ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
-A A +A

BJP’s Sixth Victory in Gujarat

A Puzzle

Ghanshyam Shah ( is former national fellow, Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi and an independent researcher, based in Ahmedabad.

​The 2017 Gujarat assembly election revolved around Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He was the main campaigner, and almost asked for a plebiscite—as the son of the soil. The Bharatiya Janata Party has managed to retain power, but the proportion of votes has reduced. Various agitations against the government in the last three years have not converted into votes in favour of opposition parties. The BJP’s party structure with committed cadres and aggressive campaign give it an advantage over the opposition parties.


I thank the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Lokniti, for providing National Election Survey data.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in Gujarat in 1996 for the first time following L K Advani’s Somnath to Ayodhya Yatra in 1989, and the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992. In December 2017, it was its sixth consecutive victory in the assembly elections. Its vote share has increased by 1 percentage point since 2012. Its rival, the Congress party, gained 2 percentage point votes more than in the previous assembly elections. Comparing this assembly poll with the last Parliament elections in 2014, the BJP’s vote share has sharply declined from 59% to 49%, whereas the Congress gained 8.5 percentage points (Figure 1). During the 2014 Parliament elections, the BJP captured all 26 seats of Parliament with majority votes in 169 out of 182 assembly segments. Since 2002, all elections in Gujarat have been Narendra Modi-centric. During the last two elections in 2012 and 2014, he appealed to the voters, “every vote you cast for local BJP candidate is a vote for me” (Deshpande and Mehta 2014). Even though he did not say so explicitly, his 2017 campaign was a clear plebiscite on his performance as the Prime Minister.

Since 2009, Modi has successfully blurred the difference between the Gujarat state assembly and Parliament elections. After an impressive victory in the 2007 assembly elections, he initiated the process of becoming India’s Prime Minister. In early 2009, business tycoons hailed Modi as “the future Prime Minister.”1 Though Advani was BJP’s prime ministerial candidate in 2009, a majority of the BJP voters preferred Modi over him. Despite their satisfaction with the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government’s performance, the “Gujarati” held greater appeal than “development” and they voted for the BJP (Shah 2011). Voters judged the performance of the UPA in 2009, and Modi’s performance as the Prime Minister in 2017. The theme of vikas (development), Gujarati pride, and Hindutva dominated the election campaign.

In terms of votes, the Congress performed significantly better in 2017 in rural areas compared to the BJP. It is more so in Saurashtra and north Gujarat. In Saurashtra, the Congress captured 29 seats out of 40. In north Gujarat, it secured 17 out of 31 seats. But urban seats of the region had been won by the BJP. We find the same pattern in central Gujarat. In south Gujarat, the BJP had done better than other regions, both in rural and urban areas. Though Congress lost most of the urban seats, its vote share in urban constituencies has improved—from 35% in 2012, 27% in 2014, to 41% in 2017.

The outcome of the election voting pattern in 2017 is like the local government elections of 2015. It indicates that the 2014 pro-Modi wave had settled down within one and half years. The BJP retained its dominant position in urban local governments in all regions. The Congress, however, slightly improved its position by capturing 22% and 28% seats in municipal corporations and municipalities respectively (Figure 2). The trend was reversed in rural areas. The Congress performed better than the 2010 elections by capturing a majority of the taluka (block) and zilla (district) panchayats. The Congress secured 48% seats and BJP won 29% seats in the zilla panchayats. In the taluka panchayats, the former gained 44% as against 34% seats of the BJP (Figure 2). The BJP lost most of the taluka and zilla panchayats in Saurashtra and north Gujarat, but retained power in the non-tribal talukas of south Gujarat.

Development and Discontent

Economic growth in Gujarat has remained higher, before and after liberalisation, than the national average (Morris 2014). Modi, however, has successfully marketed the impression that prior to his regime the state was “backward” without a “basic structure of development.” Within five years of his tenure, on the eve of the 2007 assembly elections, he claimed to have attained unprecedented growth, placing Gujarat first among all states in the country. He carved out his image as a “vikas purush” (personification of development). However, on all parameters of human development indices, Gujarat’s performance is average or low in comparison to other states (Shah 2014). Though there is some dissent in the middle class on rising costs and the quality of health and education, collective protests on these issues were momentary. But, the worsening economic condition in rural areas has frequently manifested in different forms such as processions, dharna, inter-group conflicts, etc.

