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The Accumulation Process in the Period of Globalisation

The inflation in food prices of the early 1970s that arose out of excess demand for cereals disappeared in later years not because of any significant supply augmentation, but because it was substituted by an income deflation on the working people, including the peasantry, over large tracts of the world. This income deflation, brought about by the imposition of neoliberal policies, compressed demand and kept food and other commodity prices in check. But over the longer term, income deflation has undermined the very viability of peasant agriculture, adversely affecting supply. All this is part of the process of "accumulation through encroachment" which had been a central feature of colonialism and has re-emerged with a vengeance in the era of globalisation.

PERSPECTIVEjune 28, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly108The Accumulation Process in the Period of GlobalisationPrabhat PatnaikIn preparing this lecture, which is part of a series being organised in memory of D D Kosambi in his centenary year, I have been tempted strongly to choose a topic that would have been of interest to him. Accordingly I shall devote this lecture to what everyone is concerned about these days, namely, the world food crisis.11Paul Krugman of the Massachusetts Insti-tute of Technology, whose column appears in several Indian newspapers, had compared, in his column inThe Hindu of April 22, the present worldwide excess demand for a number of primary commod-ities, which inter alia underlies the current inflation, with a similar state of excess demand for commodities that had arisen in the early 1970s. He argued that while the earlier state of excess demand was overcomethrough supply adjustment, such as new oil strikes in the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, and the entry of new land into cultivation, the same might not happen this time around, because the scope for supply adjustment was now much more restricted.Krugman however is not correct. The resource crisis of 1972-75 was not univer-sally overcome through supply adjust-ment. In the case of the most vital primary commodity, namely, foodgrains, it was overcome, not through any appreciable stepping up of supplies, but through a severe compression of demand, and the latter happened through an income deflation imposed over much of the world. The regime of “globalisation” interaliawas a means of enforcing such an income deflation.It is often not recognised that income deflation plays a role exactly equivalent to that of inflation in compressing demand. Of course, the term “inflation” itself is an ambiguous one. The notion of inflation in current orthodox economics refers to a state of affairs where all prices, including money wages, are rising pari passu, so that there is no worsening of the condition of the working masses per se and the only sufferers are those with cash balances, most of whom are likely to be rich. But inflation as we know it in real life, especially in a country like ours, where the bulk of the workers do not have wages indexed to prices, is one that hurts the working masses. Keynes (1930) had called this latter kind of inflation “profit infla-tion”, and had recognised it as a phenom-enon of great importance under capital-ism. In situations where supply could not be rapidly augmented, it overcame excess demand by raising prices relative to money wages, and thereby bringing abouta shift of income distribution from wages to profits (whence the term “profit inflation”), which, because the capitalists tended to save more out of income than workers, had the effect of lowering overall demand. Now, this demand compressing effect of a profit inflation can also be achieved through an income deflation imposed on the working masses. Starting let us say from a situation where the money wage rate is 100 and the price is 100, a reduction in the wage rate to 50 with price remain-ing the same has exactly the same effect of lowering workers’ demand as a rise in price to 200 with the money wage rate remaining at the original level. What is more, even though income deflation and profit inflation have exactly identical effects by way of compressing the demand of the working masses, finance capital prefers the former to the latter since profit inflation entails a decline in the real value (vis-a-vis the world of commodities) of financial assets, and may in extreme situations make wealth-holders turn to holding commodities in lieu of financial assets altogether. Income defla-tion therefore, even while keeping excess demand in check, and yet increasing the share of profits earned in the organised sector of the world economy, exactly as a profit inflation would have done, has the added “advantage” of keeping finance capital happy. Income deflation for the The inflation in food prices of the early 1970s that arose out of excess demand for cereals disappeared in later years not because of any significant supply augmentation, but because it was substituted by an income deflation on the working people, including the peasantry, over large tracts of the world. This income deflation, brought about by the imposition of neoliberal policies, compressed demand and kept food and other commodity prices in check. But over the longer term, income deflation has undermined the very viability of peasant agriculture, adversely affecting supply. All this is part of the process of “accumulation through encroachment” which had been a central feature of colonialism and has re-emerged with a vengeance in the era of globalisation. This is a slightly revised version of the text of the D D Kosambi Memorial Lecture delivered in Pune on May 8, 2008. I wish to thank Govind and Kalindi Deshpande, P Venkatramaiah, Akeel Bilgrami, Joseph Stiglitz, C P Chandrasekhar, Jayati Ghosh, Javeed Alam and Utsa Patnaik, for their comments on an earlier draft.Prabhat Patnaik ( is with the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
PERSPECTIVEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW june 28, 2008109working population of the world, which includes, apart from the proletariat proper, the peasantry, the petty producers, the agricultural workers, and other unorgan-ised sector workers, becomes a pervasive phenomenon in the era of globalisation, characterised as it is by the rise to hegemony of a new kind of international finance capital based on a process of globalisation of finance.2The fact that the inflation of the early 1970s arising out of excess demand for primary commodities disappeared in later years was because it was substituted by an income deflation on the working people over large tracts of the world, and not because of any significant supply augmen-tation of non-oil primary commodities, as Krugman believes.According to the FoodandAgriculture Organisation (FAO), the total world cereal output in the triennium 1979-81 was around 1,573 million tonnes for a population (for the mid-year of the trien-nium, 1980) of 4,435 million. For the trien-nium, 1999-2001 the cereal output had increased to around 2,084 million tonnes for a population (for the mid-year of the triennium, 2000) of 6,071 million. This represents a decline in world per capita cereal output from 355 kilogrammes in 1980 to 343 kilogrammes in 2000. Given the fact that during this period per capita income in the world has increased signifi-cantly, and given the fact that the income elasticity of demand for cereals (consumed both directly and indirectly via processed food and animal feed) is markedly positive (even if less than one), a stagnant or declining per capita cereal output should have spelled massive shortages leading to a severe inflation in cereal prices. Such an inflation, since it would have occurred in a situation where the money wage rates in the manufacturing sectors around the world, to which manufactured goods’ prices are linked, were not increasing pari passu with cereal prices, would have meant a shift in the terms of trade between cereals and manufactured goods in favour of the former.But this did not happen. On the contrary, cereal prices fell relative to manufactured goods’ prices by as much as 46 per cent over these two decades.3 This suggests that the decline in per capita cereal output, in a situation of rising world per capita income, did not generate any specific inflationary pressures on cereal prices. The reason it did not is the income defla-tion imposed over much of the world. It is this, rather than any supply increase as Krugman suggests, that explains the absence of any specific trend inflationary pressures in cereal prices (i e, ignoring fluctuations) until recently. And this income deflation was imposed over much of the world via the phenomenon of globalisation.2Income deflation is not a single process but the outcome of a number of different processes, which deflate not just the money wage rate as in the earlier numeri-cal example, but more importantly the level of employment and income, espe-cially in the non-capitalist, petty produc-tion sectors. It is income deflation in this comprehensive sense that eliminates the excess demand that would have arisen in its absence, given the fact of sluggish increases in supplies.Three ProcessesThere are at least three processes contrib-uting to the phenomenon of income defla-tion, in this comprehensive sense, over much of the world in the era of globalisa-tion. The first is the relative reduction in the scale of government expenditure. Globalisation, as mentioned earlier, consists above all in the globalisation of finance. Huge amounts of finance capital are moving around the world at a dizzying pace in the quest for speculative gains, so much so that even a fairly conventional economist like James Tobin had to ask for a tax on currency transactions in order to slow down this dizzying pace of movement. Because economies caught in this vortex of globalised finance can be easily destabi-lised through sudden flights of finance capital, retaining the “confidence of the investors” becomes a matter of paramount importance for every economy, for which their respective states have to show absolute respect to the caprices of globalised finance.Finance capital in all its incarnations has always been opposed to an interventionist state (except when the interventionism is exclusively in its own favour). An essential element of this opposition has been its preference for “sound finance” (i e, for states always balancing their budgets, or at the most having a small pre-specified fiscal deficit as a proportion of the GDP). The argument advanced in favour of this preference has always been vacuous, and was pilloried by Joan Robinson as the “humbug of finance” [Robinson 1962]. The preference nonethe-less has always been there, and has become binding in the era of globalised finance, when states willy-nilly are forced to enact “fiscal responsibility” legislation that limits the size of the fiscal deficit relative toGDP. At the same time, this move towards “sound finance” is accom-panied by a reduction in the tax-GDP