Administration of Drought Relief1

The “famine codes”, which came into existence in the 1880s after the famine commission report of 1880, play an important role in the provision of drought relief.2 The role and scope of government intervention has been carefully laid out in these famine codes (or “scarcity manuals”) of each state. The basic principle of the famine codes was the organisation of massive public works – to provide employment to all who applied for it, at subsistence wages at a reasonable distance from their home, and gratuitous relief for those who could not work.

A large share of the drought relief funds come from the central government. Based on the data collected by state governments on the drought situation, each state government submits a “Memorandum of Scarcity” for central assistance. Insofar as food-for-work programmes form a large part of drought relief, the foodgrain component is a crucial component of drought aid. These are supplied by the Food Corporation of India (FCI), which comes under the ministry of civil supplies and consumer affairs. The cash component of relief is allocated through the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) and the National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF). The central government provides 75 per cent of funds to each of these. The CRF is constituted by each state government and the central government’s share is paid into the fund in two instalments each year. Funds are released by the ministry of finance, but can be stopped by the ministry of home affairs, which is charged with monitoring the CRF.

The NCCF is administered by the central government. As per the Eleventh Finance Commission’s recommendations, a National Centre for Calamity Management was to have been constituted to assess the allocation of funds from the NCCF to the affected states. Pending the constitution of this centre the ministry of home affairs constituted a high level committee comprising the deputy prime minister L K Advani, the agriculture minister Ajit Singh, the finance minister Jaswant Singh and the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission K C Pant.

This high level committee was to base its decisions regarding the allocation of funds on the Memorandum of Scarcity submitted by the states, on the assessments made by the central teams sent to each state and the recommendations of the interministerial group.

Four ministries (rural development, agriculture, finance and home affairs) and the Planning Commission are involved in the release and administration of drought relief. Smooth functioning of relief requires co-ordination between these ministries as well as the FCI, which stores the foodgrain. The situation is complicated further at the implementation level where various departments such as the department of rural development, forest, irrigation get involved.

Electoral Politics: State Politics and Centre-State Politics

In electoral democracies, where political parties have to face the electorate to form governments, incumbent governments are more likely to be re-elected if, inter alia, they discharge their responsibility of providing drought relief properly. The jump in drought relief between 2000-01 and 2002-03 can be only partially attributed to the greater severity of the 2002 drought. Starvation deaths were reported during the summer of 2001 from Kotda block of Udaipur district and again in October 2002 from Baran.3 However, the state government’s response to the Baran deaths completely overshadowed the response to the Kotda deaths. The extensive media coverage of Baran could partially be explained by the fact that 2003 was an election year. The massive relief operations in the drought of 2002-03 should be evaluated against the backdrop of the assembly elections of December 2003. The Congress government in Rajasthan could not have had any chance being re-elected if relief measures had not been adequately arranged.4 The role of the opposition has also been quite crucial. However, in Rajasthan, the opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), could not claim to have been the force that compelled the government to improve its relief measures.5

In order to understand the importance of centre-state relations in the provision of drought relief, comparing drought relief in Rajasthan with drought relief in Andhra Pradesh provides interesting insights. Funds for relief operations are allocated and

Table 1: Chronology of Events in Rajasthan (April 2001 to August 2003)

released by the centre whereas the state governments are responsible for administration. The central government, in 19992004, was formed by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and headed by the BJP.6 The Congress(I) had formed the state government of Rajasthan under the chief ministership of Ashok Gehlot during the same period. This provided an opportunity for both the central and state governments to lay the blame at the other’s doorstep.

