Commentary
Mayawati’sSandwich Coalition
The unique brahmin-dalit alliance that Mayawati forged for the recent assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh paid off handsomely for the Bahujan Samaj Party. What remains to be seen is how this alliance relates to other influential sections in the state.
A K VERMA
O
Elections were held for the 15th assembly in seven phases leading to the BSP victory; the party also won all the three Lok Sabha constituencies – Bilhaur, Robertsganj and Mirzapur for which by-elections were held. Contrary to expectations and exit polls projections, the BSP got an absolute majority of 206 seats, leaving all others far behind (Table 1). The results are also given phase-wise (Table 2).
When we compare the performance of major parties in the 2002 assembly elections with the recent elections, we find that all of them lost in terms of seats except the BSP which registered a massive gain of 108 seats. It also registered a whopping gain in its vote share by 7.31 percentage points. The Samajwadi Party (SP) barely managed to hold on to its previous vote share, but the BJP and the Congress registered a decline (Table 3). On careful analysis, it appears that while the BSP certainly won, the SP did not lose – actually it very marginally improved its vote share. The 403 assembly constituencies of UP are spread over 70 districts. The SP lost votes only in 32 districts, whereas in 38 districts its vote share went up (in the other two it remained unchanged). Hence, the BSP cannot write off Mulayam Singh and it must also understand that its vote share of 30.46 per cent is not a matter to crow about because in earlier assembly elections, the BJP got higher votes than that, but lesser number of seats (Table 4).
The BJP suffered its worst performance since 1989 (1989-57, 1991-221, 1993-177, 1996-175, 2002-88, 2007-50). The party had some illusions about its prospects owing to two reasons: one, it thought that the municipal elections had suddenly revived the party (as it won eight out of 12 mayoral posts in December 2006); two, the party struck a deal with Apna Dal, brought back Kalyan Singh, and retained Janata Dal-United (JD-U), and thought, unwisely, that the BJP’s 20.1 per cent votes would add up with 3.4 per cent of Kalyan’s RKP, 2.2 of Apna Dal and a fraction of JD-U votes to take it to a wining position. Unfortunately, both presumptions proved wrong. Politics is not arithmetic and such simple additions do not work out in the changed circumstances. So far as the municipal elections were concerned, the party had lost badly at the municipal council and nagar panchayat levels, and even the mayoral victories were owing to the tactical voting of the BSP cadre [Verma 2006]. The party failed to recognise that it faces serious crises on the ideological, organisational and leadership fronts.
The Congress was mentally prepared for the fourth position though it had hoped that the BSP would be short of the majority, and the party would get enough seats to become an important ally of the BSP in forming the government. Unfortunately for the Congress, it could not even retain its seat tally but was down by three seats, and the landslide victory of the BSP did not require them to seek any outside support.
The only other party to put up a good show was the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) of Ajit Singh; though the party was down by four seats, it retained its vote base and recorded its presence in most parts of the state. Muslim parties could barely open their account and only Haji Yaqub Quareshi of the UPUDF won from Meerut. The much hyped Beni factor, Apna Dal, Kalyan factor, Aditya Nath factor, and Rahul road shows did not work. Beni Prasad Verma did not cut into the kurmi votes of SP and himself lost from Ayodhya. Apna Dal could not better the fortunes of BJP and its president Sone Lal Patel lost from Kolasla (Varanasi). Though Kalyan brought some lodh votes to BJP he did not carry any conviction with the voters as the future chief minister; and his son Rajveer Singh lost from Dibai. Mahant Aditya Nath too was cut to size and the people sent a clear message that they do not approve of communal politics. Rahul disappointed the Congress though he played his innings well and attracted crowds but the “bannerposter” variety of Congress candidates let him down.
The entire nation, except, of course, Mulayam Singh and his Samajwadi Party, commended the Election Commission (EC) for its strictness in ensuring violencefree elections. The ordinary voter realised
Table 1: Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election Results 2007
Party Contested Won Vote (Per Cent)
INC 392 22 8.56 BJP 349 50 16.93 BSP 402 206 30.46 CPI 21 0 0.09 CPM 14 0 0.31 NCP 44 0 0.10 S P 392 97 25.45 RLD 254 10 3.71 Janata Dal-United 16 1 0.43 LT Congress 2 1 0.18 Jan Morcha 118 1 0.60 Rashtriya
Swabhimaan Party 122 1 0.26 Bharatiya Janshakti 65 1 0.24 UP United
Democratic Front 54 1 0.35 Rashtriya
Parivartan Dal 14 2 0.21 Other parties 1238 0 5.19 Independents 2574 9 6.97 Total 6071 402 100
Source: CSDS Data Unit. (Election for Khaga countermanded due to death of Congress candidate.)