ratio, owing to tariff reduction and to steps taken by states competing against one another to entice multinational capital to set up production plants in their respec-tive countries. The net result of both these measures is a restriction on the size of government expenditure, especially welfare expendi-ture, transfer payments to the poor, public investment expenditure, and development expenditure in rural areas. Since these items of expenditure put purchasing power in the hands of the people, especially in rural areas, the impact of their curtailment, exaggerated by the multiplier effects which are also to a significant extent felt in the local (rural) economy, is to curtail employment and impose an income deflation on the rural working population. The second process is the destruction of domestic productive activities under the impact of global competition, from which they cannot be protected as they used to be in the dirigiste period, because of trade liberalisation that is an essential compo-nent of the neoliberal policies accompany-ing globalisation. The extent of such destruction gets magnified to the extent that the country becomes a favourite destination for finance, and the inflow of speculative capital pushes up the exchange rate. Even when there is no upward move-ment of the exchange rate and not even any destruction of domestic activity
PERSPECTIVEjune 28, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly110through the inflow of imports, the desire on the part of the getting-rich-quick elite for metropolitan goods and lifestyles, which are necessarily less employment- intensive than the locally available tradi-tional goods catering to traditional life-styles, results in the domestic production of the former at the expense of the latter, and hence to a process of internal “de-industrialisation” which entails a net unemployment-engendering structural change. This too acts as a measure of income deflation.The third process through which income deflation is effected is a secular shift in the terms of trade themselves against the petty producers of primary commodities, and in particular the peasantry. This may appear paradoxical at first sight. We had argued earlier that the decline in the terms of trade for cereals between 1980 and 2000 was a conse-quence of income deflation; to argue that income deflation is a consequence of the terms of trade shift seems to contradict the earlier argument and reverse the causation. There is however no contradic-tion here. A distinction needs to be drawn between an autonomous shift in the terms of trade, which is brought about, say, through pricing policy in the capitalist manufacturing sector, and an induced shift in the terms of trade that arises as a result of the autonomous shift through changes in the state of demand and supply for the primary commodity in question. An autonomous shift in the terms of trade (through, say, an increase, compared to the initial situation, in the administered price of manufactured goods, by monopoly capitalist producers) is like a tax, much the way that Preobrazhensky (1926) had visualised it. The imposition of such a tax may force larger primary commodity supplies from the petty producers which affects the prices they get, and hence a further adverse movement in their terms of trade (provided that manufactured goods’ prices are not lowered after their initial autonomous increase, because of the lowering of primary commodity prices, i e, that they are subject to a “ratchet effect”). A terms of trade shift therefore both causes and is caused by an income deflation of petty producers.There is also an additional mechanism. Even when there is no shift in the terms of trade against particular commodities, there is nonetheless a decline in the terms of trade obtained by the producers of those commodities because of the increasing hold of a few giant corporations in the marketing of those commodities. This too has the effect, via a shift in income distribution from the lower-rung petty producers to the higher-rung marketing multinational corporations of curtailing the consumption demand of the former, and hence the level of world aggregate demand, which in turn curtails inflationary pressures on primary com-modities themselves.Globalisation, in other words, unleashes massive processes of income deflation which, while playing exactly the same role as profit-inflation in curbing excess demand pressures, keep commodity prices in check. And this is what we have been witnessing in the entire interregnum between the inflation of the early 1970s and the recent revival of inflation. 3The question arises: why is the increase in the demand for primary commodities not met through an increase in supply? Why is it that demand itself has to be compressed, either through a profit-inflation or through an income deflation imposed on the working population? The answer lies inter alia in the fact that, for agricultural primary commodities at any rate, supply increase requires the use of additional land. At a time when capitalism was extending into the “new world”, the local inhabitants consisting of Amerindians could be driven off the land, and migrants from the metropolis could settle on this land and undertake production to satisfy the requirements of capital. Supply increases in other words could and did occur to serve the requirements of the capitalist world economy, though this process was also accompanied by a paral-lel process of an income deflation imposed on the pre-capitalist producers of the tropical colonies, through a combination