
COMMENTARY
legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional appeal. For that alone gives the decision of the Court a direction which is certain, and unfaltering, and that especial permanence in legal jurisprudence which makes it a base for the next step forward in the further progress of the law…4
The point of the Court above is put in slightly different words by former chief justice, A S Anand, in his advice of caution against what he termed “judicial adventurism”:
With a view to see that judicial activism does not become ‘judicial adventurism’ and lead a Judge going in pursuit of his own notions of justice and beauty, ignoring the limits of law…The Courts must be careful to see that by their overzealousness they do not cause any uncertainty or confusion either through their observations during the hearing of a case or through their written verdicts...
All it means is that judges are expected to be circumspect and self-disciplined in the discharge of their judicial functions.5 To be sure, human suffering and a capacity to relate with it is critical for a judge writing a judgment on human rights and in this sense his emotions do provide him the spur to intervene. However, the point is that he cannot decide based on what Supreme Court refereed to in the case above as “purely emotional
appeal”. Perhaps justice Anand wanted to say precisely this – that when emotions cannot be tempered by legal reasoning and “strict legal principle”, judicial adventurism ignoring the limits of law is the most likely result.
(iii) Ensuring against Loss of Credibility: In the era of “judicial co-governance” the judiciary also runs the risk of losing credibility especially if its orders are not implemented. Some years ago j ustice S P Bharucha had expressed this concern as follows:
This Court must refrain from passing orders that cannot be enforced, whatever the fundamental right may be and however good the cause. It serves no purpose to issue some high profile mandamus declaration that can remain only on paper. It is counterproductive to have people say, “The Supreme Court has not been able to do anything” or worse. It is of cardinal importance to the confidence that people have in the Court that its orders are implicitly and promptly obeyed and it is, therefore, of cardinal importance that orders that are incapable of obedience and enforcement are not made. 6
Justice Krishna Iyer recently
echoed justice Bharucha’s words saying, “without the active protective cooperation of the executive, judges will be helpless. We hold the court as deserving sublime status and I will be the saddest to see this grand stature diminish.”7 The Supreme Court in one of its recent orders last year also expressed concern on these aspects saying
the tendency in some courts/tribunals to legislate or perform executive functions cannot be appreciated. Judicial activism in some extreme and exceptional situation can be justified, but resorting to it readily and frequently, as has lately been happening, is not only unconstitutional, it is also fraught with grave peril for the judiciary.8
It is worth noting that the justification of the courts for interventions has been that they have been forced to do so because of executive or legislative failures. However, there are clear limits to judicial substitution for failed institutions and it also serves to keep in mind S P Sathe’s point that judicial activism does not have its legitimacy because the other organs of the government have failed.
(iv) Guarding against Excessive J udicial Restraint without ‘Taking-Over’: A concern for issuing only “implementable” judicial orders does not per se translate into courts restraining themselves from intervening where they ought to. However, justice Katju has been emphasising the significance and virtues of what he refers to as “judicial restraint” in both (a) ensuing judicial independence and (b) maintaining the principle of separation of powers. Thus in one of his recent verdicts justice Katju observes:
Judicial restraint not only recognises the equality of the other two branches with the judiciary, it also fosters that equality by minimising interbranch interference by the judiciary. In this analysis, judicial restraint may also be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary for the other coequal branches. In contrast, judicial activism’s unpredictable result make the judiciary a moving target and thus decreases the ability to maintain equality with the co-branches. Restraint stabilises the judiciary so that it may better function in a system of interbranch equality.9
The “judicial respect” as pronounced by justice Katju can be a tricky concept as a concern only with “respect by the judiciary for the other coequal branches” can quickly lead to excessive judicial restraint and this in turn leads to compromising
august 16, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