Economic and Political Weekly June 2, 2007 what it means to be voting without fear. The low turnout of voters, often attributed by some to the strictness of the EC was unfair. There were several reasons for the low turnout. Besides people’s disenchantment with parties and politicians, strict prevention of bogus voting and absentee voting brought down the voting percentage. However, complaints of missing names from the voters’ list at several places despite valid elector’s photo identity card (EPIC) or its substitute was a matter of concern. Even the governor T V Rajeshwar could not vote as his name was missing; Congress candidate Louisa Khurshid and her husband and president of UP Congress Salman Khurshid could not vote in Kayamganj for the same reason.1 The EC must devise a method to ensure that the holders of EPIC are allowed to vote even if their names are missing from the voters’ list available with the presiding officers. However, the EC was a mute spectator to the record number of criminals participating in the elections. This is a serious matter, and it cannot blame the existing laws and the lengthy judicial process as obstacles in containing them. Can the EC not resort to the model code of conduct and warn political parties that if they put up candidates with criminal antecedents, their registration would be cancelled or symbol frozen?
An analysis of the election results would require us to be BSP-centric and observe closely what has really gone into the silent preparation and homework of that party. Two major things have gone to shape the victory of the BSP; one, its attempt to forge a “sandwich coalition”, and, two, its judicious use of the reverse social osmosis.2 The “sandwich coalition” is an innovation of Mayawati and slightly different from the rainbow coalition of the Congress. It is called so because it is a coalition of the top-bottom of the society and traps all other social denominations in-between. It has an external and an internal dynamic. Externally, it is a mix of the apex social engineering combined with social engineering from below. Mayawati attempted apex social engineering through ‘brahmin jodo sammelans’, and bottom social engineering through ‘bhaichara committees’. The former was reflected in the coming together of Mayawati-Satish Mishra at the top, while the increased cordiality among brahmins and dalits at the grassroots was indicative of the social engineering from below. Muslims were integrated all along: Naseemuddin at the top and the Muslim masses at the bottom by giving tickets to 61 Muslims.
The internal dynamics of the sandwich coalition comprises of two variables; one, the vertical social coalition; two, the horizontal social coalition. In the former, several social denominations may coalesce at every level of the social hierarchy creating a virtual social axis around which horizontal social coalition may take place. In the latter, along the social axis so created, there may be two developments: (a) there may be enlargement of each social group at every level of social hierarchy by internal accretions, i e, more upper castes may join brahmins and more OBCs and Muslims may be attracted to their brethren in BSP through the process of social osmosis3 [Verma 2007]; and,
(b) the social groups in one state may get integrated with their counterparts in other states. The one has the potential to expand the social base of the BSP in Uttar Pradesh, while the other may help in expanding its base outside the state. It is this potential of the sandwich coalition which may give
Table 4: Highest Votes and Seats in Successive Elections in UP
| Year | Party | Vote (Per Cent) | S e a t s |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1989 | JD | 29.7 | 208 |
| 1991 | BJP | 31.5 | 221 |
| 1993 | BJP | 33.3 | 177 |
| 1996 | BJP | 33.9 | 175 |
| 2002 | No party was close to 30 per cent | ||
| 2007 | BSP | 30.46 | 206 |
Table 3: UP Assembly Elections 2007-2002 (Gain/Losses)
| Party | S eats | Votes | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | 2002 | Gain/Loss | 2007 | 2002 | Gain/Loss | |
| Congress | 22 | 25 | (-)3 | 8.56 | 8.98 | -0.42 |
| B J P B S P | 50 206 | 88 9 8 | (-)38 (+)108 | 16.93 30.46 | 20.7 23.15 | -3.77 +7.31 |
| S P | 97 | 143 | (-)46 | 25.45 | 25.4 | +0.05 |
| Others Independents | 18 9 | 33 1 5 | (-)15 (-)6 | 11.63 6.97 | 14.27 7.50 | -2.64 -0.53 |
Source: CSDS Data Unit.
