ISSN (Print) - 0012-9976 | ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846

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Neglect of Bank Credit for Industrial Revival

Key Developments in Financial Markets THE operations of the Indian financial markets have undergone some significant changes in the recent period which have implications for the long-term growth of the real economy. These changes have spawned one of the most serious dichotomous situations in which the financial system has been nursing a surfeit of liquidity but the productive enterprises have been facing an acute shortage of funds now for the third year in succession. Foremost among the financial sector changes has been the ballooning of marketable debt instruments issued by the public financial institutions (FIs) and public sector undertakings (PSUs) at unreasonably high rates of interest. So long as this situation is not corrected and a degree of reasonableness restored to their interest rate structure, there is no hope for the manufacturing firms to acquire the required amount of liquidity from the banking system nor is there any hope for them to see equity market getting revived, Some of the large-size manufacturing firms may partake the benefits of the growth of debt instruments to acquire bank funds, but if the world of manufacturing activity is to inn its full circle with reasonable matching of demand and supply for goods, the credit requirements of the mass of small and medium enterprises, which constitute the backbone of our economy and which generally remain outside the purview of marketable debt instruments, have to be met. Field reports suggest that it is not being done, and whenever is - offered, is at unreasonably high rates of interest, particularly in relation to the current recessionary conditions, it is time that the issues arising out of (i) the issuance of costly debt instruments by FIs and PSUs, and (ii) the general neglect of bank credit as well as micro credit as an instrument of development, are given due attention, without which the revival of the industrial economy will remain a pipedream.

Mistimed Tightening of Prudential Norms

Policy Perspectives and Developments STICKING to the new ground rules set out in the April monetary and credit policy document, the RBI governor's latest policy statement confines itself to a factual midterm review of the macro-economic and monetary developments during 1998-99 without introducing any short-term policy measures. However, against the backdrop of the second Narasimham Committee report* a number of long-term banking sector reform measures, as also some structural changes in the operations of the money market, have been announced in the statement, Almost all of the reform measures concern the introduction of tighter prudential norms' Increase in the minimum capital to risk assets ratio (CRAR) from 8 per cent to 9 per cent, introduction of a 2.5 per cent weight for market risk in the holdings of government and approved securities, stricter classification of assets for provisioning purposes and a general provisioning of 0,25 per cent on standard assets are some of the measures proposed to be introduced by the year ending March 31,2000. These arc measures of an incremental and not earth shaking character; there cannot be any objection to them as desirable standards in the long run. But in an environment where the credit delivery system, particularly in its distributional goals, is choked, the emphasis on such rigorous prudential norms may further damage the process of credit supply specially for mediumand small-scale industries and the informal sector; the measures could have waited for a more congenial environment. Instead, a satisfactory approach should have been to study the way the prudential norms have been implemented so far and the kind of impact they have had on normal banking activities like lending, In the first place, these market- based norms in line with the international best practice have been imposed on the public sector banks in India without any modicum of organisational reforms and managerial autonomy. Nor have they been, secondly, given the freedom to go to the market to mobilise fresh capital.

Need for Fresh Ideas and Risk-Taking

Uncertain Economic Backdrop UNCERTAINTIES in the real economy continue to bedevil the operations of the financial markets. All the three key factors responsible for the industrial slowdown in the first place, namely, reduced public expenditure, slackness in credit supply and high real rate of interest, show no sign of easing, not at any rate to the extent required. Added to them is the deepening of global recession which is keeping the export sector depressed. The hopes generated by the injection of nearly Rs 18,000 crore of liquidity into the system through the Resurgent India Bonds (RIBs), as also the promises of increased public expenditures and improved credit delivery, seem to have got stuck in structural and bureaucratic bottlenecks.

Expectations of Economic Revival

The Backdrop THOUGH the financial markets seem to signal positive expectations, it is as yet difficult to discern them in any physical indicators of economic activity essentially for want of more recent data. The mobilisation of $ 4.16 billion (over Rs 18,000 crore) through the Resurgent India Bonds (RIBs). combined with a normal rainfall situation and the government's promise of higher expenditure programmes for stimulating investment demand for capital goods, automobiles' steel and other construction materials, seems to hold out hope for improved industrial activity in the second half of the current fiscal year. The commercial sector, which faced an acute shortage of demand for goods and services and hence a severe liquidity stringency now for about two years, seems hopeful of seeing some respite from both these constraintsThe policy impulses emanating from the finance ministry for increased public expenditures and those from the Reserve Bank of India for improving credit delivery appear to reinforce these expectations.

Creeping Stagflation

For the third successive fiscal year, industrial growth remains low. On the other hand, the annual inflation rate has distinctly picked up. Against this backdrop of creeping stagflation, the fiscal and monetary scene is such as to give cause for grave disquiet.

Shedding Monetarist Blinkers

The Reserve Bank is shedding its erstwhile monetarist blinkers and this has enhanced the credibility of its efforts to curb speculation and excessive volatility in the short-term money and foreign exchange markets.

High Cost of Fiscal Mismanagement

Budget and Money Market THERE arc several proposals in the central budget for 1998-99 which will have implications for the financial markets, the most significant amongst them being the proposed fiscal deficit and the means of financing it, In this context, it may be mentioned in passing that the financial markets would be by now nursing substantial scepticism about the government's ability to rein in fiscal deficit as professed in initial budgetary projections. The last year's slippage in gross fiscal deficit from the budgeted 4.5 per cent of GDP 10 the actual of about 6.1 per cent was not a unique one; it has been happening now almost continuously during the past five years, essentially because the fiscal reforms have taken the path of a narrow construct based on a mainstream stabilisation and structural adjustment programme, without an integrated long-term strategy of resource mobilisation (by assigning appropriate roles for direct and indirect taxes and protection rates on export- import trade), restructuring of public expenditures, comprehensive reforms of public sector enterprises and sustainable levels of domestic and foreign borrowings. The rash populist measures taken so far on an all round slashing of direct tax rates and haphazard reductions in indirect tax rates have made it impossible for the government to achieve any semblance of fiscal balance. The budget for 1998-99 has placed the fiscal deficit at 5.6 per cent of GDP which is only marginally lower compared to 6.1 per cent in the previous year. In absolute terms, the gross fiscal deficit proposed at Rs 91,025 crore for 1998-99 stands at 36.4 per cent higher than what it was two years before, namely, Rs 66,733 crore in 1996-97, though it is only 5.4 per cent higher that in 1997- 98 (Rs 86,345 crore), Apart from very many complex issues, a danger inherent in the expansionary fiscal stance of the 1998-99 budget without the supporting real resources is the near certainty of revenues falling behind the targets and expenditures outstripping the targets, thus giving rise to further stretching of the borrowing needs. As it is, the borrowing programme set out in the budget can only be called massive: Rs 48,326 crore in net terms and Rs 79,376 crore in gross terms as against Rs 40,494 crore and Rs 59,637 crore, respectively, in the previous year. What is more worrisome is that net borrowings through medium and long-term securities (including market borrowings), i e, other than 364-day TBs, are budgeted to rise by Rs 23,443 crore or by 77 per cent from Rs 32,488 crore to Rs 55,931 crore. The higher borrowing programme and the persistence of borrowings from the RBI through large subscriptions to market borrowings as well as ways and means advances are sure to have serious implications for interest rates, as also for monetary and general economic stability.


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