Between 2001 and 2011, the number of cultivators in Gujarat had reduced to 3.55 lakh (5%), and the number of agricultural labourers had increased to 16.78 lakh (CSDS 2014). These figures speak about agrarian distress despite high agriculture growth (estimated 9.6%). Like elsewhere in the country, growth has benefited only a tiny segment (less than 5%) owning two hectares or more irrigated land. The minimum support price that farmers get compared to their input cost is not remunerative. With an average ₹ 1,26,109 debt per household, 43% of the farmers in Gujarat are in debt. Most pay 25% or more interest on their loans. Between 2013 and 2015, 1,483 farmers committed suicide. Their overall economic condition has not improved in the last five years (CSDS 2014).

Moreover, with industrialisation favouring large industries, most small industries experience a resource crunch and face difficulties in the market to compete with mega industries. Over the last two decades, several large-scale industries (with an investment of ₹ 10 crore and more) have been set up in Saurashtra.2 They acquired land from farmers with a promise to provide employment. But only a few of those who lost their land have gained employment, and many feel cheated. Moreover, since 2008, the government allocated more than 80,000 hectares of pastureland, wasteland, and fallow land to industries adversely affecting pastoral communities (Bhagat-Ganguly 2014).

Besides local resistance against land acquisition for various projects, a few successful grass roots collective action forced the government/investors to withdraw their projects. These include the Mahuva agitation against the Nirma cement factory and the Mithivedi agitation against a nuclear power plant. The agitation against the proposed special investment region (SIR) in the Mandal–Becharaji area of north Gujarat forced the government to exclude 36 of 44 villages from the SIR (Rabari 2014). These agitations were independent of each other with non-political party characteristics. Though Sarvodaya activists were at the forefront of these agitations, local Congress and BJP leaders also actively participated (Bhagat-Ganguly 2015).

Discontent among the youth regarding unemployment and aspirations for decent jobs have surfaced almost simultaneously in dominant as well as deprived communities. Fixed payment or contractual government employees have been occasionally organising protests demanding regularisation of jobs accompanied by social security. Besides grumbling about the quality of education, a section of the urban middle class protested the increase in fees in private schools, forcing the state to intervene. Traders and entrepreneurs engaged in small and medium industries protested the implementation of the goods and services tax (GST).

The government was caught unaware by two agitations, one by the dominant caste Patidars and the other by deprived caste (Other Backward Classes [OBCs]) Kshatriya Thakors in mid-2015. The Patidar Anamat Andolan Samiti (PAAS) led by Hardik Patel organised a massive rally in Ahmedabad in August 2015 with the slogans of “Jai Patidar,” “Jai Sardar,” demanding reservation in government jobs, or abolition of the reservation policy altogether. Various upper-caste factions such as the Brahmins and the Rajputs supported the rally. The confrontation between Patidar youths and the government resulted in police firing and lathi charge. Thereafter, encounters between the two have continued intermittently till today. Alpesh Thakor of the Kshatriya–Thakor Sena (KTS) organised an impressive gathering of Kshatriya youths in October 2015 around the issues of liquor addiction, education and employment. One of the purposes of the meeting was to demonstrate the strength of the OBCs (40% of the population) to Patidars and the government. The KTS asked the government for stringent implementation of the prohibition law. The government immediately accepted and made changes in the law. Later, KTS organised a couple of processions and public meetings demanding employment to youth, strict implementation of the government’s policy of 85% reservation to local people in industries, and waiving farmers’ loans. Thakor expanded the organisation as the OBC, Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) Ekta (United) Manch front.

While these agitations were active, a Dalit upsurge erupted in July 2016, following the flogging of four Dalits by gau-rakshaks (protectors of cows). Dalits spontaneously protested and organised several programmes demanding justice, including employment. The Dalit protestors included BJP, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and Congress members. Jignesh Mevani emerged as a Dalit youth leader. He organised an “azaadi yatra” (freedom journey) from Ahmedabad to Una protesting atrocities against Dalits, simultaneously raising the issues of land and dignity of Dalits (Shah 2017).