Table 2: Uttar Pradesh: Phase-wise Loss/Gain Assembly Elections 2007
| P h a s e Phase-I Phase-II Phase-III Phase-IV Phase-V Phase-VI Phase-VII Total | Tst 6 2 5 8 5 7 57 5 7 5 2 5 9 402 | Tout 46.9 47.9 50.7 46.1 43.0 43.6 44.7 46.1 | G/L -5.0 -3.4 -8.2 -10.9 -9.5 -8.1 -9.0 -7.7 | Won 4 2 1 3 9 1 2 2 2 | Congress G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L 0 9.3 -0.7 -4 7.5 -3.0 -3 8.4 -1.5 1 8.4 0.3 5 14.3 3.1 0 6.0 -0.8 -2 6.4 -0.1 -3 8.6 -0.4 | Won 8 1 0 8 4 6 6 8 5 0 | B J P B S P G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L -8 19.4 -2.0 3 3 1 9 31.6 8.7 0 19.5 2.7 29 14 30.4 6.3 -3 20.4 1.5 28 19 27.6 7.7 -10 16.6 -7.6 2 7 1 8 31.7 9.0 -10 13.4 -8.0 2 6 8 30.2 7.5 -5 14.5 -6.0 3 3 1 8 32.2 7.9 -2 14.1 -3.4 3 0 1 3 29.9 4.9 -38 16.9 -3.1 206 109 30.5 7.4 |
| P hase Phase-I Phase-II Phase-III Phase-IV Phase-V Phase-VI Phase-VII Total | Tst 6 2 5 8 5 7 57 5 7 5 2 5 9 402 | Tout 46.9 47.9 50.7 46.1 43.0 43.6 44.7 46.1 | G/L -5.0 -3.4 -8.2 -10.9 -9.5 -8.1 -9.0 -7.7 | Won 1 4 3 1 7 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 7 9 7 | S P G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L -10 27.1 0.4 -5 15.8 -2.0 -8 25.9 0.9 -8 29.4 -1.1 -2 26.2 2.0 -9 27.2 0.6 -4 27.3 0.7 -46 25.5 0.1 | Won 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 | RLD Other Parties G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L -2 1.1 -0.4 3 1 11.6 -6.1 -1 15.6 2.8 4 -4 11.2 -6.9 -1 3.9 0.7 3 -4 13.9 -9.3 0 1.0 1.0 0 -1 13.0 -1.6 0 1.6 1.6 4 -1 14.2 -6.1 0 0.8 0.7 1 -4 19.2 -2.3 0 1.1 1.0 2 -5 21.2 -3.1 -4 3.7 1.2 17 -18 14.9 -5.1 |
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other parties a tough time vis-à-vis the BSP Baghpat -0.4). In all the other 66 districts, retaining its vote share it could not retain in the days ahead. the vote share of the party increased. its seats.
The BSP took full advantage of the Though the SP also tried to make use of reverse social osmosis [Verma 2007]. The the reverse social osmosis, it could not
Focused Approach
way the party succeeded in attracting devise the right philosophical tools to each and every caste and class amply catch up with the BSP. It however But the BSP’s sandwich coalition exdemonstrates that. There appeared to be succeeded in expanding its vote base in periment was juxtaposed with its clear a scramble for the party all over proved 38 out of 70 districts. Probably SP suc-focus on issues, ideology and image of the by the fact that its vote share only margin-ceeded in horizontal social coalition but leader. The party was very focused on ally declined in just four districts failed in the vertical social coalition raising the twin issues of “deteriorating (Banda -0.9, Jhansi -0.8, Kushinagar -0.5, which explains why despite the party law and order” and “false claims of
Table 5: Changing Caste Base of Parties in Uttar Pradesh (2007-2002)
Castes Congress BJP BSP S P
Assembly Assembly Gain/ Assembly Assembly Gain/Loss Assembly Assembly Gain/Loss Assembly Assembly Gain/Loss Election Election Loss Election Election Loss Election Election Loss Election Election Loss 2007 2002 (+/-) 2007 2002 (+/-) 2007 2002 (+/-) 2007 2002 (+/-)
Brahmin 19 26 -7 42 50 -8 17 6 +11 10 3 +7 Rajput 910 -1 45 47 -2 12 5 +7 21 9+12 Vaish 10 12 -2 50 49 +1 14 3 +11 1217 -5 Other UC 12 22 -10 39 45 -6 16 5 +11 17 14 +3 Jat 2 0+2 23 10 +13 13 0 +1311 5 +6 Yadav 4 5-1 4 5-1 7 5 +2 73 72 +1 Kurmi 6 4+2 36 43 -7 16 10 +6 21 9+12 Lodh 6 6 0 42 22 +20 1912 +7 1122-11 Other pesant 9 8 +1 14 26 -12 34 19 +15 20 19 +1 MBCs 8 9 -1 18 20 -2 2828 020 22 -2 Jatav 2 4-2 3 2+1 85 79 +6 3 2+1 Other SCs5 9 -4 11 12 -1 55 55 013 15 -2 Muslims14 10 +4 3 2+1 17 10 +7 47 54 -7
Source: CSDS Data Unit; the figures are from CSDS Post Poll survey of Assembly Elections 2002 and 2007. The figures have been rounded off.
