The truth about reform comes out with Yeltsin’s own words: “What was needed was a kamikaze crew that would step into the line of fire and forge ahead, however strong the general discontent might be. I had to pick a team that would go up in flames but remain in history” (p 79). For Yeltsin it was demolition job rather than reform. All Soviet institutions, whether they had positive outcomes on people or negative, had to be razed to the ground. The outcome did not matter, as Sergei Rogov shows in his interviews as he talks of how the reforms had a deep and long-lasting negative impact on the Russian people and on Russia. The demographic crisis today is a consequence of the reform experience: “People have responded by retreating into their personal worlds” (p 210).

The project of demolition led by the Yeltsin team was perfectly coordinated and supported by the US, and Strobe Talbott makes that clear when he states: “He [Yeltsin] also had strong and consistent commitment to certain principles and objectives that were in the interest of the United States” (p 172). Yeltsin’s policies, as Talbott tells, “yielded huge and lasting benefits to the United States, which we can talk about” (p 172). On the other hand, these policies had a grave impact on the people of Russia, as shown by Anatoly Vishnevsky, Rogov and others who talk of the impoverishment, the rising inequalities, the marginali sation and exclusion of groups of people, and the creation of the oligarchs. How little these mattered to policymakers who seemed little aware or accountable for their consequences is clearly evident from the inter views of Talbott, Yegor Gaider and Chubais.

Record of the Times

The myopic vision of the reformers at the helm of affairs becomes clear in these interviews. Boris Nemstov, former prime minister says: “Unfortunately, Gaider, Chubais, and I thought that all we had to do was to stabilise the currency, fight inflation, and privatise companies and the doors would open. The public would understand and support us. Our biggest mistake was to our inability to talk to the people” (p 142). The outcome is explained by Nadori Simonia as “a horrific deterioration, a destruction of Russian industry, and the impoverishment of the masses”. The reformers did not take people into confidence; they focused on markets without thinking about people. In the early period of the reform between 1990 and 1994, overall 22 per cent more deaths occurred than in the preceding years. A generation was lost as the interview with Vishnevsky reveals. The reform process and the reformers were thus as autho ritarian as the Soviet system they sought to demolish. The same people that forced reform before forcing democratic institutions now blame Putin for authoritarianism!

The interviews done by Desai with Oleg Vyugin and Sergei Dubinin, both of whom held key positions in the economy during the Russian transition, are especially useful, even though at times they appear to justify their policy positions. Desai’s interrogation brings out the picture on the role of the banks and the stabilisation of the Russian economy. They frankly acknowledge theflight of capital, the pro blems that occurred when the Russian markets opened to foreign capital and role played by the International Monetary Fund.

There is much focus and discussion on personalities in this book that makes the entire period come alive. Even though sometimes one would have liked to see more facts at times, since structures and institutions had collapsed, it was opinion

The interviews in this book show the wide divergence of opinion between the Russians and western policymakers. This is especially marked on the foreign policy front, where Talbott dismisses the idea of multipolarity as a “pretty stupid proposition” (p 180). Russian scholars not only endorse it as part of Russian “national interest” but also believe that the international system is likely to move in that direction.

The book is an everlasting source of evidence for a crucial period of Russian history. It provides key evidence from the makers of contemporary Russian history and from some of its best analysts and scholars. Some might argue that a book like this has little analysis from the author and they might choose to read the long introduction as the conclusion since there is none. However, that is not the purpose of the book. The analysis which is sometimes profound and sometimes facile comes from the views of those who were involved in the process of this change itself. And if their analysis is facile, it shows that makers of history can have limited or biased perceptions. Why else is history and politics imperfect and why else does Russia continue to be a puzzle to so many? This book is a collection of opinions, views, narratives, interpretations and accounts of the Russian transition and reform. It is valuable as a primary source and any future analysis of this period can and must rely on this book. Padma Desai has done a great service for Russian scholars and for all those interested in international politics by recor ding and faithfully re producing these valuable interviews. Another of her “must read” books!

EPW

Email: Chenoy@gmail.com