During their agitations, these three leaders belonging to diverse backgrounds occasionally joined hands against the government. Hardik Patel began his public life with Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Patidar caste activities. Initially, the public life of Thakor was confined to his caste. His father was actively associated with the Congress for many years. Mevani, though actively involved in the Dalit movement, has also been active in working-class issues with the trade union movement. He is a critic of both the BJP and Congress party. During the agitations, these three youths realised that the assembly elections were an occasion to bring their issues on the political agenda. The BJP tried all means to win, intimidate, and/or defame them—imposing sedition charges, registering police cases, exile for six months from Gujarat (for Hardik Patel), and it is believed that some purportedly pro-BJP sympathisers, made his sex CDs viral, alleging misuse of the Patidar community’s fund for living a luxurious life, etc. Thakor contested on the Congress ticket, Mevani contested as an independent candidate with Congress support, and Hardik Patel worked against the BJP with a tacit understanding with the Congress on the issue of reservation. During the election campaign, Thakor and Mevani were confined to their constituencies and won. It is difficult to cull out the extent of their influence in other constituencies on Dalits and OBCs. Hardik Patel organised several meetings and road shows which gathered huge crowds of youth, largely from upper castes in general and Patidars in particular. He campaigned against the BJP. The extent of his appeal translating into anti-BJP votes is a matter of speculation.

Unlike Kshatriyas and Dalits, the Patidar elite is well-accustomed to the BJP’s economic and cultural ideology. And the community (around 11% of the population) has constituted a major BJP vote bank since the 1980s (Shah 1990; Shah and Jani 2014). To pacify the Patidar agitation, the government offered a package in September 2015 for “poor” (annual income up to ₹ 4.5 lakh) upper-caste students, providing subsidies in college fees, scholarships, and a 10% reservation in jobs and education institutions (the Gujarat High Court later struck down the reservation).3 The government decided on withdrawing police cases against Patidars involved in the agitation; and promised to appoint a committee to investigate police firing during the agitation. While over 400 Patidar leaders, associated with caste and religion organisations, and leading business–industrialists and professionals thanked the government for its positive approach, Hardik Patel rejected the government package, calling it a “lollipop,” a mere pacifier. The BJP leaders sought the resignation of Chief Minister Anandiben Patel with a hope that a change of guard would normalise the situation.

On the eve of the elections, the Congress negotiated with Hardik Patel and promised to meet the demands of PAAS for reservation. The party also accommodated a few Patidars of his choice as its candidates. In October 2017, the government filled up many government vacancies and regularised some temporary, part time, and contract-based ad hoc employees.

Party Structure

Organisationally, the BJP is a monolithic, centralised party under the leadership of Amit Shah and Modi. There is little scope for dissent in decision-making. In everyday politics, the party has built a mechanism to contact needy persons to get their work done in government departments. For election campaign and mobilisation, the party’s structure was well-coordinated with committed cadre and detailed micro-planning up to the booth level (Shah 2015). Over the years, the party structure of Congress has become sluggish in maintaining contacts with people. It is generally faction-ridden. The number of pro-poor, committed Congress workers in the party has sunk during the last two decades. However, this time it was more united than 2012. Similarly, its election structure for canvassing and mobilising voters was better in 2017 than earlier. The party appointed functionaries with specific responsibilities, at all levels. Their level of commitment was not as high as that of the BJP’s cadres. The party accommodated not only the three youth leaders mentioned above but also tribals from the Bharatiya Tribal Party.

Election Campaign

According to the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies’ (CSDS) post-election survey (2014), 64% of the voters reported that they had decided their preference for a party to vote before the campaign started, presumably before November. They might have decided this based on their everyday perception of performance and programmes of political parties and candidates. However, 7 percentage points changed their preference during the last phase of the campaign. The remaining voters were vacillating and seem to have been influenced by the campaign.