Table 6: Changing Class Base of Parties in Uttar Pradesh (2007-2002)
Class Congress BJP BSP S P
Assembly Assembly Gain/ Assembly Assembly Gain/Loss Assembly Assembly Gain/Loss Assembly Assembly Gain/Loss Election Election Loss Election Election Loss Election Election Loss Election Election Loss 2007 2002 (+/-) 2007 2002 (+/-) 2007 2002 (+/-) 2007 2002 (+/-)
Age Up to 35 9 7+2 19 19 0 29 23 +6 26 26 0 36 to 55 8 9 -1 18 21 -3 3222 +10 2525 0 Above 559 13 -4 18 22 -4 30 27 +3 24 23 +1 Gender Male 910 -1 19 21 -2 30 22 +8 25 25 0 Female 8 8 0 18 18 0 3225 +7 2625 +1 Education Non-literate 7 6 +1 12 13 -1 37 32 +5 25 27 -2 Matric 9 9 0 19 26 -7 29 17 +12 27 26 +1 Graduate 11 24 -13 27 30 -3 22 18 +14 23 26 -3 Locality Rural 7 6+1 18 19 -1 32 25 +7 26 25 +1 Urban 16 21 -5 21 26 -5 21 15 +6 23 26 -3 Eco status Poor 5 4+1 12 14 -2 4130 +11 2329 -6 Middle 914 -5 19 24 -5 2918 +11 2723 +4 Rich 1212 0 30 34 -4 14 8 +6 2516 +9
Source: CSDS Data Unit; the figures are from CSDS Post Poll survey of Assembly Elections 2002 and 2007. The figures have been rounded off.
Table 7: Uttar Pradesh: Muslim Category-wise Loss/Gain Assembly Elections 2007
Category Tst Tout G/L Congress BJP BSP Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L
Low Muslim 340 45.5 -7.9 20 -1 9.0 0.2 38 -36 15.8 -4.3 179 92 31.0 7.4 High Muslim 62 49.7 -6.6 2 -2 6.6 -3.7 12 -2 22.9 2.6 27 17 27.6 7.5 Total 402 46.1 -7.7 22 -3 8.6 -0.4 50 -38 16.9 -3.1 206 109 30.5 7.4
Category Tst Tout G/L S P RLD Other Parties Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L
Low Muslim 340 45.5 -7.9 81 -39 26.0 0.4 8 -1 3.0 1.2 14 -15 15.3 -5.0 High Muslim 62 49.7 -6.6 16 -7 22.9 -1.7 2 -3 7.4 1.0 3 -3 12.7 -5.7 Total 402 46.1 -7.7 97 -46 25.5 0.1 10 -4 3.7 1.2 17 -18 14.9 -5.1
Economic and Political Weekly June 2, 2007 development”. These issues were so uniformly and strongly felt by the common man that the massive campaign of SP in print and electronic media (through Amitabh Bachchan) was totally negated. The party beautifully combined its coalition experiment with an ideological component; it sold its philosophical transition from bahujan to sarvajan, and the ideological shift from exclusionary to inclusionary. It also projected the image of Mayawati as a good administrator; rough with bureaucrats and tough on criminals.