of taxation and import-induced de- industrialisation, to compress their demand and squeeze out resources for world capitalism [Bagchi 1982]. With the closing of the “frontier” in the “new world”, which Keynes (1919) saw as a turning point in the history of capitalism, further increase in supplies of agricultural commodities required essentially the adoption of land-augmenting technologi-cal progress in densely-populated areas of settled peasant agriculture. Capital did not directly have access to land in these areas; and it could not drive the vast peas-ant population off the land by force as it had done in the temperate regions of white settlement. If supplies had to be aug-mented, then the requisite land- augmenting technological progress had to be introduced within the framework of peasant agriculture. This did happen in the post-decolonisa-tion period through the dirigiste regimes of the third world adopting a number of measures to promote multiple cropping and improve yields. These measures even culminated in the ushering in of the so-called “green revolution” in countrieslike India. But with the dirigiste regimes run-ning into crisis, especially a fiscal crisis, and with their supersession by the neoliberal regimes of the era of globalisation, the scope for such supply increases dried up. It is not in the nature of capitalism to develop peasant agriculture. The fact that peasant agriculture got a boost during the dirigiste period was precisely because dirigisme, a natural sequel to the national liberation struggles of the third world, did not represent capitalism in its spontane-ous development, did not express the immanent tendencies of capitalism, but stood for an intervention in this spontaneity “in the interests of the nation”, though within clearly bourgeois bounds. Dirigisme, like its counterpart Keynesian-ism in the advanced capitalist countries, could only be transitional. As the special conjuncture producing it passed, dirigisme gave way to neoliberalism. The immanent tendencies of capitalism asserted themselves against the earlier regime of interventionism, and trans-formed the nature of state intervention from one that invoked a notion of “national interest”, not identical with the interest of finance capital, into one that saw the two setsofinterest as being identical. With this came a basic shift in the fate of peasant agriculture. The immanent
PERSPECTIVEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW june 28, 2008111tendency of capitalism is not to promote peasant agriculture; as Lenin had said in hisImperialism (2000, p 89), if capitalism could develop agriculture “which today everywhere is lagging terribly behind industry”, then it would not be capitalism. Its immanent tendency on the contrary is to dispossess peasants of their land and other means of production, which in areas of settled peasant agriculture can only occur over a period of time. And the squeeze employed on the peasantry by this immanent tendency of capitalism in the current era is itself ipso facto an act of income deflation. It is an income deflation imposed on the peasantry and is covered within our general concept, namely, the imposition of an income deflation upon the working population under globalisation. The income deflation on the working population therefore, and hence the com-pression of the latter’s demand as a means of squeezing out agricultural primary commodities (as opposed to increasing the supplies of these commodities to meet the growing demand that would arise in the ab-sence of such compression), is part of the im-manent tendency of capitalism, which also manifests itself in the current epoch.4This distinction between supply augmen-tation and demand compression of the working population, as the two alterna-tive means of overcoming the tendency towards ex ante excess demand for primary commodities that arises in the process of expanded reproduction of capital can be expressed somewhat differ-ently. Any particular bloc of capital can grow, conceptually, in two ways. One is by reinvesting its surplus value and thereby growing bigger; the other is by annexing other blocs of capital, or by taking overcommon property, or the property of non-capitalist petty producers, or that of the state. The first of these constitutes “accumulation through expansion”; the second consti-tutes “accumulation through encroach-ment”. These terms which we have defined with respect to one particular bloc can also be used for larger blocs, and even for the entire bloc of capital in the world economy. In each case the pictures corresponding to thetwo processes can be clearly visualised.4 The argument of the preceding section can then be expressed as follows: taking the entire bloc of capital in the world economy, its accumulation through expan-sion necessarily has to be complemented by a process of accumulation through encroachment. As capital accumulates in the world economy, it requires, at the base price, certain material elements of means of production and means of subsistence. The supply of these elements however does not grow to satisfy, at the base prices, the requirements of capital accumulation. Since any process of price increase above the base price is against the interests of finance capital, the imbalance between the increases in demand and supply at the base price, is overcome by compressing demand not only of the workers directly employed by this bloc of capital, through curbs on their money wages, but above all by forcibly compressing the demand exist-ing outside the domain of this