead (military and civilian), while memorialising and apotheosising fallen Japanese soldiers.Following Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese administration, on May 15, 1972, the Okinawa Battle Site Governmental Park established by the government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI) was renamed the Okinawa Battle Site National Park and the entire area around Mabuni Hill became the Peace National Park.It is widely believed that Japan has no national cemetery, or that Yasukuni Shrine functions in effect as a national war cemetery that preserves no remains of deceased soldiers. But in 1979, the Shikina Central Ossuary that housed the remains of the unknown war dead was replaced by the National Okinawa War Dead Cemetery (NOWC) at Mabuni Hill. With the war remains transferred from both Konpa-kuno-tō, the local ossuary, and from Shikina, NOWC became Japan’s first and only national cemetery. Figal shows how the cemetery expanded beyond its Okinawan roots to become a national sacred site that commemorates all of Japan’s Asia-Pacific War dead:Prefectures enshrined the spirits of the war dead from all south seas campaigns and in some cases from continental Asia as well, transform-ing the form and function of memorial space in Okinawa from its local roots around Komesu to a national shrine centred at the site where the Japanese commanders committed ritual suicide on June 23, 1945.The cemetery is a Mecca for Japanese tour groups, including mili-tary groups organised by unit and by prefecture, paying homage not only to the war dead from the Battle of Okinawa, but also to the Asia-Pacific War, one celebrating the emperor-military bond.Following the election of Ota Masahide as governor in 1990, Okinawa moved to create the Cornerstone of Peace (Ishiji) at Mabuni Hill, inscribing in stone the names and nationality of the 239,000 combatant and non-combatant dead of all nations: Japanese, Ameri-can, Korean, Taiwanese, British, and Okinawan among others. This cosmopolitan and inclusive approach, with its distinctive Okinawan roots and close attention to the civilian victims of the Battle, stands out among the world’s memorials. The Cornerstone contains this in-scription looking beyond the nationalist passions of war: “The Cor-nerstone of Peace” is a place to remember and honour the 2,00,000 people who lost their lives in the Battle of Okinawa and other battles, to appreciate the peace in which we live today and to pray for ever-lasting world peace.Yet for all its universalism, we note the continued stamp of the na-tion state in two important ways in the memorial spaces at Mabuni. First, the dead are arrayed in separate areas by nationality, and with Okinawans distinguished from the mainland Japanese. Second, Mabuni Hill includes not only the Okinawan representations encap-sulated in the Cornerstone of Peace and Konpaku-no-tō, but the NOWC and the prefectural military memorials with their intimate ties to the Japanese military and Yasukuni Shrine. The mélange of memorials illustrates the conflicting approaches to commemoration between the Japanese state and Okinawan prefectural authorities. We may say that the NOWC is a monument to war while the Cornerstone is a mon-ument to peace. The Cornerstone of Peace is notable for its inclusive-ness in commemorating the dead of all nations, and its honouring of civilians and military victims of the battle. Such inclusiveness has been realised in no mainland Japanese, American, British or German national commemorative site with which I am familiar.10Yasukuni, Nationalism and Historical MemoryThe post-war period brought subtle yet crucial changes in the con-struction of Japanese war memories. During the occupation, Yasu-kuni, like so much else, became a Japan-US construction with implications for the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The Yasukuni problem is most fruitfully viewed in relation to US decisions that include the permanent positioning of US forces in Japan, the pres-ervation of Hirohito on the throne at the symbolic centre of post-war Japanese politics yet subordinate to American power, and the dismantling of state Shinto while allowing the shrine to continue as an independent religious legal entity. Yasukuni’s formal position was redefined by constitutional provisions separating church and state, yet important ritual bonds linking emperor and shrine have remained intact. Because the post-war constitution does not specify a head of state, the emperor and the imperial representative were able to patronise and visit Yasukuni, the chief priest of the shrine held regular audiences with the emperor, and the emperor’s repre-sentative played a central role in shrine rituals without raising legal issues.11 The Yasukuni Shrine was intimately associated with, and provided legitimation for, Japan’s Pacific War. In the 1930s and early 1940s, visits by the emperor provided ideological and spiritual foundations for war and empire.In the post-war period with Japan at peace and occupied by US forces, the shrine has played a role in structuring how the war is remembered and presented to the Japanese people. It did so within a framework crafted by the occupation authorities who exonerated the emperor of all responsibility for initiating or waging war. Indeed, Hirohito was credited by both the occupation authorities and the Japanese government with bringing peace by personally intervening to end the war. Not only would the emperor not be deposed or tried as a war criminal, he would be shielded even from testifying at the
SPECIAL ARTICLEnovember 8, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly74Tokyo trial.12 The verdict at Tokyo, sentencing Tōjōand a small number of prominent military and government officials to death, as well as the convictions of thousands of soldiers and police officials tried in B and C class tribunals, in leaving untouched Japan’s supreme wartime leader and focusing narrowly on the specific crimes of military men, essentially absolved the Japanese people of the responsibility to ex-amine their own behaviour in the era of colonialism and war. For these reasons, the US as well as Japan ultimately share responsibility for resolving issues of war responsibility including those associated with the emperor and the Yasukuni Shrine.Viewing Japan as a MonolithInternational critics of Japanese neonationalism frequently present Japan as a monolithic entity, a nation that is thoroughly unrepentant about, even celebratory of its record in the era of colonialism and war. Throughout the post-war era, however, the Japanese polity has been, and remains, deeply divided over how to remember the era of coloni-alism and war in general, and the Yasukuni