VIVEK KUMAR

I

But ironically the mainstream media, intelligentsia and academia have been interpreting BSP’s victory in an oversimplified manner. Earlier they labelled the BSP as a movement spreading the venom of casteism, a party without ideology, a “power hungry” outfit without any agenda of emancipation and only committed to erecting Ambedkar’s statues and gardens, celebrating birthdays, etc. In each election they predicted its doom and in poll surveys of 2007 gave the BSP only 120-160 seats. Now these analysts are evaluating BSP’s victory in terms of a dalit-brahmin social engineering programme led by brahmins, an anti-incumbency effect and the effectiveness of the Election Commission in overseeing the elections, etc, without substantiating why only the BSP has benefited from these factors.

dalit-brahmin equation? Why did the Congress not succeed in reviving its brahmin-Muslim-dalit arithmetic? Why was the Bharatiya Janata Party unable to make its ‘samrasta’ slogan functional? Moreover, the BSP has been contesting elections since the days of the Dalit Soshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti (DS4) in 1981, yet why is it that only now it has been so successful?

One can argue that the BSP did not earlier welcome brahmins as it does now. But the question is, why did the brahmins earlier not support the BSP in the same proportion as they were given a share in seat allocation? We can argue that the brahmins came to the BSP once the party crossed a threshold with its traditional votes and they were convinced that the BSP could give them a sure victory. Moreover, the new elite and its younger generation have been stagnating in the Congress and BJP, as the established leadership has not given them any space for their development. Brahmins will stay with the BSP as long as the party has power and they themselves do not have space for development in other parties. Secondly, this alliance will not take a pan-Indian shape unless the BSP crosses a threshold in different parts of the country. In sum, the dalit-brahmin alliance in UP is not part of any social engineering process but a pure political adjustment.

That means the reasons for BSP’s success in 2007 assembly elections are to be found in the historical nature and struggle of the “Bahujan Movement” – because the BSP is an offshoot of a movement and is also a movement in itself rather than only a political party [Kumar 2006]. This article is an attempt to analyse BSP’s victory historically.

End of ‘Chamcha Age’

The BSP’s first step in politics was establishment of an “independent dalit political leadership” instead of a “dependent dalit political leadership” [Kumar 2003a]. The latter was present in the political parties that were led and dominated by the so-called upper castes and was a product of the politics of patronage – the ‘ma-baap’ culture. Against this Kanshi Ram produced an “independent dalit political leadership” in a party that was led and dominated by the dalits with an independent agenda. As a result, the BSP made the dalit leaders in other political parties redundant. The 2007 UP election was a witness to this phenomenon, with all political parties giving Mayawati a virtual walkover as far as the dalit votes were concerned. Except for giving tickets to dalits from reserved seats no political party tried to mobilise the dalits. Even during the election campaign no political party could present a dalit leader for mobilising the dalits, though they did have a number of such candidates for leadership.

This has happened because of the emergence of Mayawati. She has not only effectively mobilised the dalits in the BSP’s favour but her style of governance and performance of her successive governments has consolidated dalit support . The dalits have virtually lost faith in dalit leaders from other parties. That is why this time in UP, BSP won a record 62 out of 89 reserved seats, i e, almost 70 per cent of the seats and garnered 77 per cent of the

The other backward classes (OBCs) have always been the core component of Bahujan Samaj. A strong notion prevails among the general public that OBCs perpetrate atrocities on dalits. However, in UP as well in the rest of India, the OBCs do not form a monolithic whole. There are 79 castes, which come under the rubric of the OBCs in UP. Of the lot, the yadavs, kurmis, jats, lodhs and gujjars can be termed as economically and politically mobile. Internally differentiated on the class lines, these are still socially stigmatised and excluded from the higher bureaucracy. These castes cannot match the brahmins in UP, as far as bureaucratic power is concerned.

