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Functional Devolution to Rural Local Bodies in Four States

The Eleventh Schedule added to the Constitution by the 73rd amendment lists 29 functions devolvable by states to rural local bodies. States were free to set the speed and design of their approach to decentralisation under the general framework of the Constitutional mandate. Fourteen years on, a quantitative measure is attempted in this paper of the extent to which functional transfers have been achieved through the budgetary transfer of funds, with respect to the fiscal year 2006-07, in four states: Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Orissa. The approach taken here is thus radically different from that in official documents, where functional transfer to rural local bodies is dealt with in a purely qualitative manner, based on administrative notifications. Without an associated budgetary provision these do not carry any operational significance.

Special articles

Functional Devolution to Rural Local Bodies in Four States

The Eleventh Schedule added to the Constitution by the 73rd amendment lists 29 functions devolvable by states to rural local bodies. States were free to set the speed and design of their approach to decentralisation under the general framework of the Constitutional mandate. Fourteen years on, a quantitative measure is attempted in this paper of the extent to which functional transfers have been achieved through the budgetary transfer of funds, with respect to the fiscal year 2006-07, in four states: Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Orissa. The approach taken here is thus radically different from that in official documents, where functional transfer to rural local bodies is dealt with in a purely qualitative manner, based on administrative notifications. Without an associated budgetary provision these do not carry any operational significance.

INDIRA RAJARAMAN, DARSHY SINHA

I Introduction

T
he Eleventh Schedule added to the Constitution by the 73rd amendment lists 29 functions devolvable by states to rural local bodies (panchayati raj institutions). States were free to set the speed and design of their approach to decentralisation under the general framework of the Constitutional mandate. Although the Constitutional amendments were enacted at the centre, it is at the level of the state where authority for expenditure assignment and devolution of functions to panchayats is fundamentally vested. No devolution of functions is expected from the centre to the states.

Fourteen years on, a quantitative measure is attempted in this paper of the extent to which functional transfers have been achieved through the budgetary transfer of funds, with respect to the fiscal year 2006-07. A notified functional transfer without an associated budgetary provision does not carry any operational significance.

The use of budget estimates (BE) for an ongoing year rather than achieved actuals for some past year is justified on the grounds that it is the most current devolution picture that is of relevance. Further, as a statement of budgetary intent, budget estimates carry validity in and of themselves.

This paper presents estimates of functional devolution for four states: Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,1 Orissa and Rajasthan.2 The exercise also makes abundantly clear why it is that such an exercise has not been attempted so far. In official documents, such as GoI, 2006, functional transfer to rural local bodies is dealt with in a purely qualitative manner, based on administrative notifications.3

Budgets of both central and state governments are presented and approved by the Parliament or the legislature, in the form of numbered demands for grants, which carry no requirement of uniformity whatever across states in terms of either numbering or purpose. If all flows to panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) were presented under a dedicated demand head comprehensively covering all fund transfers to PRIs, this would yield an aggregate estimate of transfer of resources. Unfortunately, this is not practiced by all states.

Each demand lists expenditures under budget heads and subheads, which are nationally uniform, at least in principle. In an earlier simpler era, there would have been a one-to-one correspondence between demand, four-digit budget head, and department. For example, the demand for grants for forests would have carried exclusively the four-digit revenue budget head for forests (2406 along with the corresponding capital budget head 4406), and been assigned to the forestry department. This correspondence broke down much before the advent of decentralisation. New demands defined by the identity of beneficiaries (special component plans for scheduled castes for example) carried a very wide assortment of budget heads. Even states which do have separate dedicated demands do not comprehensively include all transfers to PRIs, and include within these demands expenditures by the state-level panchayati raj department which are not transferred to PRIs. These practices make the unearthing of transfers to PRIs needlessly tedious, so that a quick assessment of the status of functional devolution across all states is not possible.

If demands for grants are visualised as columns in a matrix array with budgetary heads and sub-heads in rows, a separate demand for PRIs carries the further and more important advantage that functional decentralisation becomes monitorable as the migration over time of budgetary provisions (in each row of the matrix) from the parent demands (columns) to the demand (column) for PRIs.

The budget head equivalents of the Eleventh Schedule functions do not constitute devolvable expenditures in their totality.

Every budget head has constituents that cannot be devolved to PRIs, certainly at the present stage of their development.4 Although there is an unavoidable subjective element in the designation of some expenditure in any segment as devolvable, it is nevertheless preferable to interpolate this in measuring the progress made by the state towards devolution of the specified functions. It serves to underline the fact that it is not desirable, and indeed may be seriously counter-productive, if all components of functions listed in the Eleventh Schedule are designated as devolvable. Even with this attempt, the identification of devolvable expenditures is by no means as delimited as it should be in principle. Budget heads make no distinction between rural and urban expenditures, so that the devolvable base in most cases includes expenditures targeted at urban areas as well.

Section II of the paper maps 21 of the 29 functions listed in the Eleventh Schedule onto their equivalent four-digit budget heads, or sub-heads as the case may be. There is a residual miscellany of functions, whose equivalent budget heads are not explored. Some of them, like rural electrification, non-conventional energy sources, or technical and vocational education, will require much greater maturity in PRI governance and capacities before any substantial transfer can take place. Some, like cultural activities, libraries, or maintenance of community assets, are a bit inchoate and difficult to map onto any particular budget head. Finally, markets and fairs were among the functions traditionally performed by panchayats much before the Constitutional amendments, and are a major entry in revenue receipts rather than in revenue expenditures.