problem in particular. This explains the furore among Japanese provoked by prime minister Koizumi Junichiro’s Yasukuni visits and by state approval of textbooks that reiterate neonationalist themes and suppress accounts of war-time atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre, the comfort women, and the role of the military in ordering Okinawan civilians to commit suicide in the course of the battle. For more than half a century public sentiment in favour of the no-war clause in Japan’s constitution has helped prevent the ruling party, with US support, from eliminating Article 9 in order to legitimate overseas military activities. Most important, sustained popular sup-port for Article 9 is widely recognised as one important factor that has enabled Japan, which was more or less continuously at war between 1895 and 1945, to enjoy six decades of peace and prosperity. Popular support has not, however, been sufficient to prevent the ruling coali-tion from steadily eroding the meaning of Article 9 by extending the regional and even global reach of Japanese military power within the US-Japan framework and setting in motion a process of constitutional revision. Popular support for Article 9 goes hand in hand with sub-stantial popular sentiment critical of Japan’s conduct of the Asia- Pacific War and Yasukuni nationalism, a finding repeatedly confirmed in public opinion polls. Japanese critiques of the Pacific War have not been limited to paci-fists and progressives. Kaya Okinori (1889-1977), who led the War Bereaved Families Association (Nihon Izokukai), for 15 years begin-ning in 1962, was finance minister in the wartime Tōjō cabinet. The Association is a powerful political bulwark and lobby for Yasukuni Shrine, and, indeed, for the Liberal Democratic Party, which in turn continues to support family members of deceased soldiers financially six decades after the war. Kaya served 10 years of a life sentence im-posed by the Tokyo Tribunal before being released and eventually taking up a post as justice minister. In his memoirs, Kaya condemned Japan’s war against the US and criticised his own role in the war. His most important point, no less pertinent today than when he wrote, is this: “as a Japanese, it is extremely regrettable that the people them-selves could not judge the responsibility of their leaders.”13 Despite US and Japanese policies encouraging remilitarisation, significant numbers of Japanese have consistently rejected wartime ideology, opposed the dispatch of Japanese forces overseas, criticised the militarisation of the US-Japan security relationship, and support-ed compensation for Japan’s war victims. Numerous Japanese scholars have displayed dedication, resourcefulness and courage in unearthing and analysing Japanese war crimes and atrocities. Their research has made it possible to mount effective public critiques of atrocities and to question fundamental premises of Yasukuni nation-alism. In contrast, for example, to the US anti-Iraq war movement, which fizzled once the war began despite widespread continued popular disapproval of the conduct of the war, Japanese pacifism and activism have been sustained in large and small ways over decades, notably in anti-nuclear movements, but also in movements supporting reparations for the victims of Japanese atrocities. The number of privately-founded peace museums, perhaps more than in the rest of the world combined, provides one measure of this. The 50-year effort by Chukiren veterans (China returnees), who were captured and re-educated in China, and have publicly criticised their own atrocities and those committed by other members of the Japanese military ever since, is another.14Critics of the revival of Japanese neonationalism have good reason to be concerned about trends of recent years, notably Japan’s dis-patch of troops and ships to the Persian Gulf in support of the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.15 At the same time, it is important to recognise that, in contrast to the US, for 60 years, Japan has not gone to war, Japanese have not killed or been killed on battlefields in Asia and beyond, and the proponents of constitutional revision led for half a century by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have not succeeded in eliminating Article 9 of the constitution.Nevertheless, in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Socialist Party as the major opposition party, and the decline of social democracy in the face of a US-spearheaded neoliber-alism, a neonationalist revival has accompanied the redefinition of the US-Japan security relationship.16 Japan’s failure to adequately come to terms with its wartime aggression and the nature of its atro-cities has been and remains an obstacle to the reduction of tensions and the achievement of a viable Pacific community.The issues are not, of course, limited to Japanese intransi-gence, as our discussion of US war conduct has made plain. Progress toward tension reduction will also require action on the part of both Korea and China to curb their own volatile nationalisms in the interest of a common vision for the future of the region. Historian Hong Kal has examined the construction of Japanese and Korean nationalisms through Yasukuni Shrine and the Korean War Memorial in Seoul. In both instances, the governments seek to cloak their legitimacy in the conduct of these wars, the Asia-Pacific War for Tokyo and the Korean War for Seoul. And in both, the presence and influence of the US, first in its wartime role and subsequently, in its post-war construction of Japanese and Korean polities, is palpable even as efforts are made to conceal it.17 While Yasukuni nationalism reverberates throughout the Asia-Pacific, manifestations of South Korean nationalism are projected in the War Memorial Centre on North-South rivalry. Political Logic of Yasukuni NationalismSince 1970, historical issues centred on the China-Japan War, atrocities, and the Yasukuni Shrine, have repeatedly fuelled con-flict. The China factor has grown in importance and complexity
