GAUTAM NAVLAKHA

M

Is Hizbul Mujahideen Terrorist?

Collapsing every form of political violence under “terrorism”, of which there is not a single universal definition, is unwise. Even authorities in charge of ground operations in J and K tend to agree. A recent handout issued by 15 Corps in Kashmir spoke of HM as a “predominantly Kashmiri militant group”. In the past the central government too has characterised HM as an “indigenous group” and entered into negotiations with them in July 1999. However much self-styled patriots may recoil at the idea, a sizeable majority in J and K considers the presence of the security forces as akin to occupation. The obtrusive presence of Indian troops across the urban and rural habitation centres nourishes this. An Indian columnist recently wondered that if “Kashmiris no longer feel alienated from India, why do they so readily believe every rumour, every interpretation of events, that portray Indians as a brutal occupying force?” (Prem Shankar Jha in The Hindustan Times, June 30, 2006). A leader of the National Conference (NC) wondered why is it that, unlike elsewhere in India, every time people come out on the streets to protest human rights violations by the security forces they are fired upon? (Greater Kashmir, June 12, 2006). Thus, try as we might to claim fighting a “proxy war” in J and K, there are few takers for this line there. So much so that HM is considered an indigenous resistance force even by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) or the NC who insist that the central government initiate talks with them.

There is an even more pertinent reason for dismissing the official characterisation of HM as a terrorist organisation. On April 14, in the weekly Chattan, the Jamiatul Mujahideen defended the use of grenades as a “message to the Indian government” that the militancy was well and alive. In the very next issue HM condemned this and insisted that they do not believe in hurling grenades, which often hurt the unsuspecting public and accused JuM of violating a code of conduct announced by the United Jehadi Council. Similarly, HM opposed the ban imposed on cable operators from telecasting all but a few channels in Kashmir, which was demanded by LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) (The Hindu, May 14, 2006). In fact HM opposes any move to disrupt the Amarnath Yatra. The chief minister himself told the state legislative assembly that hatred between the “local and non-local militants” was so strong that “we had to separate them even in jails” (The Hindu, August 6, 2006). Therefore, what was the pressing need to lump the head of the HM with the unacceptable characters in the list?

This apart, involvement of LeT or JeM in acts of mass murder in India surfaces from time-to-time, sometimes with evidence, at other times as speculation. This, however, did not stop the government from entering into the “peace” process with Pakistan in January 2004. Presumably, tangible progress in dialogue was seen as contributing to isolating these groups. Also, the mobilisation for war that was ordered by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government following the attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001 brought home the lesson of the limits of coercive diplomacy rather sharply. War as “politics by other means” is not an option available to India against Pakistan while the latter hosts US troops required for the “war against terror”. Consequently, there is an element of

Economic and Political Weekly September 2, 2006 posturing in India-Pakistan relations in order to jockey for a better bargaining position. Simulated outrage over an act of mass murder comes in handy to ward off US pressure on the one hand and put pressure on Pakistan for concessions on the other hand. Policy-makers cannot be unaware that the Pakistan government is not going to oblige India by handing over the 20 persons the latter demands. Yet despite this, sooner rather than later, talks will resume.

Therefore, the fatal flaw in the “peace process” begun under the NDA government in January 2004 is located less in Pakistan’s refusal to switch off promotion of “cross border terrorism” and more in the absence of a peaceful political process in Jammu and Kashmir. All the border openings and all the trade cannot substitute for a political process. Neither were the two round table conferences attended by any of the separatist groups nor has there been any rollback in the repressive regime India has in place there. The more than six lakh troops present, according to the deputy CM of J and K (Greater Kashmir, August 2, 2006), and the “disturbed area” notice, accompanied by extraordinary laws, remains intact. For the people of J and K, therefore, the Indo-Pak “peace process” seems yet another one of those attempts to marginalise them and serve them a fait accompli. Such a situation cannot inspire confidence or be considered conducive for people to feel that the militancy has outlived its purpose. Further, to treat Syed Salahuddin of Hizbul Mujahideen as a “wanted criminal” is to compound the problem. By further marginalising an indigenous militant group the government will leave the space open for communal fascists to occupy. The bankruptcy of the government’s policy towards J and K stares at us.

EPW

Email: gnavlakha@gmail.com

Economic and Political Weekly September 2, 2006