Section III of the paper goes into the demand structure in each of the four states for recording fund transfer to panchayats. Section IV demonstrates the lack of conformity across states even to common budget heads, which do carry a requirement of uniformity. This is demonstrated with respect to three major national schemes, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY) and Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY). Section V then

Table 1: Eleventh Schedule Functions and Equivalent Budget Heads

Eleventh Schedule Equivalent Budget Constituents
Heads Four
No Description Digit
Livelihoods
1 Agriculture including agricultural extension 2401 Crop husbandry
2 Land improvement, land consolidation, soil conservation 2402 Soil and water conservation
3 Minor irrigation, water mgt, watershed development 2702 & Minor irrigation
2245 Relief for natural calamities 01 Drought
4 & Animal husbandry, dairy, poultry 2403 Animal husbandry
12 Fuel and fodder
5 Fisheries 2405 Fisheries
6 & Social forestry, farm forestry 2406 Forestry & wild life 01 Forestry
7 Minor forest produce
8 & Small scale industries 2851 Village and small industries
9 Khadi, village industries
Infrastructure
11 Drinking water 2215 Water supply and sanitation 01 Water supply
13 Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways 3054 Roads and bridges 04 District and other roads
Education, health
17 Education, primary and secondary 2202 General education 01 Elementary education
19 Adult & non-formal education 2202 04 Adult education
23 Health and sanitation 2210 Medical and public health 03,04,06 Rural, public health
Anti-poverty, social welfare
16 Poverty alleviation programmes 2501 & Special programmes
for rural development
2515 & Other rural development
programmes
2505 Rural employment
10 Rural housing 2216 Housing 03 Rural housing
24 Family welfare 2211 Family welfare
25 Women and child development 2236 Nutrition 02 Distribution of nutrition
26 Social welfare 2235 Social security and welfare 02,60 Social welfare, other
social security programme
27 Welfare of weaker sections, SC/ST 2225 Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 01,02,03 Total
Miscellaneous
14 Rural electrification, electricity distribution
15 Non-conventional energy sources
18 Technical training and vocation education
20 Libraries
21 Cultural activities
22 Markets and fairs
28 Public distribution system
29 Maintenance of community assets

Notes: 1 The sub-heads of four-digit budget categories are two-digit, with further three-digit components, as in 2215 (water supply) where sub-head 01 is for water supply, and 102 is for rural water supply; or directly three-digit, as in 2851 (village and small scale industries) or 2211 (family welfare). 2 Table A2 will show that one of the major national schemes, which is wholly routed through state government budgets, and also wholly devolved to PRIs, the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana, is accounted for in Orissa not under budget heads 2501 or 2515, as in the other states, but under 3451 (Secretariat Economic Services), subhead 102 (District Planning Machinery). That is included in the figures for Orissa, but not in the other three states.

3 The budget head for Social Welfare (2235), sub-heads 02 and 60 also include womens and child welfare, so that function 25 in the Eleventh Schedule could be additionally seen as mapped onto constituents of this budget head as well, in addition to 2236. Source: The Eleventh Schedule from the Constitution of India; budget categories from Budget Documents 2006-07, Government of India, 1987.

uses the budget head equivalents of Section II to quantify the fund transfer to panchayats for each of 21 functions mapped. In addition to budgetary heads corresponding to specific functions, flows from the state government mandated by the State Finance Commissions, and other grants for specific purposes such as establishment grants, are also quantified in Section V. Aggregating across all expenditure categories within the identified set, an overall rating is possible of the quantitative extent of devolution achieved in the four states, subject to a (hopefully acceptable) margin of error. Section VI concludes.

II Mapping the Eleventh Schedule onto Budget Head Equivalents

Table 1 maps 21 out of the 29 functions in the Eleventh Schedule onto the four-digit revenue budget head which are the major classificatory boundaries for revenue expenditure, and are fortunately uniform in subject coverage across states. Each carries sub-heads (two-digit with three-digit components, or directly three-digit). In some cases, as shown, the Eleventh Schedule function is so finely specified as to map onto only a sub-head, or the sum of a few sub-heads. In other cases, a single function like poverty alleviation can map onto three budget heads, but there are other functions like social forestry, and minor forest produce, which map onto the same budget head. Thus, the 21 functions map (purely coincidentally) onto a total of 21 budget heads for examination. In addition to the budget heads in Table 1, individual states have idiosyncratic ways of accounting for their expenditures. These are added on wherever they were discovered, through the process of tracking the fund flow of major national schemes.

Capital expenditures are not examined (with a major exception, dealt with below). There might be episodic capital expenditures directly incurred by state government departments on PRIs, for construction of panchayat buildings and structures for example, under the heads of administration, or public works. But where these funds for capital expenditure are transferred to PRIs, they get recorded in revenue expenditure, since the capital account cannot by definition include grants to PRIs, even where it is intended for capital expenditure. Loans to PRIs if any would get recorded in the capital expenditure of the state, but states have not so far lent funds to PRIs.

III Mapping Fund Transfer to Panchayats: Dedicated Demands

Most states have a basic dedicated demand for fund transfer to panchayats, which has at its core the four-digit budget head 3604, for assigned revenues to PRIs as shares of either particular taxes or generalised state revenue. These are listed in the first row of Table 2. Even here there are exceptions; budget head 3604 may be found under other demands as well (Table 6). Rajasthan places these flows not only in the demand designated for the purpose (49), but also in another for community development (41). Basic revenue support grants are also to be found in the four-digit budget head 2515, for “Other Rural Development Programmes”.

In addition to the basic dedicated demand, three of the four states (all but Rajasthan) have other dedicated demands for PRIs, in which functional fund transfers to PRIs are recorded. The multiplicity of dedicated demands is an unfortunate complication, but retains the essential advantage of separateness and transparency. The inclusion of functional transfers in dedicated demands for grants for PRIs in this manner, running in parallel with the parent demands for grants down through rows of budgetary heads, yields a matrix array with two advantages. Functional decentralisation for each of the 29 functions becomes monitorable as the migration over time of budgetary provisions (in each row of the matrix) from the parent demand (column) to the set of demands (columns) for PRIs. The second advantage is that the sum of dedicated demands for PRIs, and the per cent they

Table 2: Dedicated Demands for Grants to PRIs

Type MP CH R J O R
Fin assis to 3-tier PRIs 8 0 8 0 4 9 1 7
Fin assis to 3-tier PRIs for SCs 1 5 1 5
Fin assis to 3-tier PRIs for STs 5 2 8 2
Panchayats Rural development Externally aided plans for rural development Community development 6 2 3 0 5 9 3 0 3 0 5 9 50,28 4 1 2 8

Notes: 1 The description of each demand corresponds to the nomenclature used in MP and CH. Demand 49 in Rajasthan is titled Local and Panchayat Compensation and Assignment, but flows to PRIs for establishment, and other provisions by the state and national finance commissions (Eleventh/Twelfth) are actually included in demand 41, titled Community Development; see also notes to table 6. Demand 50 of Rajasthan is for Rural Employment, and 28 for Special Programmes for Rural Development. Demand 17 in Orissa is for the Panchayati Raj Department, and 28 for the Rural Development Department. 2 The demands for expenditure on rural development, and externally aided expenditure on rural development, are not formally designated for devolution of funds to PRIs, but are included in this table because they contain large grant components to PRIs, and in the case of Chhattisgarh demand 30, merge expenditure on PRIs and rural development.