SPECIAL ARTICLEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW november 8, 200875for Japan in recent decades as China emerged as a major power and competitor in Asia and as economic relations among China, Japan, South Korea and the US rapidly expanded. Indicative of the stakes are the fact that in spring 2008, China replaced the US as Japan’s leading trade partner while Japan was China’s number three partner, with bilateral trade totals of $237 billion.18Prime minister Koizumi’s annual Yasukuni pilgrimages were among the three central symbolic and practical international actions of his five-year tenure, together with his visits to North Korea and the dispatch of Japanese ground troops (Ground Self-defence Force – GSDF) to Iraq, as well as naval forces (Maritime Self-defence Force – MSDF) and air forces (Air Self-defence Force – ASDF) to the Persian Gulf. The Yasukuni visits antagonised not only China and Korea, but also the people of other Asian nations and the US.19 They may also have firmed Koizumi’s political base in Japan even while sparking controversy. Paradoxically, it is precisely because Koizumi moved so determinedly to lash Japan to US regional and global strategic designs that Yasukuni loomed so large for him. While Koizumi’s successors have wisely refrained from visiting Yasukuni so as to avoid provoking China and Korea, they have continued to embrace growing Japanese subordination to US power, sought to expand Japan’s military reach within the US-Japan framework, and supported neonationalist calls for textbooks that elide reference to Japan’s war atrocities. This is evident in former prime minister Abe Shinzō’s passage of a new education law and measures setting in motion the process to amend the constitution. One result of prime minister Koizumi’s annual Yasukuni visits, and, to a lesser extent, the battles over Japanese textbook nationalism, was that relations soured and five years passed without a meeting at the highest levels of the Chinese and Japanese leadership between 2001 and 2006.20 This was also a period in which other Japan-China conflicts, notably the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands territorial and oil and gas dispute flared. Japan-South Korea relations were similarly poisoned by the combination of Yasukuni nationalism and territorial disputes centred on the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets, offsetting the poten-tially salutary influence of the shared hosting of the 2002 World Cup and a cultural boom touched off by the unprecedented success in Japan of the Korean TV drama Winter Sonata.The transition from Koizumi to Abe and Fukuda, and the growing recognition in influential sectors of Japanese business and intellectual life of the importance of China and Korea for Japan’s future, have made it possible to put aside, at least temporarily, the passionate encounters over Yasukuni and to reopen diplomatic negotiations at the highest levels. While Japanese neonationalist book and Manga authors as well as filmmakers continue to re-enact the Pacific War and defend the benevolence of Japanese colonial rule and vilify China and Korea, other tendencies are at work. For example, as Matthew Penney has documented, in recent years the most influential Japanese books pub-lished on China by Japanese publishers have underlined Chinese achievements and paved the way toward China-Japan rapproche-ment.21 As the preceding analysis suggests, however, neonationalism remains a latent and dangerous force in Japanese and regional politics.Other factors could contribute to China-Japan tensions. Former prime minister Fukuda’s determination to extend the MSDF role in refuelling the US and coalition ships in the Persian Gulf is indicative of an expansive Japanese military thrust within the framework of US power, one that seems certain to continue under prime minister Asō Tarō. The Japanese military actions in the Gulf, of course, have long-term strategic implications both for guarding Japan’s oil lifeline from West Asia, as well as for extending the reach of the US-Japan strategic alliance. Gavan McCormack has observed that Japan’s deepening struc-tural dependence and subordination require the theatre of nationalism to make it palatable to the Japanese people. The independence that is denied in substance must be affirmed and celebrated in ritual and rhetoric. Indeed, for Japan to become the Great Britain of east Asia, as in its dispatch of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to the war zone of the Persian Gulf, Yasukuni and other rituals of bravado, and educational efforts such as those conducted by the Yūshūkan, are conducted to satisfy pride.22 Nationalist bravado may conceal an overweening reality of dependence. Precisely the Koizumi, Abe, Fukuda and Asō administrations’ support for US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for the Bush administration’s global “war on terror” buy tacit US acceptance of Yasukuni nationalism and an expansive Japanese military role while inflaming Japan’s relations with her neighbours.At a time when many nations bridle at the Bush administration’s scorn for international norms of law and justice, as in its invasion of Iraq and the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and in its unilateral claims to the right to intervene on its own terms everywhere, Japan’s support for US military ambitions increases the importance of Yasukuni as a statement to strengthen the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) nationalist credentials at home. Japan plac-es ever more of its cards on an expansive military alliance with the US, as illustrated by its extraordinary agreement to pay $6 billion (and perhaps, much more) to fund the cost of transferring 8,000 US Ma-rines from Okinawa to Guam.23 As Japan commits to an enlarged re-gional military subordinate to US regional and global power projec-tions throughout the Asia-Pacific, all the more it requires dramatic claims to nationalist credentials domestically. The evolving character of the US-Japan alliance is well- illustrated by the establishment of a forward base or regional headquarters for I Corps, the US Army’s Asia-Pacific and West Asia headquarters at Camp Zama in Kanagawa, Japan.24 In this way, the integration of US and Japanese military planning for the entire Asia-Pacific is being facilitated in flagrant violation of Article 9. The US military’s five-day “Valiant Shield” exercise off Guam in June 2006 brought together US and allied navy, air, marine and coast guard forces involving an armada of three aircraft carriers and 25 other ships, including the Yokosuka-based Kitty Hawk group and other Japan-based ships.25 The 22,000 troops and 280 warplanes, including the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 5th Air Force based in Okinawa, joined in the largest military exercise in the Pacific since the Vietnam War, sending powerful warning signals toward both North Korea and China. Most important, from the perspective of understand-ing the Yasukuni phenomenon, is that Japan’s military subordi-nation to US power enables it to expand its military reach and ignore or flout the strong feelings of Asian neighbours, even those that are important economic partners.Since the 1980s, China-Japan and Korea-Japan economic rela-tionships have grown exponentially at the same time that their