The government of Rajasthan (GoR) blamed the centre for its step-motherly treatment towards Rajasthan. It alleged that the centre was being miserly in the allocation of relief funds to the state and that the funds were not being released in a timely fashion.7 The central government, on the other hand, emphasised the poor utilisation of the state’s quota of foodgrains.8 The implicit message in the allegations made by the state was that the central government headed by the BJP wanted to ensure that the Congress-led GoR was portrayed in a bad light to the public, so that in the forthcoming elections of 2003, the BJP could gain political mileage out of this. The Congress government, of course, would have wanted to perform well on its drought relief measures for these very reasons.9

We compare the relief package for Rajasthan with that of Andhra Pradesh, in order to examine whether there was any truth in the claims of the Rajasthan government. With 29 seats in the 13th Lok Sabha, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) was the second largest party in the NDA, and therefore, one of the most important alliance partners in the BJP-led NDA government at the centre.10 The TDP was in power in the state under the chief ministership of Chandrababu Naidu.

By most indicators, the drought situation in Rajasthan was worse (Table 2). It was a more widespread drought, more prolonged and more severe in terms of agricultural losses at least. For example, in 2002, 22 districts out of 26 in Andhra Pradesh were declared drought-affected whereas in Rajasthan all 32 districts were drought-affected. Rainfall in Andhra Pradesh was below normal in three out of five years in 1998-2002, in the three meteorological subdivisions. Rajasthan experienced below normal rains in each of the five years during the same period in both meteorological subdivisions. While the drought situation was worse in Rajasthan, its ability to deal with drought was hampered on account of its less diversified economy (especially compared to that of Andhra Pradesh).

There are three counts on which Rajasthan seems to have been discriminated against:11

minister and others had to literally beg every now and then for the next instalment of funds. After allocations had been made, there were delays in the release of both cash and of foodgrains.

Public Action in a Democracy

Role of the Media

Table 2: Comparison of Relief in Andhra Pradeshand Rajasthan

Andhra Pradesh Rajasthan

Figure 1: Procurement and Distribution of Foodgrains

gg

t i t i i40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 (in million tonnes) Procurement Distribution

1980-90 1991-97 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Source: Economic Survey, 2003-04, Table 1. 18, p S-22.

significant. The reach of newspapers, especially Hindi newspapers, has been increasing rapidly, given the increase in literacy rates in the 1990s.16 More importantly the vernacular press remains more finely tuned into rural issues than national dailies in English, or the electronic media. The following case study illustrates how the media can function as a watchdog and as a mobiliser of public opinion.17

The sahariyas (classified as a “primitive” tribe) constitute onefifth of the population in Baran. When the rains failed in 2002, it dealt a double blow to the sahariyas. On the one hand, they lost their earnings as cultivators and agricultural labourers, and on the other, forest produce became even scarcer. Just before Dusshera in 2002, 12 children were reported to have died of starvation in Sanwaas village of Baran district. A four-member PUCL team, which included a reporter from the Jaipur bureau of The Hindustan Times and me, visited Baran on October 14-15, 2002 to investigate the starvation deaths. We visited those seven villages and hamlets where starvation deaths had been reported. The PUCL team found that the situation of the sahariyas was indeed deplorable. There was little by way of government relief. Murari (village Mudaliar) lost his father, wife, and 20 day-old child in the span of a few days. All Murari received as compensation was employment on a relief site. Few had ration cards, ration shops rarely opened. Of the 50 houses in Murari’s hamlet, only seven had BPL cards and three had Antyodaya cards – the rest had been classified as “above the poverty line”.18 The ration shop had distributed foodgrains only twice in the past year. Most were eating only one meal in a day and were eating a wild vegetable (‘phaang’). People were consuming ‘sama’ (collected from the forest) in lieu of grain though they were aware that sama had probably caused the death of the three members of Murari’s family. The sarpanch told us that sama was something people ate only in distress (‘majboori’). Most children looked severely malnourished – brown hair, bloated stomachs, spindly limbs, running eyes and noses, though the only functional government scheme was the mid-day meal scheme.