Source: Compiled from Budget Documents for 2006-07 of the State Governments of Madhya Pradesh (MP), Chhattisgarh (CH), Rajasthan (RJ) and Orissa (OR).

Table 3: Transfer of Funds to PRIs by Function in Crop Husbandry (2401): Madhya Pradesh

Not-Devolved Devolved Per Cent
Demands Demands Devolved
(Rs Crore) (Rs Crore)
2401 Crop Husbandry 1 3 4 1 6 4 1 5 5 2 8 0
001 Direction and
administration 111.66 10.33 0.00
102 Foodgrain crops 6.36 3.43 12.02 2.48 1.08 3.53 24.54
103 S e e d s 5.97 4.97 4.48 0.45 2.87
105 Manures and
fertilisers 0.68 0.00
107 Plant protection 108 Commercial crops 0.07 20.42 5.79 6.25 2.27 2.39 0.00 7.68 27.54
109 Extension and
training 110 Crop insurance 10.34 6.64 9.27 18.68 0.00 0.00
113 Agriculture
engineering 119 Horticulture and 14.40 0.98 0.75 0.00
vegetable crops 0.00 3.24 3.21 2.21 2.56 8.40 67.13
800 Other expenditure 54.52 17.37 1.54 3.55 6.61
Total 231.06 55.38 45.40 6.96 8.03 23.16 10.31

Notes: The per cent devolved in the last column is obtained from the sum of entries in the devolved demand columns, as a per cent of the total budgetary provision in the row across all columns. See notes to Table 2. In Rajasthan, the entries for budget head 2401 are found under demand 37 (Agriculture), 51 (Special Component Plan for SCs) and 30 (Tribal Area Development). None of these is a demand dedicated to PRIs.

Source: Budget Documents 2006-07, government of Madhya Pradesh.

constitute of total budgeted expenditure, yields an aggregate (albeit very approximate) estimate of transfer of resources.

The list of dedicated demands for grants in the four states under which fund transfer to PRIs is effected in Table 2 includes, in addition to demands explicitly for financial assistance to PRIs, those for expenditure on rural development and externally aided plans under which there might be substantial grants-inaid to PRIs.

Rajasthan is different. Neither the basic demand for PRIs, nor the other demands for rural development include functional transfers of funds to PRIs. Instead, these are incorporated within the parent functional demands under three-digit budget subheads, which specify the panchayat tier receiving the fund (196, 197 and 198 for zilla, block and gram panchayats respectively). This carries two disadvantages. First, it is impossible to obtain a summary approximation to the aggregate transfer of resources to PRIs from demand heads alone, as is possible for the other three states. Second, the three-digit sub-head under which the transfer took place is not known, in the way possible with a parallel demand, which carries the same budget head structure, and enables an understanding of the function that has been transferred along with the funds. This is a matter of immense importance, since fund transfer to PRIs is merely a concomitant of transfer of functions.

The practice of recording transfers to PRIs under the threedigit budget subheads 196, 197, and 198, is adopted also at the centre, where it is entirely appropriate. It is not at the centre that functional decentralisation of governance is expected to take place, so a budgetary system for recording fund transfers adopted at the centre is not suitable at state level, where it is only the pattern of fund transfer that records the associated functional transfer.

The sole provision within the budget head structure for recording funds devolved to PRIs in such a manner that the function transferred is indicated thereby is under the budgetary head for elementary education (2202/01), where subhead 103 is for “Assistance to local bodies for primary education”.5

Table 3 illustrates the advantage of having an accounting structure whereby the functional transfer gets identified, with the example of crop husbandry (budget head 2401). This is the first function in the Eleventh Schedule. In Madhya Pradesh, the parallel demand structure makes possible quantification of the degree of devolution for each subfunction. Funds for horticulture and vegetable crops have been the most devolved, with foodgrain and commercial crops second. There is the larger issue of the unsatisfactory classification system into subheads itself.6 In Rajasthan by contrast, since the accounting mechanism merely adds fund transfer to PRIs under additional three-digit subheads 196/197/198, the pattern of transfer by subfunction is not known. All that is known is the total quantum transferred, without the associated functional transfer.

Table 4 provides another illustration with figures for Madhya Pradesh for village and small industries.7 The largest transfers are for cooperatives and sericulture. Handloom, handicraft and khadi industries, surprisingly, have zero or negligible transfer to PRIs. This profile of functional transfer is revealed only because of the accounting structure adopted in Madhya Pradesh.

Table 5 summarises revenue account transfers under the demand heads of Table 2, as a per cent of total revenue expenditures budgeted in 2006-07, with an unavoidable element of both inclusion and exclusion error. Inclusion error arises as in the case of demand number 62 in Madhya Pradesh, for example, which includes expenditure on panchayat elections, clearly not a transfer to PRIs, or more seriously in the case of Orissa demand number 28, where expenditure of 387 crore on construction of water supply and district roads is not devolved to PRIs. Exclusion error arises because even in Madhya Pradesh, there are grants-in-aid to PRIs, which exist in the small print of parent demands for grants. This initial estimate will be juxtaposed against that obtained from the more detailed examination of functional devolution that follows in the Section V.8

The function-specific figures from the budget heads onto which each function maps, are taken in turn in the sections that follow.