When we look at the support base of parties, we find that the BSP not only capitalised on the brahmins, but also the OBCs; its strategy of giving tickets to 110 OBCs paid rich dividends and a massive +43 percentage points shift of the caste group towards BSP was discernible (jats +13, yadavs +2, kurmis +6, lodhs +7, other OBCs +15). This coupled with the massive 85 per cent support of the jatavs made all the difference. To this was added Muslim support (17 per cent) which resulted in 28 out of 61 Muslim candidates of the BSP winning. The SP lost votes among vaishya, lodhs, MBCs, other SCs, but gained among brahmins, rajputs, OBCs (especially kurmis) and jatavs. BJP suffered losses among brahmins, rajputs, other upper castes, kurmis, yadavs, peasant castes, MBCs, and other SCs, but gained among lodhs and jats. Congress lost votes among all upper castes and SCs, but gained among OBCs and Muslims (Table 5). When we examine the support base of parties along class lines, we find that the BSP is the only party to have gained in all classes cutting across age, gender, education, locality and economic status. But, its highest gains were among the educated (+14) and the middle class (+11) voters. Surprisingly, the so-called “socialist” party (SP) recorded maximum gains among the rich (+9) and maximum loss among the poor (-6). The BJP too recorded losses in each and every class, and the Congress was no better (Table 6).
Muslim Votes
The BSP also succeeded in marginalising the secular-communal divide as it defeated both the so-called communal and the so-called secular parties, viz, BJP and SP respectively. The 2007 assembly elections marked the beginning of a new era in Muslim politics in UP. For the first time, Muslim voting was non-BJP centric; instead they voted for a party which promised better law and order and development even if that meant voting against the “secular” SP. Many had apprehended that if Muslims voted for the newly formed Muslim parties – the United Democratic Front (UDF) and People’s Democratic Front (PDF) candidates, that would invite a reaction leading to Hindu polarisation giving an advantage to the BJP. But, that did not happen as is evident from Table 7; in 62 constituencies with high Muslim concentration, the SP lost seven seats and
1.7 per cent votes, whereas BSP gained 17 more seats and 7.5 per cent more votes as compared to 2002. The SP’s deviation from socialist ideology to corporate culture, its “jhanda-banner-poster-socialism”, and goodbye to agricultural concerns and ruralism cost the party dearly.
The BSP gained seats and votes in all sub-regions, the highest seat gains were in east UP and Doab, but the highest number of votes were in Doab and Avadh. There were 21 districts where its vote share rose by more than 10 percentage points.4 SP lost seats in all regions; its highest losses were in east UP and Doab, but its vote share declined only in west UP and the north-east. That showed that even the SP took advantage of the reverse social osmosis. The RLD lost seats in west UP (-2) and one seat each in Ruhelkhand and Doab, but increased its vote share in all segments of the state; it gained votes by 1.2 percentage points. Congress gained in Avadh and Bundelkhand both in terms of seats and votes, but lost in all others. BJP lost seats in every sub-region; the highest losses in Avadh (-13) and east UP (-8), but increased its vote share in Ruhelkhand, west UP and marginally in Doab (Table 8).