Among the national English dailies, HT broke the news first in October 2002.19 The government’s and the administration’s initial response was shocking. The local MLA, himself a sahariya, said “ek time khana mil raha hai, ek time nahi mil raha, to ise bhook se marna thodi kehete hai” (when you are getting alternate meals you can’t term this as dying of hunger).20 Nor was the district collector at all alarmed by the situation. He complained that he did not have adequate staff in the district, making it difficult to implement government schemes. The collector informed us that in Baran relief funds had not been fully utilised because they had not been able to identify “appropriate” works. The state government tried to absolve itself of all responsibility by blaming the deaths on illnesses, unrelated to starvation. Later, a central team investigating the matter confirmed that these were starvation deaths, but the state government continued to deny this.21

After HT, the national media (print and electronic) turned the spotlight on Rajasthan.22 Most English national dailies sent their correspondents to Baran to investigate the situation there. These reports were uniformly (and severely) critical of the denial of the starvation deaths by the government and of the lack of response of the government. In the face of these investigative reports, it became increasingly difficult for the state government to deny the occurrence of the starvation deaths. As a result, the state government’s response evolved from one of denial to taking remedial measures.23

The effect of media attention on drought relief is clearly brought out by Figure 2. This figure plots the increase in relief employment provision in the district in the two drought years. Employment generated in Jhalawar (a neighbouring district) and in the eastern region (consisting of Bundi, Chittorgarh, Jhalawar and Kota districts) has also been plotted. Jhalawar and Baran are similar in terms of population and crop losses. In 2002-03 not only does the magnitude of relief employment in Baran dominate that in Jhalawar and the average for the eastern districts, but relief employment shoots up after October, when reports of the starvation deaths hit the national headlines. One could argue that the increase in relief employment is a “seasonal” effect, i e, a pattern that is observable in other years as well. In 2000-01, when there were no reports of starvation deaths, we find that relief employment picked up only in the summer months, especially after March. Further, in 2000-01 employment in Jhalawar and Baran was roughly of the same magnitude (with Jhalawar getting slightly more employment than Baran) whereas in 2002-03 Baran clearly dominates Jhalawar.24 One could argue that the situation in Baran was worse than in Jhalawar. If we look at the agricultural output in these two years as a proportion of “normal” output then we find that in 2000-01 the output in Jhalawar was below normal and it was above normal in Baran. In 2002-03, output was below normal in both districts, though the situation was slightly better in Baran (78 per cent of normal) compared to Jhalawar (58 per cent of normal).

Soon after the Baran reports, news of starvation deaths started drifting in from other parts of the country (especially Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa).25 The international media began to take notice of the drought situation and of the starvation deaths too.26 International attention added to the feeling of a national shame. Many reports drew attention to the fact that starvation deaths were taking place in the “shadow” of rising food stocks. With the Supreme Court also pulling up the state and central governments for their poor performance the issue of starvation deaths and (probably for the first time) chronic hunger became national issues.27

The Baran case study demonstrates the ability of the media in highlighting crisis issues and its potential in ensuring appropriate government responses to such crises. An important outcome was the introduction of a scheme of gratuitous relief called ‘do bori anaaj’. Under the scheme, each panchayat was to keep an emergency supply of 200 kg of wheat to dole out to families that were going hungry.

The Baaran story also shows the limitations of the media in addressing underlying policy imbalances. In its role as a

Figure 2: Relief Employment in Two Consecutive Years of the drought. To that extent, public anger/opinion remained regionally fragmented or localised. One of the mechanisms through which the media leads to accountability of governments is by

mobilising public opinion against government inaction or apathy,

this development may not be entirely beneficial. Public Pressure This section takes a closer look at the role of the Akal Sangharsh Samiti in exerting pressure on the government. Though there were frequent reports of cattle deaths, of migration, of loss of work , -lu 2 , t j l i l w w Baran, 2002-03 East Rajasthan (excluding Baran) 2002-03 Jhalawar, 2002-03 2002-03 Baran, 2000-01 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 10000 East Rajasthan (excluding Baran)

Monthly average employment on relief sites

in the months following the failure of the monsoon in 2000, the

state government dragged its feet in responding to the situation.