IV Budgetary Routes for Some Major National Schemes

Even where, as in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, there are separate demands for transfer of funds to PRIs, not all transfers to PRIs take place within these grants. This is illustrated with respect to three major central rural schemes, designed for full devolution to PRIs.9

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), the newest and most ambitious of the employment programmes on offer in 200 districts, is not intended for full devolution to gram panchayats, since the guidelines specify that they must actually implement only a minimum of 50 per cent of the works under the scheme. However, middle and zilla panchayats may implement the remainder, and the funds are transferred in any case to a district-level programme officer who can be the CEO of the zilla panchayat. The NREGS is recorded under the same budget head everywhere except Rajasthan, where it is not even in the revenue account (Table A1 in the Appendix). The justification for recording NREGS in the capital account in Rajasthan seems to be that the NREGS was the descendant of the earlier National Food for Work Programme, under which both receipts from the centre and expenditures were recorded in the capital account. These accounting conundrums need to be resolved in a uniform manner across states.

The NREGS is split into several demands in each state. In Madhya Pradesh, all are devolved demands, but in Chhattisgarh,

Table 4: Transfer of Funds to PRIs by Function in Village andSmall Industries (2851): Madhya Pradesh

Village Not-Devolved Devolved Per Cent and Small Demands Demands Devolved 2851 Industries (Rs Crore) (Rs Crore)

56 11 41 64 52 80 15

101 Industrial estates 3.00 0.00

Small scale 102 Industries 6.24 8.60 0.00 103 Handloom 7.51 3.14 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.35 104 Handicraft 2.53 1.79 3.66 0.00 105 Khadi 4.99 2.14 1.90 0.00

sericulture 107 Industries 10.85 2.29 2.63 0.40 2.34 14.82 108 Powerloom 9.54 0.00 110 Cooperatives 1.26 1.99 0.17 1.67 0.66 43.50 200 Other village

industries 16.04 0.00 800 Other expenditure 4.65 0.00 Total 27.14 38.36 12.50 16.88 0.57 4.01 0.69 5.27

Notes: See notes to Table 3. Source: Budget Documents 2006-07, Government of Madhya Pradesh.

the funds are devolved through grants-in-aid to PRIs in parent demands for tribals (demand 41) and scheduled castes (demand 64), not through the corresponding demands for transfer to PRIs of funds for tribals (demand 82) or scheduled castes (demand 15). Quite aside from the tedium of assembling the total provision across these separate provisions, there is the larger issue of whether a demand-driven employment programme not intended for demarcation by caste or tribe, should be separately provided for by identity of recipient in state-level demands in this manner.

The Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY), a scheme for development of 100 backward districts; and the Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), a nationwide scheme for selfemployment, are both fully devolved to PRIs. The provision under state budgets for NREGS and SGSY is for the state contribution alone, with the central contribution flowing directly to PRIs. The RSVY on the other hand is entirely routed through state budgets under central support for state plans, so that state budgets capture the full fund flow to PRIs under the scheme.

The RSVY (which has been renamed the Backward Areas Development Fund with effect from 2006-07) is recorded under budget heads 2501 or 2515, even extending to 3451 for Secretariat Economic Services in Orissa, and there is the splintering by demand as well (Table A2). The Orissa practice departs seriously from the intent of RSVY, and is what makes the mapping of Table 1 not complete in its depiction of actual practice. The SGSY is splintered in all three states, into multiple budget heads (2501 and 2225) and multiple demands, including parent demands for tribals and scheduled castes (Table A3).

From the evidence for these three schemes, a summary percentage of devolved expenditures from devolved demands alone may understate transfers to PRIs. In Rajasthan in particular, where major schemes like NREGS are accounted for under the capital account, devolved expenditures are not contained even within the revenue account.

V Devolved as a Per Cent of Devolvable Expenditures

Devolution percentages have been computed for each budgetary head as a percentage of what is devolvable. Percentages of devolvable to total expenditure under each budget head are provided alongside, and the product of this with the devolved percentage yields the per cent devolved to total expenditure.

In addition to the functions listed in the Eleventh Schedule, there are other funds devolved to PRIs. The basic revenues owed to them under the accepted recommendations of the State Finance Commissions, as revenue shares and establishment and other grants, are recorded under budget head 3604, but also under budget head 2515 (other rural development programmes). These provisions are tabulated in Table 6. There is a total lack of uniformity in recording practices once again. In two states, shares of levies are recorded under designated budget heads which indicate the source (such as 102 for stamp duty), but in Rajasthan and Orissa, shares are recorded by destination in terms of panchayat tier. Once again, uniformity in accounting practices would be a great aid to a cross-state understanding of patterns of revenue sharing between states and panchayats.

Aggregating across all these entries the basic revenue transfer from state governments to PRIs, independent of the functional flows addressed in the rest of this chapter, stand at Rs 56.34 per head in Madhya Pradesh, Rs 89.88 in Chhattisgarh, Rs 83.04 in Rajasthan and Rs 42.78 in Orissa. Thus, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan are about at par, and transfer about 60 per cent more than Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. These figures exclude the provisions made by the TFC, which are routed through the state budget. The TFC transfers are listed in the notes to Table 6.

The devolvable percentage (Table 7) is low where there is large expenditure on departmental infrastructure (as in crop and animal husbandry, fisheries, minor irrigation and water supply) and in a few of the targeted welfare categories. The devolvable percentages are high, where the function maps onto only a sub-head, or a sum of sub-heads, such as medical and public health for

Table 5: Demands for Fund Transfer to PRIs as a Per Cent of Total Revenue Expenditure: 2006-07

Type of demand MP CH RJ OR

Transfers to PRIs:80(MP,CH)/49(RJ)/17(OR) 4.97 5.79 0.00 3.98 Transfers to PRIs: SCs 15(MP,CH) 1.63 0.24 Transfers to PRIs: STs 52(MP)/82(CH) 2.69 1.48 Exp on PRIs: 62(MP) 0.23 Exp on PRIs & RD: 30(CH) 2.37 Exp on RD: 30(MP)/50,28(RJ)/28(OR) 1.93 0.25 2.93 Externally aided rural dev exp: 59(MP&CH) 0.09 1.67 Community development: 41(RJ) 4.35 Sum 11.54 11.56 4.60 6.91

Notes: See Table 2 and notes for coverage under each demand. In Rajasthan the demands for PRIs are not comprehensive in their coverage, and therefore do not purport to represent the full measure of transfer to PRIs. Whereas in Rajasthan, these demands include capital expenditures, only the revenue expenditure total has been taken. Demand 50 in Rajasthan is for rural employment.

