Articles by Murali Patibandla

Economic Reform and Industrial Growth Murali Patibandla M Mallikarjun While the supporters of economic reform look at industrial growth mostly through supply side efficiency, critics point to the demand constraint. This note discusses some of the possible supply and demand side factors behind recent trends in industrial growth.

Import Protection and Exports Murali Patibandla THE note by Marjit and Sarkar (1995) in this journal attempts to show that reduction in tariffs on imports of a commodity could lead to decline in its exports. The arguments put forward by the authors is not only onesided but also leave serious gaps in the explanation of the possible results within their model. This note shows by taking the basic model used by Marjit and Sarkar that reduction in import tariffs on a commodity does not necessarily lead to a decline in its exports. If one takes import tariff reduction to be both on the final good and also on intermediate goods used in its production, it should lead to increase in exports by shifting the cost curves downward. Analysis of exports in the context of the present policy reforms towards making policy prescriptions warrants a careful examination of the effect of liberalisation polices in general on the evolution of the domestic market structure and its implications on costs of production rather than going by piecemeal approaches.

Cotton Hank Yarn Murali Patibandla H K Amar Nath This article shows that the lower counts cotton hank yarn, which are used to produce lower quality segment of handloom cloth, are subject to higher short-run price instability than the higher counts hank yarn which are used to produce higher quality handloom cloth. We argue that one of the dominant reasons for the higher price instability of lower counts hank yarn is that the spinning mill sector treats the production of these counts as a residual activity. This, in turn, leads to erratic supply adjustment and high price instability.

A Few Conceptual Issues Murali Patibandla In the context of the recent policy reforms, the industrial policy has two alternative policy options. One is the pursuit of a neutral competition policy, that does not interfere with a market structure or its evolution, but monitors and restrains anti-competitive conduct of firms. The other policy alternative is the one that plays an active role in the evolution of an .industrial structure and conduct and performance of firms. The paper brings out a few conceptual issues regarding these policy options.

acknowledging the existence of caste oppression, it is necessary to confront one more question: are there oppressor castes?
In answering this question, it is not enough to accept that there are privileged castes. We have to go further. In the numerous instances of denial of temple entry, access to drinking water, or other practices of untouchability and caste oppression, do not non-ruling members of the upper, privileged castes participate? And is their participation in these acts of oppression not merely as lathaits, as hired hands of the landlords, but because the continuance of caste oppression is necessary for the maintenance of caste privileges? Privilege for the upper castes includes the possibility of engaging (exploiting) bonded farm hands (halwahas), who are kept in their place as bonded labourers by not just debt, but also caste oppression. Privilege for the upper castes and oppression of the lower castes form a unity, are the two opposed aspects of the caste system. The one cannot exist without the other. Oppressed castes cannot exist without caste differences. Difference is only another word for contradiction. Which is to say, oppressed castes and oppressor castes exist in a unity that can only be dissolved by ending (superseding) the caste system.