Granted these five castes are aggressive; what about the other 74 castes, which can be termed as most backward castes like the rajbhars, nais, mauryas, kushwahas, bindhs, sainis, nishads, kevats or mallahas, pals, noniyas, kumhars, etc, to name a few. Most of these castes have lost their traditional occupations and have had no access to political power. Their economic and political status is akin to dalits, especially in the countryside. How then can they be seen as exploiting dalits or brahmins? Moreover, in UP even the yadavs are not a monolithic whole as western and eastern UP yadavs have different lineages.

Over the years the BSP has developed an amicable relationship between the dalits and OBCs by propounding a common history of exploitation by the ‘Manuwadis’. The pantheon of bahujan leaders which includes Jotiba Phule, Narayan Guru, Sahuji Maharaj, Babasaheb Ambedkar and E V Ramasamy Naicker Periyar helped further to unite bahujans in the Hindi heartland. Moreover, the BSP has developed a committed leadership among each sub-group of these OBCs. If the leaders failed to win direct elections they were nominated to the vidhan parishad and Rajya Sabha so that they could be visible in their communities. The BSP also directed OBC leaders to mobilise members of their castes in the reserved constituencies. Now these leaders and their castes have become the second pillar of BSP politics. That is why in the recent UP assembly elections, out of 110 tickets given to OBCs about 50 per cent have won, 27 per cent of OBCs (non-yadavs) voted for the BSP and 8 yadavs have also won.

Economic and Political Weekly June 16, 2007

In all, the BSP’s leadership followed a different strategy, in this era of coalition politics, by directly forging an alliance with castes and communities instead of having an alliance with political parties. Along with its core constituency of dalits, OBCs and Muslims, the BSP mobilised the so-called upper castes and they also voted for BSP (Table 2).

Superior Organisational Machinery

Apart form consolidating its core constituency of dalits, OBCs and Muslims and adding savarnas, the BSP’s success in the assembly elections of 2007 should be seen in terms of its superior organisational preparedness. For instance, the party had announced its prospective candidates almost one and a half years in advance. Further, while the national parties formed coalitions, the BSP contested elections alone. Moreover, in a shrewd political move BSP did not contest the civic polls held in November 2006 to avoid the embarrassment of defeat, as it knew its weakness in urban areas. That also helped the party avoid inner party bickering and prevented factions emerging in the local leadership.

Besides building a social movement and political manoeuvring, Mayawati has developed a charisma of an able administrator and hard taskmaster, cutting across caste and religious boundaries. She is considered to be the only political boss able to teach bureaucrats a lesson that they are the servants and not the masters. People remember her treatment of the self-styled aristocrat of Kunda to prove the point that no one is above the law. As far as commitment to her ideology is concerned, by pursuing the Ambedkar Village Scheme, effective implementation of the Atrocities Act, overseeing a communal riot-free regime in 1995, 1997 and 2003, she has justified her commitment to dalits, minorities and other marginalised sections of the state [Kumar 2003b]. By wooing the savarnas she projected herself as the leader of an umbrella party, which can carry all the castes/communities together.

Conclusions

The BSP’s victory in the UP elections 2007 is the result of a “social engineering” process started some three decades ago by Kanshi Ram, which divided India’s population into two imaginary group, 85 per cent bahujans and 15 per cent Manuwadis. Different castes in the social hierarchy were brought together via construction of a common history of exclusion. Lower caste Muslims were also made conscious of exclusion wihin their own religion and handed an agenda of development with independent leadership. While other parties offered food, shelter and employment BSP offered them “self-respect”. After the demise of Kanshi Ram – the founder of ‘Bahujan’ ideology – Mayawati window dressed the so-called upper castes with the slogan ‘Sarvajan’, which is not a part of the social engineering as discussed earlier. But it is sure that dalits and OBCs and minorities have become more confident that their party can come to power on its own and are joining the BSP in different states.

EPW

Email: vivekambedkar@yahoo.com