Source: See source to Table 2.

Table 6: State Revenue Transfers to PRIs as Mandated by State Finance Commissions (Rs crore)

Demand MP CH RJ OR

3604 Compensation to local

bodies and PRIs 101 Land revenue 49 0.13 102 Stamp duty 80 15.00 19.00 108 Profession tax 80 4.30 4.25 200 Miscellaneous 80 114.23

52 49.54

15 49.13 196 To Zilla Panchayats 17 6.46 197 To Block Panchayats 17 8.04 198 To Gram Panchayats 17 73.94 2515 Other rural development

programmes 001 Direction and administration 17 8.43 101 Panchayati Raj 15 0.87

52 0.67

80 45.74 138.53 102 Community development 17 46.86 196 To Zilla Panchayats 41 15.80 197 To Block Panchayats 184.13 198 To Gram Panchayats 211.93 Total 279.47 161.78 411.86 143.75 Estimated rural population 4.96 1.80 4.96 3.36 Per capita 56.34 89.88 83.04 42.78

Notes: The basic demands for fund transfer to PRIs are 80 in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, 49 in Rajasthan, and 17 in Orissa; see table 2 and notes for the constituent of each demand. There are in addition the flows mandated by the national finance commissions (Eleventh/ Twelfth), which are not included here. The sums so transferred under budget head 2515 are Rs 328.41 (lower than Rs 332.6 crore prescribed for Madhya Pradesh in the TFC Report), Rs 123 crore (Chhattisgarh), Rs 246 crore (Rajasthan demand 41), and Rs 160.6 crore (Orissa).

Source: Budget documents for the four states, 2006-07.

example. Comparing across states, they are in general much widows’ pensions to PRIs in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh higher in Chhattisgarh than in Madhya Pradesh, the state of which accounts for the high devolved percentages in one of the two it was until 2000-01 a part. The reasons could be that the state welfare heads. Elementary education shows one-third devolution inherited a lower departmental overhang. Devolvable shares in in Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan but none in the other two. Rajasthan are more similar to those in Madhya Pradesh, with Elementary education also has grants-in-aid under Sarva Shiksha relatively lower shares in animal husbandry and forestry. In view Abhiyan, and Kasturba Gandhi Gram Vidyalayas for girl children, of the importance of animal husbandry in Rajasthan, the low but the recipients of these grants are either the schools themselves devolvability is of some concern. Orissa has low percentages in or line outposts of state government departments. Madhya Pradesh some categories like adult education in which other states are devolves more in some livelihood and infrastructure categories, fully devolvable, reflecting the high share of expenditure on for example minor irrigation, water supply, crop husbandry, and departmental administration. fisheries than in education, health and nutrition programmes.

In aggregate, the weighted average of devolvable expenditure With the major exceptions of elementary education and fishas a per cent of the total across all functions is remarkably similar, eries, devolved percentages are much lower in Chhattisgarh than falling in a narrow range of 86 to 91 for the four states. The in Madhya Pradesh, or about on par (Chhattisgarh also devolves percentage is this high because it is heavily weighted by the old age and widows’ pensions), while Rajasthan has sharply high centrally-driven anti-poverty programmes. devolution in some categories. For example, soil and water

Devolved as a percentage of devolvable expenditures vary very conservation, an important function in a water-scarce state, is widely across functions (Table 8). The highest devolved percent-highly devolved, at 85.99 per cent of the devolvable total. Eleages are of course in the rural employment and other rural mentary education is also at around the one-third mark, as in programmes, where they are close to 100 per cent. These Chhattisgarh. In all other functions, including minor irrigation, programmes are driven by central directives on devolution of drought relief and water supply, the devolved per cent is surfunds to PRIs, and do not really reflect state moves towards prisingly low. Rajasthan also does not devolve old age and devolution. Between the other classes of functions, devolution widows’ pensions, unlike Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. of rural and public health is uniformly low across states, as are What uniquely distinguishes Orissa is that the per cent devolved family welfare and nutrition. The devolution of old age and is at or close to zero, with the exception of the centrally funded

Table 7: Devolvable Per Cent of Total Revenue Expenditure by Table 8: Devolved as a Per Cent of Devolvable Revenue Budget Head: All States (2006-07) Expenditure by Budget Head: All States (2006-07)

MP CH RJ OR MP CH RJ OR

Livelihoods Livelihoods

2401 Crop husbandry 50.52 63.28 59.98 37.52 2401 Crop husbandry 20.41 1.75 0.09 0.00 2402 Soil and water conservation 89.17 96.71 95.16 64.29 2402 Soil & water conservation 0.00 0.00 85.99 0.00 2702 Minor irrigation 11.65 71.89 53.62 44.61 2702 Minor irrigation 56.31 8.54 9.52 0.00 2245 (01) Drought 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 2245 (01) Drought 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2403 Animal husbandry 45.37 63.07 19.61 35.11 2403 Animal husbandry 10.35 4.09 0.00 0.00 2405 Fisheries 66.66 84.14 61.58 69.00 2405 Fisheries 24.70 35.28 26.73 0.00 2406 (01) Forestry 82.97 77.71 44.17 88.80 2406 (01) Forestry 0.00 0.00 16.76 0.00 2851 Village and small industries 82.84 98.10 98.90 77.13 2851 Village and small industries 6.35 3.67 0.00 0.00

Infrastructure Infrastructure

2215(01) Water supply 36.95 73.85 36.28 50.19 2215 (01) Water supply 25.48 5.55 7.26 0.00 3054(04) District and other roads 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 3054 (04) District and other roads 0.00 0.00 0.0006 10.42

Education, Health Education, Health

2202(01) Elementary education 98.49 96.38 97.43 97.94 2202(01) Elementary education 12.23 31.45 34.55 0.00 2202(04) Adult education 100.00 100.00 100.00 27.66 2202(04) Adult education 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.44 2210 2210 (03,04,06) Rural and public health 96.26 97.94 98.99 89.88 (03,04,06) Rural and public health 0.00 1.27 0.00005 0.00