The US-China opening of 1970 and the resurgence of Asian economies in the final decades of the 20th century paved the way for the re-knitting of regional bonds, the emergence of east Asia as one of the world’s three dynamic centres, and China’s reemergence as a regional and global power. This has not given rise to a regionalism of the European Union type characterised by political, security, juridical and diplomatic integration as manifest in the European parliament, a common currency, a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) security regime, and a common judicial structure.28 Contemporary east Asian regionalism, like its post-war European variant, began to take shape within the framework of American geopolitical dominance. However, in the course of the last quarter century, regional economic integration, pivoting on China, Japan and Korea, and measured by trade, investment, and technology transfers, has proceeded rapidly, while signs abound of US decline. The US retains regional and global strategic primacy and a major economic position. But its chronic problems of soaring balance of payments and budget deficits, the collapse of the value of the dollar against Asian and other currencies, and a costly permanent and unwinnable permanent war on terror, culminating in the financial pandemic of 2008 all underline its relative decline and point toward profound changes in the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region.

In recent years, regional integration in east Asia has been reinforced by new levels of cultural interaction (albeit not without xenophobic reaction) involving film, TV, anime, music, sports, and Manga, with cultural exchanges among China-Japan-South Korea interchanges among the most dynamic and intense. At the same time, wider efforts at regional integration have centred on Association of South-East-Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN + 3 ( China, Japan and Korea) and other variations have emerged, with China playing a vigorous regional role and Japan a far more reticent one. This pattern has been replicated in the Six-Party talks centred on the North Korea bomb and the US-North Korea relationship in which China has played a leading role, while J apan remains at best a reticent partner. Other regional formations have simultaneously appeared, notably including the Shanghai Group linking Russia, China and central Asian nations, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). China has led in many of these regional endeavours, while a much more prosperous and technologically advanced J apan has been content to reaffirm its subordinate ties to the US and has been slow to respond to emerging regional formations in which a resurgent China could play a major or even leading role.

