Taking the evolution of auction pricing from arbitrary bureaucratic “beauty contest” to highly sophisticated auction where academicians have ruled the practical space, this article outlines the monopoly and missteps of civil servants and argues for the professionalisation of the regulator and elimination of redundant bureaucracy.
State of Renewable Energy in India: A Citizen's Report by Chandra Bhushan, Nayanjyoti Goswami, Aruna Kumarankandath, Kanchan Kumar Agrawal and Joel Kumar, New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 2014; pp 198, Rs 690.
You have argued in your editorial “Why Kill the Golden Goose?” (14 November 2009) against share sale of profit-making public sector undertakings (PSUs). The primary purpose of privatisation is always to place management control in private hands for better efficiency.
It appears that the courts did not look at the substantive issues behind the allegations that excess land was acquired for the Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor. The courts seem to have gone by the Karnataka government's assurance that only a minimum amount of land was given to the company. Bad governments need not act in public interest and may indeed abuse their "eminent domain" powers and aid and abet "eminent thievery".
Due to the lack of market orientation and absence of competitive spirit, the Indian postal service, a premium public service, has yielded ground to private couriers. This article discusses the decline and fall of India Post due to the sudden erosion of morale and fall in self-esteem of employees in working for one of the best public services.
The present study addresses one key component of power sector reforms, namely, reducing transmission and distribution losses. It outlines the problems in measurement and the information asymmetry between the regulator and licensee on this account. Then it addresses the broader issue of distribution privatisation and the prerequisites for it.
The Electricity Act 2003 opens the door to immense possibilities in unleashing competition and trading, but at the same time opens a new area of policy risk, which it is supposed to mitigate. The act has an enabling framework to introduce competition in generation and privatisation in distribution, but the homework in terms of addressing transition issue has been left undone.
The power purchase agreement (PPA) in respect of the Tanir Bavi power project has been the subject of conflict and litigation. This is because the PPA is complicated and confusing. An attempt is made in this article to analyse the PPA and the dimensions of the conflicts and to draw some lessons for policy for the government and strategy for independent power producers (IPPs).