Anti-poverty, social welfare Anti-poverty, social welfare

2501 Special programmes for rural 2501 Special programmes for

development 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 rural development 86.16 73.53 99.90 100.00 2515 Other rural development 2515 Other rural development

programmes 94.82 95.66 98.70 94.36 programmes 94.33 85.72 99.29 100.00 2505 Rural employment 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 2505 Rural employment 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.50 2216(03) Rural housing 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 2216 (03) Rural housing 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 2211 Family welfare 62.53 68.43 73.35 70.61 2211 Family welfare 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2236(02) Distribution of nutrition 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.50 2236 (02) Distribution of nutrition 13.38 0.48 0.00005 0.00 2235 2235 (02,60) Social security and welfare 95.67 96.44 89.68 97.18 (02,60) Social security and welfare 41.99 41.72 1.25 0.00 2225 Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 95.36 96.94 97.63 99.91 2225 Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 24.41 0.89 8.71 0.00 Average Average across all functions across all Weighted 29.57 25.30 29.89 10.93 functions Weighted 89.53 90.89 86.06 88.61 Unweighted 29.35 23.52 23.34 14.83

Average devolved to totalNotes: Uniform assignments by budget head and sub-head have been made Weighted 26.47 23.00 25.72 9.69

across states with two exceptions. The exceptions are sub-head 001

(direction and administration) in 2403 (animal husbandry) and 2501 Notes: The names of categories correspond to the budget sub-head indicated,

(special programmes for rural development), and sub-head 109 where relevant. For details on inclusions within each four-digit major

(extension and training) in 2405 (fisheries) in Madhya Pradesh, category, see Table 1.

Chhattisgarh and Orissa. There is no entry for 2216(03) in Rajasthan and Orissa. The Indira Source: Authors’ calculations from Budget Documents 2006-07, Government Awaas Yojana is accounted for under 2505 (rural employment).

of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan. Source: Ibid.

rural programmes. Even expenditure on fisheries, which shows high devolved percentages in the other three states, are not devolved in Orissa. The devolved percentage in elementary education is zero.

The product of the figures in the two tables will yield the share of devolved to total expenditure in the relevant budget category.10

Although devolved as a percentage of devolvable expenditure show large differences between states for particular functions, in aggregate, these differences get averaged out, and the weighted devolved percentages vary within a narrow band of 25 to 30 per cent in all states except Orissa, where the weighted average is 11 per cent. Because of the high devolvable average across functions, devolved as a per cent of total expenditure falls in the range 23 to 26 per cent for Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan, and is at 10 per cent for Orissa.

An analysis of variance on the devolved percentages in Table 8 does not show any statistical significance for the difference between all four states taken together, although of course it does show differences for pair-wise comparisons of Orissa with each of the other three taken in turn.

Pulling together the consolidated flow from states to PRIs in the four states, Table 9 shows the per capita flow in terms of the budgeted release from state budgets in the ongoing budget year 2006-07. The functional flow is obtained by adding on to the 21 listed functions in Table 8, the flows from the capital account in Rajasthan for NREGS and other rural employment schemes (Table A1), and from other than rural budget heads

Table 9: Summary of Per Capita Flows from State Governments to PRIs: 2006-07

Rs per capita MP CH R J O R
Functional flows 427.46 531.58 390.26 154.81
of which TFC 66.2 68.3 49.6 47.8
Rev transfers 56.34 89.88 83.04 42.78
Total to PRIs 483.80 621.46 473.30 197.59

Notes: Functional flows add on to the absolute flows under the 21 heads of Table 8, the NREGS flows from the capital account in Rajasthan, and RSVY flows from account head 3451 in Orissa.

Source: Based on Tables A1, A2, 6 and 8.

Table 10: State Flows to PRIs as a Per Cent of Total Revenue Expenditure 2006-07

(Rs crore)

MPCH RJ OR

Total revenue expenditure 22509.97 9597.27 24034.35 15939.88 Total to PRIs 2399.67 1118.62 2347.56 663.90 PRI share in total revenue

expenditure (per cent) 10.66 11.66 9.77 4.17 Sum PRI dedicated demands in total

revenue expenditure (per cent) 11.54 11.56 4.60 6.91

Notes: See notes to Table 9. Source: See source to Table 2.

Table 11: Ranking of Four States by Devolution Progress

Per Capita Devolved/Total Per Capita PRI Share in Rural Poverty Revenue Expenditures on Total Total Revenue Headcount Transfers 21 Functions Transfers Expenditures 2004-05 (Rs) (Per Cent) (Rs) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)

CH:89.88 MP:26.51 CH:621.46 CH:11.66 OR:46.80 RJ :83.04 RJ:25.72 MP:483.80 MP:10.66 CH:40.80 MP:56.34 CH:23.00 RJ:473.30 RJ:9.77 MP:36.90 OR:42.78 OR:9.69 OR:197.59 OR:4.17 RJ:18.70

Source: Tables 8,9 and 10; poverty figures from Government of India, 2007.

in Orissa for the RSVY (Table A2). These flows include those TFC and other flows from the centre routed through state budgets. It is not feasible, nor really analytically useful, to separate those out, since the intent here is to capture what flows to PRIs, and not so much to capture the source of funding of these flows.

Adding on the revenue support, in accordance with SFC recommendations, yields a total per capita flow in the range Rs 473 to 484 per capita in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, about 30 per cent higher, at Rs 621 in Chhattisgarh, and lowest of all in Orissa, at Rs 198 per head.

Finally, Table 10 obtains the sum from the detailed extraction of flows to PRIs described in the previous section as a per cent of total revenue expenditure budgeted for fiscal year 2006-07. (There is a slight, but unavoidable error, in adding on the capital flows under NREGS in Rajasthan.) These are then juxtaposed against the estimate from the sum of PRI-dedicated demands shown in Table 5. It can be seen quite clearly that in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, which have separate (albeit multiple) demands for PRIs, the sum of dedicated demands yields a good approximation. However, in Rajasthan, where functional flows to PRIs are not recorded in dedicated demands, clearly they underestimate total flows. In Orissa, the sum of dedicated demands include 437 crore of expenditures incurred by the state government on rural roads and waterworks, but not actually devolved to PRIs.

