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Structuring Regulation

The central dilemma inherent in designing effective regulatory institutions is how regulatory decisions should be taken and where they should be located in the wider structures of governance. By representing the state as a series of institutions that derive authority from a constitutional structure and developing the doctrine of separation of powers as an analytical device, case studies relating mainly to insolvency and competition in India are analysed. While insolvency tribunals could make for â??speedy decisionsâ?, this could lead to social costs associated with the violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and the breakdown of inter-institutional bargaining. The Competition Act, 2002 is also an inappropriately structured law for these very reasons.

Incentives and Judicially Determined Terms of Employment in India

This paper begins by presenting an account of some of the successive restrictions imposed by the law - both by the statutes and their interpretation by courts - that define the parameters within which Indian industrial establishments are obliged to function in relation to dismissing workers. This description of the substantive content of the law indicates that the restrictions on the termination of errant workers are embedded in judicial concerns of equality. Translated into procedure this requires, one, that penalties imposed on workers be proportional to misconduct, and two, that stringent evidentiary requirements be met in every case of worker termination. These constraints lead to a trade-off between concerns of efficiency and justice, opening up the question of whether such a trade-off is inevitable or it is possible to ease the trade-off by structurally reorienting the law.

An Economic Analysis of Judicial Activism

Over time it is not just the rights of the 'socially excluded' that have been put up for judicial review and intervention; a whole gamut of issues such as the environment, consumer affairs, property rights, the practices of municipal corporations, educational institutions, politicians and political parties, to name a few areas, have been presented before the courts to prescribe public policy outcomes. This widening of subject matter has caused Indian judicial activism to be celebrated as a device of engineering social change. We propose an examination of judicial activism using the positive tools of economic analysis. The singular value of such an analysis lies in placing judicial activism in relation to the norm of economic efficiency. This enables a discussion in which one does not present the problem as one of contesting ideologies, but in terms of the impact of judicial activism on the allocation of resources. In the first section of the paper we outline the tools for the analysis. We establish a link between the doctrine of separation of powers and the notion of transaction costs and use this to define activism. In the second part we use the definition to perform a heuristic economic analysis of judicial activism. Our conclusions are mixed: while we see some virtue in what we call interpretational judicial activism, other forms of judicial activism that encroach on legislative or executive decision-making on grounds of privilege can result in social costs that outstrip benefits.

Monopolistic Trade Practices and Concentration of Economic Power

In the interest of enactment of a robust competition law it is importan to look at the structural components of the current law regarding monopolistic practices and concentration of economic power. It is imperative to discern whether the problem with the law is merely one of non-implementation or whether the law is flawed in its basic conception.
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