Worried by the deteriorating situation and angered by govern

ment apathy, many NGOs and other grassroots organisations began discussing their role in April 2001 at the first national convention of the people’s right to information held in Beawar. This resulted in the formation of the Akal Sangharsh Samiti (Network to Fight Drought and Famine), a loose network of approximately 50 NGOs, social movements, journalists, academics and concerned citizens representing most districts of Rajasthan. The Akal Sangharsh Samiti (hereafter Samiti) became one of the main channels of exerting public pressure in the course of those two years.31

The Samiti used “adversarial” methods against the government, but also cooperated with it to ensure that adequate relief was provided. Among the adversarial methods used were the organisation of public hearings on the issue of hunger and employment, protest marches in the state capital, and ‘dharnas’. When the monsoon of 2000 failed, government relief measures were slow in coming and meagre when they did arrive. The Samiti organised a public hearing (or, ‘jun sunwai’) highlighting the plight of drought-hit villagers in Jaipur in the summer of 2001. As soon as the monsoon arrived in June 2001, the state government announced that it would close down all relief operations. The samiti argued that since it would be at least two months for the crops to be harvested, and that relief operations should continue until September. When the state government refused to budge, the Samiti decided to sit on an indefinite dharna in Jaipur (from June 14, 2001 onwards) until the state government granted their demands. On each of the 27 days that the dharna lasted, between 70-80 villagers from 14 districts of Rajasthan slept in the open demanding that relief works be continued till September 30 without labour ceilings, strengthening the public distribution system (PDS) and providing 10 kg of grain per person on subsidised rates without any distinction between the families below and above the poverty line, and an Employment Guarantee Act on the pattern of Maharashtra’s Employment Guarantee Scheme.

Rajasthan chief minister Ashok Gehlot wrote to the prime minister on June 30, demanding central assistance for providing open ended employment till September 30. The central government pledged support of five kg of grain per labourer to the drought-hit states. The dharna ended on July 10, 2001 when the Rajasthan government announced its decision to continue foodfor-work programmes till September 30. This was seen as a victory because this was one of the key demands of the dharna. However, this promise was not kept by the government and the Samiti did not do much about it.32

A positive outcome of the dharna was that on July 10, 2001 the central government announced a 30 per cent reduction in PDS grain prices for families that possessed above poverty line ration

Source: Relief Department.

watchdog, it tends to be effective only when the issue has “sensational” value. This is truer of the English national media than of the vernacular press.28 It also seems that too much importance is accorded to coverage by the English media. Until news gets into the English print media or into electronic media it is difficult to get the government machinery to act or to get the attention of policy-makers. This problem is not new. N Ram (1990) states that, “it may be assumed that about 20 influential newspapers and magazines...would constitute a useful sample of current coverage of hunger and poverty. Such a sample would miss out much in the experience of Indian journalism...but since the sample would be very influential in terms of circulation and the impact on the decision-making process it would be strong in serving our purpose” (ibid, p 205, emphasis added). Out of the 20 influential newspapers and magazines that are listed, nine publications are in English betraying an elitist bias in Indian democracy. In Baran too, it seemed that if HT had not picked up the story of the starvation deaths, government action may not have taken the scale and form that it did once it formed the focus of English national media.29

However, the blame for the low priority accorded to such issues at other times does not lie with the media alone. Some of the blame also lies with policy-makers and the public in general. If social concerns were adequately articulated in political debates and bureaucratic circles then issues such as the low nutritional achievement of Indian women and children or the low educational attainments of nearly half the Indian population would be as much of a national shame as starvation deaths. Perhaps this “distortion” of priorities must be put down as a failure of Indian democracy.30 As a result, this distortion of priorities is one that the media cannot, by itself, address.

The introduction of local supplements in national and vernacular newspapers is a recent development and deserves mention with respect to the media’s mobilisation role. This development could be a double-edged sword. Local news receives greater coverage which means that social concerns can get more space. However, there is a danger that better coverage of local issues may come at the cost of state-wide or national news. For instance, villagers of Barmer could read about the drought situation only in their district or in their region. Drought-related reports from other parts of Rajasthan, which were as badly affected, did not reach these people. Newspapers failed to convey the widespread nature (APL) cards and a five kg increase in the quota of grain for below poverty line (BPL) families. The government had already increased the quota of grain for BPL families from 20 kg to 40 kg and for APL families from 10 to 20 kg till September. Putting the need for work during the monsoon on the government’s agenda and the increase in the monthly entitlement of wheat from the PDS was all that the dharna could achieve in terms of immediate relief. The dharna served as a learning experience for activists. This involved learning related to the drought conditions that prevailed in other parts of the state but more importantly the learning related to participating in non-party politics.