VI Conclusions

A final relative ranking of the four states follows in Table 11. This is juxtaposed against the rural poverty headcount ratio for 2004-05. It is clear that Orissa where rural poverty incidence is highest also has the lowest devolution achievement in both per capita and percentage terms. Two caveats immediately follow. First, no causal relationship can be inferred between the two. Second, the relationship is not neatly inverse, since Rajasthan is not at the top of the devolution indicators.

The most astonishing feature of decentralisation of governance in India has been the complete absence of a uniform accounting system that would render transparent the transfer of functions mandated. This is a major deficiency of the process of decentralisation in India. Accounting uniformity was entirely compatible with the freedom rightly granted to state governments to shape the contours and speed of decentralisation. Even transfer of state funds to PRIs under some major national schemes like the National Rural Employment Guarantee, the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana, and the Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana, is not uniformly dealt with across states in terms of budget heads, which unlike the grant structure do carry a requirement of uniformity

The structure of budget heads and sub-heads is nationally uniform, and therefore any departures found in practice constitute a violation of that requirement of uniformity. The structure of demands for grants however is not required to be nationally uniform. Here, the appeal for a common structure is based on the need for monitoring the process of functional transfer over time. In the absence of a nationally uniform grant structure, an assessment of the functional devolution across all states calls for an impossibly detailed examination of the budget of each state.

The first four of the six recommendations that follows are immediately implementable at state level. The last two are possible only at national level. It will be impossible to quantify the extent of functional devolution over time unless these recommendations are fully implemented.

First, at the state level, all revenues transfers from states to PRIs, under the mandate of State Finance Commissions, along with establishment and salary grants, should be recorded entirely under the head 3604 specified for this purpose (“compensation to local bodies and PRIs”). Rajasthan records these transfers entirely, and Chhattisgarh largely, under the head 2515, which is for “other rural development programmes”, with line entries specifying that these are SFC-mandated flows. Madhya Pradesh and Orissa record them largely under 3604, but also have some bits under the head 2515.

Second, the major state flows to PRIs under centrally funded schemes need to be recorded in the revenue account, and under

Appendix

Table A1: Budgetary Classification of Fund Transfer under theNational Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: 2006-07

Budget Head/(Devolved Rs Cr Budget Head/(non- Rs Cr Total
or Rural Demand) Devolved Demand) Rs Cr
Madhya Pradesh
2505
01(Nat progs)
702 (JGSY)
#42 (NREGS)
/Demand 30 4.0
/Demand 15 28.0 32.0
Chhattisgarh
2505/Demand 30 2505
60 (Other) 60 (Other)
101 (NREGS) 101 (NREGS)
#14 Grant 30.0 #14 Grant
/Demand 41 25.0
/Demand 64 5.0
60.0
Rajasthan
4515/Demand 50 4515/Demand 30
101 (PR) 796 (ST)
18 (NREGS) 6.0 08 (NREGS) 10.0
4515/Demand 51
789 (SC)
06 (NREGS) 4.0 20.0
Orissa
2505/Demand17
01(Nat progs)
701 (JRY) 53.8
789(SC) 25.9
796(ST) 44.8 124.5

Notes: 1 NREGS is targeted nationally at 200 districts. For coverage of budget heads, see Table 1, and for demands, Table 2. The budgetary provisions can be seen to not fall exclusively under the broad definition of devolved demands as listed in Table 2. NREGS provisions in Chhattisgarh fall under demands 41 (tribal area sub plan), and 64 (special component plan for SCs), notwithstanding the parallel set of demands 82 and 15 respectively, intended to cover transfers to PRIs directed at the same set of beneficiaries. Demands 30 and 51 of Rajasthan are for Tribal Area Development and Special Component Plan for SCs. The total budgeted provision for other national rural employment schemes under budget head 2505, excluding NREGS, in Madhya Pradesh is 245.58 crore; in Chhattisgarh 87.5 crore; and in Rajasthan (under budget head 4515 in the capital account), 45 crore. Orissa has no formal budget head for NREGS. The provision is recorded under the head for the Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana. 2 In Rajasthan, no NREGS provision is made in the revenue account.

Source: Ibid.

uniform (revenue) budget heads. This is not the case at present. With the rural employment schemes, the same budget head 2505 for rural employment programmes is used everywhere except Rajasthan, where they go into 4515, which is capital expenditure for rural development. The justification for this in Rajasthan seems to be that the NREGS was the descendant of the earlier National Food for Work Programme, under which both receipts from the centre and expenditures were recorded in the capital account. A grant to PRIs recorded in the capital account is in any case technically wrong in an accounting sense. The Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana for backward districts is recorded either under 2501 (Special Rural Development Programmes), or 2515 (Other Rural Development Programmes), or even 3451 (Secretariat Economic Services). The Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana for rural self-employment can be found in 2501 or in 2225 (Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Tribes).

Third, although states are perfectly free to structure their demands for grants, it is possible to monitor the progress towards functional devolution only if all fund flows from states to PRIs, whether of the revenue transfer or the functional variety, are assigned to demands uniquely designated for the purpose. This is presently being done, though not comprehensively, in three of the four states. Rajasthan is the exception again. The Rajasthan budget records functional flows to PRIs within the parent functional demands under three-digit budget subheads, specifying the tier receiving the fund (196, 197 and 198 for zilla, block and gram panchayats respectively). This practice is adopted at the centre, where it is entirely appropriate, since there is no functional

Table A2: Budgetary Classification of Fund Transfer to PRIsunder Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana: 2006-07

Budget Head/(Devolved Rs Cr Budget Head/(non- Rs Cr Total
Demand) Devolved Demand) Rs Cr
Madhya Pradesh
2501
01(IRDP)
101 (DRDA)
#42 (RSVY)
/Demand 15 10.5
/Demand 80 25.0
/Demand 52 99.5 135.0
Chhattisgarh
2515/Demand 30 2515/Demand 41
102(Com. Dev) 102(Com. Dev)
#14 (RSVY) 75.0 #14 (RSVY) 75.0 150.0
Rajasthan
2515/Demand 41
101(PR)
01/05 (RSVY) 0.0
2515/Demand 41
196(ZP)
03 (RSVY) 0.0
2515/Demand 30
196(ZP)
06 (Backward ADF ) 60.0 60.0
Orissa
3451/Demand 16
102 (District Plan)
0922 (Misc)
78006 (RSVY) 75.0 75.0

Notes: 1 The RSVY has been renamed the Backward Area Development Fund from the fiscal year 2006-07.

