Even if adjustment and reform in 1991 were driven by economic compulsions, it was the political process that made these possible. However, liberalisation was shaped largely by the economic problems of the government rather than by the economic priorities of the people or by long-term development objectives. Thus, there were limitations in conception and design which have been subsequently validated by experience. Jobless growth, persistent poverty and rising inequality have mounted as problems since economic liberalisation began. And, 25 years later, four quiet crises confront the economy, in agriculture, infrastructure, industrialisation and education as constraints on the country’s future prospects. These problems must be resolved if economic growth has to be sustained and transformed into meaningful development. In this quest, India needs a developmental state for its market economy to improve the living conditions of her people.

The gathering momentum of globalisation in the world economy has coincided with the spread of political democracy across countries. Economies have become global. But politics remains national. This essay explores the relationship between globalisation and democracy, which is neither linear nor characterised by structural rigidities. It seeks to analyse how globalisation might constrain degrees of freedom for nation states and space for democratic politics, and how political democracy within countries might exercise some checks and balances on markets and globalisation. The essential argument is that the relationship between globalisation and democracy is dialectical and does not conform to ideological caricatures.

The retreat of the state and the advance of the market have changed the national context of higher education. The spread of markets is beginning to exercise a significant influence in this area. There are dangers inherent in such commercialisation, but there are also some opportunities of learning from markets. The gathering momentum of globalisation, which has changed the international context, is also beginning to reshape higher education. This too has important, positive and negative, implications for development. Countries should formulate policies for higher education in the pursuit of development, so as to minimise the dangers and capture the opportunities.

The story of economic development in independent India is often distorted by beliefs in fashion or caricatures of perceptions which shape conventional wisdom. This is misleading, not only in analysing the past but also in contemplating the future. If we consider India during the 20th century as a whole, the turning point in economic growth was circa 1951. If we consider India since independence, the turning point in economic growth was circa 1980. And it is clear that the turning point in the early 1950s was much more significant than the structural break in the early 1980s. In the first phase of growth in post-independent India, from 1950 to 1980, India was not the lumbering elephant that it is often made out to be. In the second phase, from 1980 to 2005, India was not quite the running tiger that some believe it has become. The real failure, throughout the second half of the 20th century, was India's inability to transform its growth into development, which would have brought about an improvement in the living conditions of ordinary people.

Interaction of Economics and Politics in Independent India Introduction THERE is a vast literature on the theme of economic development in India over the past 50 years. The literature on the subject of political democracy in India since independence is just as extensive. Both are rich in terms of range and depth. But they constitute two different worlds, divided into the disciplines of economics and political science. The intersections are few and far between. This essay makes a modest attempt to reflect on the interconnections. It situates the process of economic development in the wider context of political democracy to explore the interaction between economics and politics in independent India. Section II sets out an analytical framework. It explains why markets and democracy provide no magic wand, to suggest that the real issue is the tension between the economics of markets and the politics of democracy. The problem, it argues, is compounded because markets exclude people, particularly the poor. The paper then divides the five decades into three phases, Any such periodisation is obviously arbitrary but it serves an analytical purpose. Section III examines the first phase, 1947-66, in which the strategy of development was shaped by a political consensus and characterised by a long-term perspective. The spirit of nationalism meant that there was less need to manage conflict, but there was a conscious effort to accommodate the poor even if it was long on words and short on substance. Section IV analyses the second phase, 1967-90, which witnessed a qualitative change in the interaction of economics and politics. Economic policies and economic development were strongly influenced by the compulsions of political democracy. Those with a political voice made economic claims on the state. But the process of mediation and reconciliation had long-term economic and political consequences. Section V discusses the third phase, 1991-97, characterised by an absence of consensus and a presence of short-termism, in which the economics of liberalisation and the politics of empowerment seem to be moving the economy and the polity in opposite directions. The need for conflict resolution is greater than ever before. But the task has become more difficult And, strangely enough, the effort is much less.