Major obstacles continue to confront the realisation of the c ooperative possibilities inherent in the economic and cultural realms of regional cooperation in east Asia. None seem more important than the potential clash with the political and strategic dimensions of Japanese nationalism and/or the US-Japan order, both of which appear to centre on curbing an ascendant China.

A dilemma confronting east Asia in the new millennium is how to mediate nationalisms that inflame historical antagonisms. To the extent that the critique of the chauvinism of others serves to privilege one’s own nationalism, the result can only be a deepening spiral of conflict. It is essential that critiques of nationalism begin, therefore, with close examination of one’s own nation: the roots and consequences of its nationalism, its record as a colonial power, an invader, and an oppressor of other peoples including ethnic minorities. This applies above all to Japan, the US and C hina, but no significant nation is exempt. This can provide a foundation for exploring the possibilities of alternative cooperative perspectives. The post-war predominance of US power has long granted Japan impunity from confronting its own atrocities and its aggressive and interventionist posture. Assessment of the Yasukuni problem, in particular one by an American, must locate the issues within the parameters of the US-Japan relationship. This requires reflection on both Japanese and American war crimes and atrocities that have yet to be recognised and effectively a ddressed by the Japanese or American governments in the form of apologies and compensation of victims, and ultimately in each nation’s textbooks, museums and historical monuments.

History matters. The starting point for reconciliation in the wake of wars, as the German experience amply demonstrates, lies with overcoming historical amnesia to recognise one’s own war crimes and atrocities and redress victim grievances. In the to continue to fight anew many of the still unresolved battles of a absence of steps by all parties towards overcoming the poisonous war that ended more than six decades ago but continues to reverlegacy of earlier wars, the Asia-Pacific region could be destined berate powerfully in historical memory. index.html.

Yasukuni Shrine, Nationalism and Japan’s International Relations.

. See the joint editorial by the Yomiuri and Asahi calling for a national memorial to replace Yasukuni Shrine: ‘Yomiuri and Asahi Editors Call for a National Memorial to Replace Yasukuni’ by Wakamiya Yoshibumi and Watanabe Tsuneo

The Yomiuri also published a 22 part series on “war responsibility” that remains available at their web site


. For an astute assessment of the Yomiuri project, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘Who is Responsible? The Yomiuri Project and the Enduring Legacy of the Asia-Pacific War’,

. The same is true of groups that challenge state power through armed struggle in the name of d emocracy, national independence, revolution, eternal salvation, or other goals

Heroic Resistance and Victims of Atrocity: Negotiating the Memory of Japanese Imperialism in Chinese M useums’, Negotiating_the_Memory_of_Japanese_Imperialism_in_Chinese_Museums.

John Breen’s sensitive analysis of the shrine’s rites of apotheosis and propitiation well documents the nexus of power and ideology that gives the shrine its special place in contemporary Japan. Casualties.

A Foot Soldier in the War Against Forgetting Japanese Wartime Atrocities

and Hein___A__Takenaka-Exhibiting_World_War_ II_in_Japan_and_the_United_States_

Reuters, May 4, 2008. world/asia-pacific/1491091.stm.

The Cultural Career of the Japanese Economy: Developmental and Cultural Nationalisms in Historical Perspective’

Okinawan Environmentalists Put Robert Gates and DOD on Trial. The Dugong and the Fate of the Henoko Air Station, Environmentalists_Put_Robert_Gates_and_DOD_ on_Trial__The_Dugong_and_the_Fate_of_the_ Henoko_Air_Station.

. I Corps headquarters remains at Fort Lewis, Washington.

On Japanese museums, see Akiko Takenaka and Laura Hein, ‘Exhibiting World War II in Japan and the United States

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