capital, so that the overall supply limitations do not adversely affect the requirements of capital. Such compression, which means the snatching of resources for the capital-ist sector from the petty production sector outside of it, constitutes accumulation through encroachment.Of course if the petty production sector, in particular peasant agriculture, could grow in tandem with the capitalist sector, i e, if there could be a balance between the growth of the different sectors, then the need for accumulation through encroach-ment would not arise. But the very scope of accumulation through encroachment forecloses this possibility. The capitalist sector sells its goods there at the expense of the traditional producers, and this is enough to compress demand for the primary commodities and release them for the capitalist sector. The capitalist sector jacks up its price owing to monopoly pricing; and this is enough to release resources for it through a compression of demand of petty producers. In other words, accumulation through encroach-ment is not the outcome of some conspir-acy; it is simply the outcome of relations between two sectors of unequal strength; and its being there forecloses the possibil-ity of supply augmentation (the dirigiste phase being an exception because of its historical context).An example can make the point clear. The capitalist sector can meet, say, its raw cotton requirements in any one of two ways: if the peasant agricultural sector increases its supply to match the require-ment of the capitalist sector; or if some traditional cotton manufacturers are thrown out of their occupation and the raw cotton they were using becomes avail-able to the capitalist sector. Since it is in the nature of capitalism to capture markets from pre-capitalist producers, its “normal” functioning will entail its meeting its raw cotton needs through the second route. And this very fact will foreclose the first route, which, in any case, it is not in the nature of capitalism to follow. Accumula-tion through encroachment therefore is an intrinsic property of capitalism, which is based not on balanced but on uneven development of the different segments of the world economy.Closing of the FrontierThis feature of capitalism comes into particular prominence in the contempo-rary epoch because of the closing of the “frontier”, so that even such supply adjust-ments as were possible in the period of availability of “empty spaces” (which were not actually empty since they were peopled by Amerindians and other local inhabitants) are no longer possible now. The period of “globalisation” therefore has two specific features: first it charac-terises a world where supply adjust-ments, at least of agricultural primary commodities, have limited scope, and hence accumulation through encroach-ment, entailing compression of demand of the working people all over the world, must come to the fore. Secondly, unlike in the colonial period where the colonial state enforced both deindustria-lisation and taxation which were major instruments for compressing demand, the imposition of neoliberal policies does this compression even in the absence of any political domination of the colonies, i e, even in a situation of political decoloni-sation. We now have accumulation through encroachment without colonialism.The idea that capital accumulation required encroachments being made on
PERSPECTIVEEconomic & Political Weekly EPW june 28, 2008113cultivation; it was because of income deflation. And such growth in output as occurred was owing to the adoption of land-augmenting technological progress in countries like India and China. The technological scope for such progress is far from over. The real problem is that the agency through which such progress could be introduced, namely, the peasantry, is, because of this very income deflation, no longer in a position to do so. In fact, income deflation has taken its toll on the peasantry to a point where even simple reproduction of the peasant economy is no longer possible in countries like India, as is evident from the mass suicides of the peasants.We have so far seen income deflation as a mechanism purely of demand compres-sion. While it does compress demand immediately, it also has a long run effect on supply. As it undermines the viability of the peasantry, simple reproduction is no longer possible and supplies drop. The impossibility of simple reproduction of the peasant economy of course is the means through which the peasantry gets dispos-sessed of land and becomes destitute; it is precisely what capital wants and enforces. It represents nothing more than the march of capital.8 But it is this march of capital that is creating a crisis for mankind. If the march of capital had brought misery to mankind in the form of world wars in an earlier epoch, it is threatening to bring misery to mankind in the form of food shortage and starvation in the current epoch. What we are seeing today is not some kind of a natural limit being reached by mankind, but the limit to which capitalism has dragged mankind.9 This limit can be transcended, but only when the social system underlying it is transcended.6The tendency of capitalism as a social system is to dispossess the vast mass of the peasantry. The alternative social system that a transcendence of capitalism must bring about should be one that defends and promotes the peasantry instead of making it destitute. This does not neces-sarily mean a promotion of petty produc-tion and individual peasant farming. Collective and cooperative forms of operation, and