2 The Orissa budget is for the Backward District Initiative under RSVY. Budget head 3451 is for Secretariat Economic Services. Demand 16 is for Planning and Coordination Department.

3 See notes to Table A1. Source: Ibid.

decentralisation of governance from centre to PRIs. It is not suitable at the state level, where functional transfer can be tracked only through the associated pattern of fund transfer. The audited finance accounts also group transfers to PRIs under these three subheads, and so lose the information potentially available from a well-structured grant format.

Even where fund flows to PRIs are placed in separate demands, as in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, a few are tucked away as grants-in-aid under general demand heads. These states also have multiple demand heads dedicated for PRIs, reflecting the historical evolution of demands, away from what was initially a purely functional orientation, towards demands for designated caste and other beneficiaries. These practices add an avoidable element of extreme tedium in determining what flows to PRIs from state exchequers.

Fourth, state provisions under the NREGS, a demand-driven programme for all rural households that self-select into it, should not be carved into demand heads for targeted groups like scheduled castes or tribes. By the national objectives, which are to provide employment to self-selecting poor households regardless of caste or tribe, the state contribution should come under general demands for transfer of funds, and not under demands targeted towards special groups.

Table A3: Budgetary Classification of Fund Transfer to PRIsunder the Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana: 2006-07

Budget Head/(Devolved Rs Cr Budget Head/(non- Rs Cr Total
Demand) Devolved Demand) Rs Cr
Madhya Pradesh
2501 2225/64
01(IRDP) 01(SC)
101 (DRDA) 102 (Econ Dev)
#42 (SGSY) #42 (Grant) 10.0
/Demand/15 5.5
/Demand /80 17.6
/Demand /52 6.7 39.8
Chhattisgarh
2501/30 2501
06(Self emp) 06(Self emp)
101 (SGSY) 101 (SGSY)
#14 Grant 10.1 #14 Grant
Demand/41 7.7
Demand/64 2.4
2225/64
01(SC)
102 (Econ Dev)
#14 (Grant) 4.5 24.7
Rajasthan
2501/28 2501/30
06(Self emp) 06(Self emp)
196(ZP) 5.7 196(ZP) 1.0
2501/51
06(Self emp)
196(ZP) 1.6 8.3
Orissa
2501/17
01(IRDP)
001(Dir & admin) 3.1
789(SC) 5.1
796(ST) 6.0
800(Other) 12.0 26.3

Notes: 1 SGSY is intended by the guidelines to reach PRIs. 2 SGSY provisions in Chhattisgarh fall under demands 41 (Tribal Area Sub Plan), and 64 (Special Component Plan for SCs), notwithstanding the parallel set of demands 82 and 15 respectively, intended to cover transfers to PRIs directed at the same set of beneficiaries.

3 The Orissa Annual Plan for 2006-07 shows a provision for SGSY of 20 crore, lower than the sum obtained here from the Budget documents. Source: Ibid.

At the national level, two reforms are needed. First, budgetary heads and sub-heads have to be restructured so as to convey the functional content of each. There is duplication between categories 2501 and 2515, both of which cover rural development programmes. Then, within four-digit heads, such as crop husbandry (2401) for example, there are some input based categories (like 103 for seeds or 105 for manure and fertilisers), and some output based categories (like 102 for foodgrain crops, and 108 for commercial crops). The assignment of expenditure in such an irrational system would necessarily be ad hoc. Again, the catch-all component 001 for direction and administration in this as under other budget heads needs to be subdivided and grouped with other non-salary expenditures for the performance of a particular function so as to enable a more functional understanding. The category 109 for extension and training is an example. Salaries for extension staff are not included under this head, but are grouped with other salaries under 001. These boundaries do not enable an understanding of the different sub-functions within an overall head.

Second at the national level, the budgetary structure needs to provide for distinctions between rural and urban expenditures. The devolvable base in most budget heads in the previous section unavoidably includes expenditures targeted at urban areas as well.

EPW

Email: indira_raja@yahoo.com

Notes

1 The state was a constituent of Madhya Pradesh prior to November 2000. 2 The four-state study was funded by UNDP Project No IND/03/020. 3 With one marginal exception, dealt with later on. 4 The sub-heads within each four-digit budget category assigned to the

devolvable and non-devolvable categories are listed in annex 1 of

Rajaraman and Sinha (2007). 5 For details, see Rajaraman and Sinha, 2007. 6 Some three-digit sub-heads are input based (like 103 for seeds, or 105

for manure and fertilisers), and some are output based (like 102 for foodgrain crops, and 108 for commercial crops). The assignment of expenditure between these categories would necessarily be ad hoc.

7 In Rajasthan, this budget head is found under demands 30 (Tribal Area Development), 42 (Industries) and 51 (Special Component Plan for Scheduled Castes), none of which is a demand dedicated to PRIs.

8 In GOI (2006; Volume II), a sum across demand heads 80, 82 and 15 is obtained for Chhattisgarh alone, of the four states, to quantify fund flows to PRIs.

9 This was the process through which budget heads, outside those mapped in Table 1, were uncovered.

10 The product of the devolved and devolvable percentages in Tables 7 and 8 for crop husbandry yields the devolved to total percentage figure of 10.31 shown in Table 3.

References

Governments of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan (2006): Budget Documents 2006-07. Government of India (1987): List of Major and Minor Heads of Account of Union and States, Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance.

  • (1993): Constitution of India.
  • (2005): Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission.
  • (2006): ‘The State of the Panchayats: A Mid-Term Review and Appraisal’, Vols 1-3 (Ministry of Panchayati Raj).
  • (2007): Poverty Estimates for 2004-05, (Press Information Bureau, March 21).
  • Rajaraman, Indira and Darshy Sinha (2007): ‘Tracking Functional Devolution by States to Panchayats’ (NIPFP: mimeo, March).

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