The UP elections may be over, but the Lok Sabha elections are round the corner and Mayawati also has an expansion plan. Hence, the big question is: will she be able to retain and/or further expand her sandwich coalition? This is because there are more serious issues pertaining to the nature of the coalition. One, will the brahmins with their socio-cultural superiority adapt and live as equals with their new dalit friends? Or, will they conspire to outsmart dalits at every step? Two, how comfortable are the dalits in the company of brahmins? Are they able to feel as equals or, nourishing silent resentment against the sudden influx of brahmins and feeling marginalised? Answers to these questions would have serious repercussions for the socioeconomic structure at the grassroots. While brahmin-dalit coalition may provide a model for social cohesion, it would be closely
Table 8: Uttar Pradesh: Region-wise Loss/Gain Assembly Elections 2007
| Regions Ruhelkhand Avadh East West Doab Bundelkhand North-east Total Regions Ruhelkhand Avadh East West Doab Bundelkhand North-east Total 2042 | Tst 50 74 79 42 75 21 61 402 Tst 50 74 79 42 75 21 61 402 | Tout 51.5 45.8 43.8 48.0 46.6 46.6 43.5 46.1 Tout 51.5 45.8 43.8 48.0 46.6 46.6 43.5 46.1 | G/L -7.7 -8.9 -8.5 -3.2 -5.2 -8.3 -11.0 -7.7 G/L -7.7 -8.9 -8.5 -3.2 -5.2 -8.3 -11.0 -7.7 | Won 1 8 1 1 3 3 5 22 Won 1 3 2 3 1 7 2 1 7 4 21 9 7 | Congress G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L -2 8.5 -1.9 4 11.5 1.4 -1 5.7 -0.8 -2 7.6 -2.4 -4 7.7 -1.1 2 13.3 2.3 0 9.0 0.3 -3 8.6 -0.4 S P G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L -8 25.2 0.2 -5 29.2 1.7 -13 27.8 1.2 -5 16.8 -4.1 -10 24.3 1.3 0 26.1 3.0 -5 25.6 -2.4 -46 25.5 0.1 | Won 8 7 6 7 12 0 10 50 Won 0 0 0 6 4 0 0 10 | B J P B S P G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L -2 20.3 2.5 25 16 27.1 7.1 -13 12.8 -8.6 32 15 31.5 9.3 -8 12.2 -6.0 53 27 33.0 7.4 -1 20.1 2.5 23 12 29.5 6.7 -3 20.5 0.3 35 20 31.4 8.4 -6 13.2 -10.9 14 4 33.2 5.2 -5 20.1 -3.1 24 15 27.4 5.6 -38 16.9 -3.1 206 109 30.5 7.4 RLD Other Parties G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L Won G/L Vt(Per Cent) G/L -1 4.3 0.7 3 -3 14.7 -8.5 0 1.5 1.5 4 -1 13.4 -5.2 0 0.7 0.6 2 -5 20.6 -2.5 -2 13.5 0.9 3 -2 12.5 -3.7 -1 5.7 1.6 4 -2 10.3 -10.5 0 1.5 1.5 0 0 12.7 -1.1 0 0.8 0.8 1 -5 17.1 -1.3 -4 3.7 1.2 17 -18 14.9 -5.1 Economic and Political Weekly June 2, 2007 |
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watched for how it stands vis-à-vis the dominant landowning yadavs, rich OBCs, thakurs and influential Muslims? One thing is sure: with brahmins on their side, the exploitation of dalits at their hands will be greatly reduced, if not eliminated. Additionally, dalits may also enjoy the process of sanskritisation in the company of their new brahmin friends. The sandwich coalition of Mayawati with its vertical and horizontal dynamics has the potential to control both the state and the national political agenda in the days to come.
EPWEmail: anil_verma@vsnl.net
Notes
1 On this ground, the EC ordered re-poll in about 46 polling stations in Kayamganj on May 10 so that the missing names could be included.
2 For full treatment of the ‘Reverse Social Osmosis’ see author’s work in Economic and Political Weekly, March 10-16, pp 817-20, Vol XLI, No 10.
3 “Social Osmosis” is a process where the movement of castes is from the lower concentration zone to the higher concentration zone. In this case, the brahmin concentration in BSP’s social axis would represent higher concentration zone for the upper castes facilitating their movement from society (low concentration zone) to the BSP. The same would apply to the Muslims and the OBCs.
4 BSP vote share rose by more than 10 percentage points as follows: Allahabad 17.3, Ballia 11.3, Bara Banki 12.2, Etah 11, Etawah 17.6, Farukkabad 14.7, GB Nagar 17.6, Hardoi 12.5, Kanpur Dehat 10.3, Kanpur Nagar 10.5, Kaushambi 12.2, Lalitpur 19.4, Lucknow 12.1, Muzzaffar Nagar 11.3, Pratapgarh 14.5, St Kabir Nagar 11.2, SR Nagar 10.2, Shahjahanpur 16.2, Shrawasti 10.4, Sitapur 11, Sonbhadra 15.6.
References
Verma, A K (2006): ‘Municipal Elections in Uttar Pradesh’, Economic and Political Weekly, December 23-29, pp 5218-21, Vol XLI.
– (2007): ‘Reverse Social Osmosis in Uttar Pradesh’, Economic and Political Weekly, March 10-16, pp 817-20.
Economic and Political Weekly June 2, 2007