Judicial Action

At a time when it seemed that cynical political calculations would take precedence over the moral obligation of the government, the Samiti decided to take recourse to judicial action. This section outlines the role of judicial intervention in expediting relief efforts in Rajasthan and in the other drought-affected states.

In India, the use of the judiciary to highlight food security issues is not new.34 Faced with the government’s apathy, denial and inaction in the face of the drought on the one hand and distressing reports from rural areas of Rajasthan on the other, the Rajasthan chapter of PUCL35 lodged a PIL in the Supreme Court (hereafter right to food case) pointing to a violation of the right to life.36 The legal basis of the petition was simple. Article 21 of the Constitution is a guarantee of the right to life, and imposes upon the state the duty to protect it. The Supreme Court has held in previous cases that the right to life includes the right to live with dignity and all that goes along with it, including the right to food. The petition argued that the response to the drought situation by central and state governments, in terms both of policy and implementation, constituted a clear violation of this right.

The petition focused on two aspects of food security: the PDS and the inadequacy of government relief work. In the case of the PDS, the petition highlighted the inadequate coverage of the PDS, the inadequacy of entitlements from the PDS (at 10 kg per household per month in 2001) and erratic supplies from it. The petition pointed out that despite being required (as per the obligations set out in the famine code) to give work to “every person who comes for work on a relief work”, the Rajasthan government followed a policy of labour ceilings. By the government’s own statistics, labour ceilings meant that employment was restricted to less than 5 per cent of the drought-affected population.

The petition demolished the official excuse for both these problems, namely, the lack of funds. The Supreme Court had already held that shortage of funds could not excuse the failure to fulfil constitutional obligations, an excuse that was singularly inapplicable, given the availability of gigantic food stocks. The specific demands made in the petition were the initiation of adequate relief works, gratuitous relief for all those who are unable to work, an increase in PDS quotas, and the provision of subsidised foodgrain to all families.37

Interim orders (IOs) issued by the apex court and the appointment of commissioners to monitor the implementation of these orders are two significant outcomes of the PIL. Besides this, the court intervened to provide immediate respite in crisis situations (e g, when reports of starvation deaths came to light from various parts of the country).38 The IOs have been used by grassroot organisations to ensure swift action from local administration in many cases. The IOs have been a major boost towards the realisation of the right to food in India and have focused attention on the lacunae in the design and implementation of food and welfare schemes.

In its very first IO, the Supreme Court ordered all states to ensure that all closed PDS shops are re-opened. Soon after this, it issued a landmark order on November 28, 2001 covering all food security and welfare schemes of the central government.39 In this order, the Supreme Court directed all state governments to start “providing every child in every government and government assisted primary school with a prepared mid-day meal …each day of school for a minimum of 200 days.” This order was significant because it converted the entitlements under these programmes into legal entitlements. Very few states, however, introduced cooked meals in primary schools before the Supreme Court’s deadline of February 28, 2002. After three years of sustained pressure from various civil society organisations, most governments have now complied with this order. Today, about 120 million children in India get a cooked meal at school, making this the largest mid-day meal programme in the world.40 In the same order, the court ordered that the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) be implemented “in full”. The ICDS covers children aged zero to six years, adolescent girls, pregnant and nursing mothers and malnourished children. The court’s intervention has led to an increase in the number of anganwadis from six lakhs to 14 lakhs as well as the financial allocation per child from Re 1 per child to Rs 2 per child. Similarly, an expansion of the Antyodaya scheme to include the aged, disabled and widows was also ordered by the court eventually doubling of the coverage (from five to 10 million households) of the scheme.41

Role of Research

Source: Dreze and Khera (2001).