even ownership, voluntar-ily entered into by the peasantry, can transform and modernise peasant agricul-ture, without dispossession and destitu-tion of the peasantry. The alternative social system therefore does not have to be one based on petty production, but it must be one that ensures a balanced devel-opment of different sectors through a changing but non-exploitative relation-ship between different classes, and correspondingly changing forms of property relations and of production organisation. The core of the system has to be social ownership of the modern means of production, for that alone, by overcoming the “spontaneity” of capita-lism, enables society to consciously fashion its own destiny.The social system that the transcend-ence of capitalism must bring about in other words can only be socialism, not necessarily in the form it had taken in the past (or is taking today in China), but not too far perhaps from the form which Lenin had originally visualised at the time of the Revolution, when he had set great store by the ‘schmytchka’, or the worker-peasant alliance, as forming the bedrock of social-ism. At that time mankind had been faced with a choice between the barbarism of war and the alternative of socialism. Today the choice that is emerging before mankind is between mass hunger, destitu-tion and starvation on the one side and the alternative of socialism. When a vast segment of the population consisting of petty producers cannot even carry out simple reproduction, and when this fact in turn jeopardises the subsistence of other segments of the working popula-tion, then clearly the social system which causes this has run its historical course. Between these two alternatives before us, there can scarcely be any doubt overwhat the choice of D D Kosambi, the most outstanding intellec-tual figure of post-independence India, would have been.Notes 1 This lecture relies heavily on the research work of Utsa Patnaik, which can be accessed, for instance, in U Patnaik (1996), (2003), (2004) and (2007). 2 I have discussed the nature of this new kind of finance capital in Patnaik (2000). 3 I am grateful to Shouvik Chakravarty, research scholar of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, for making these terms of trade figures available to me from his ongoing PhD thesis. 4 The distinction between “accumulation through expansion” and “accumulation through encroach-ment” was introduced in Patnaik (2005). 5 This argument has greater force in the case of agricultural commodities than perhaps in the case of oil, where the link with the financial markets is more pronounced. At any rate there can be little doubt that speculation in oil futures, unrelated to any present shortage, is playing a significant role in the current upsurge in oil prices. 6 I am grateful to Sriram Natarajan for making his research on China’s foodgrain absorption figures available to me. 7 The foodgrain output figure for 2007-08 that is being quoted in official circles for India is much higher than in the earlier years of this century. But that is likely to be a deliberate strategy to defeat inflationary expectations. 8 To attribute the condition of Chinese peasants to the march of capital, when China happens to be an economy with substantial social ownership of the means of production in a juridical sense, may appear odd at first sight. But under the Chinese strategy of achieving high growth by adjusting (albeit in an attempted neo-mercantilist fashion) to the capitalist world economy, there is a replica-tion within the economy of the phenomenon of income deflation with respect to the peasantry and the unorganised migrant workers, as under capitalism. 9 It may be thought that the rise in foodgrain prices itself will stimulate the output of peasant agricul-ture and thereby be self-negating. But the intro-duction of a fresh round of land-augmenting technological progress under peasant agriculture requires much more than high output prices; it requires above all substantial state support which is not feasible under neoliberalism in normal circumstances.ReferencesBagchi, A K (1982): The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Ghosh, J and C P Chanrasekhar (2003): Work and Well-being in the Age of Finance, Tulika Books, Delhi.Keynes, J M (1919): Economic Consequences of the Peace, Macmillan, London. – (1930): A Treatise on Money, Vols 2, Macmillan, London.Lenin (2000):Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capital-ism, Leftword Books, Delhi.Luxemburg, R (1963): The Accumulation of Capital, Routledge Paperbacks, London.Patnaik, P (2000): ‘Introduction’ to Lenin (2000).– (2005): ‘The Economics of the New Phase of Imperialism’, Patnaik, U (1996): ‘Export-Oriented Agriculture and Food Security in Developing Countries and India’, Economic & Political Weekly, Nos 35-37, Septem-ber,reprinted inThe Long Transition – Essays on Political Economy,Tulika, 1999. – (2003): ‘On the Inverse Relation between Primary Exports and Food Absorption in Developing Countries under Liberalised Trade Regimes’ in J Ghosh and C P Chandrasekhar (2003), q v.–(2004): ‘The Republic of Hunger’,Safdar Hashmi Memorial Lecturepublished by Sahmat, Delhi and reprinted inThe Republic of Hunger and Other Essays, Three Essays Collective, Delhi, 2007.– (2007): ‘Neo-Liberalism and Rural Poverty in India’, inEconomic & Political Weekly,July 28.Preobrazhensky, Y (1926): The New Economics,Claren-don Press, Oxford, 1965.Robinson, J (1962): Economic Philosophy, C A Watts, London.

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