The ‘Vikas’ Buzzword

In the 2017 election, “vikas” has remained a catchphrase. Four months before the polls, the memes pointing out development failures like potholes on roads, waterlogging, diseases, unemployment, overcrowding school vehicles, price rise, etc, with the punchline “vikas has gone crazy” went viral on social media. Initially, BJP was taken aback by this. It then called those ridiculing their campaign as blind. For the party, to give up the slogan of “vikas” would amount to accepting failure in development. It reiterated this with “I am Vikas, I am Gujarat.” It started talking about its achievements in quantitative terms on visible urban infrastructure like roads, flyovers, parks, riverfronts, buildings, institutions, etc, and electricity in villages. However, it kept silent on human development. In October, Modi launched public works and projects worth ₹ 3 lakh crore in Vadodara, Ro-Ro ferry service connecting Ghogha in Saurashtra with Dahej in south Gujarat, and the first phase of Saurashtra Narmada Avtaran Irrigation (SAUNI) project expected to fill up Narmada water in 10 dams of Saurashtra.4

The Congress launched its campaign with a slogan “Navsarjan” (rejuvenation) and joined social media in ridiculing “vikas.” It raised questions on the government’s performance on human development. In its manifesto, a week before the polls, the party promised to provide employment, fill up government positions, unemployment allowances, subsidise college fees, etc. But these failed to catch the imagination of the vocal middle class.

Modi, on the other hand, dubbed those mocking his development model as “anti-development forces.” He warned that a non-BJP state government would not get any financial support from the centre. He added that “after a decade and much toil, we have same party governments at the Centre and State. … People of Gujarat should not lose this opportunity.”5

Anti-Muslim and Hindutva

From the early stage of the campaign (November), pro-BJP circles circulated messages on social media that in case of a Congress victory, Ahmed Patel would be the chief minister. Simultaneously, a video went viral saying Hindu girls would be harassed by Muslims under the Congress rule. In October, the chief minister alleged that Ahmed Patel had “link with ISIS” (Dhar 2017). Modi frequently labelled Congress leaders as Aurangzeb, Babar, etc. He accused Congress leader Mani Shankar Aiyar of giving supari (contract killing) to Pakistanis to kill him. He also accused the Congress of hatching a “conspiracy” with Pakistanis for making Ahmed Patel the Gujarat chief minister.

With anti-Muslim propaganda, Modi synergised Gujarati pride. While projecting himself as a saviour of Gujarat in 2002, he launched the Gujarat Gaurav Yatra march for Gujarati pride with phrases such as “Aapanu Gujarat, Aagavu Gujarat” (our Gujarat, distinct Gujarat) (Shah 2007). After the National Democratic Alliance’s defeat in 2004, he raised the issue of injustice to Gujarat by the central government. This was repeated in the 2007 assembly elections and 2009 Parliament elections. In his public meetings, he mentioned the injustice to Sardar Patel and Morarji Desai and the conspiracy of the Congress in removal of other Patidar chief ministers, including the BJP’s Keshubhai Patel and Anandiben Patel. While reiterating charges of injustice, he asked, “Will any Gujarati forgive this? Will you forget attack on your son? Will you forgive the atrocity on your son?” 6 Simultaneously, a message was floated on social media that “now once again when a brave Gujarati of his own ability has become the Prime Minister and serving the country with absolute efficiency, honesty, courage,” at that time some Gujaratis were making efforts “to dislodge him from power and trying to repeat the history.” In other words, vote to the Congress amounted to a betrayal to Gujarat.

In October 2017, WhatsApp group messages were circulated saying, “We all Gujaratis know for sure that some decision of Modiji may be wrong but his intention can never be wrong,” “we will keep only one objective in mind that we will not allow any injustice to one Gujarati and will not support any conspiracy against Modiji.” Some asserted that Modi had no personal interests, no family to collect wealth, etc. He was “a symbol of country’s development, the country’s traditions, country’s culture.” “Though it is desirable that Narendra Modi control inflation, why are we not happy by seeing that our prestige in the world is shining? Today China fears India … ,” “There is no alternative but Modiji to make India as Hindu Rashtra. For the survival of Hindutva, people need to bear price hike and other difficulties. This is the last train to save Hindutva.” It is difficult to cull out influence of this propaganda around Hindutva and Gujarati pride on voting behaviour. In contrast, Rahul Gandhi’s speeches were sober. A section of the middle class, including the pro-BJP appreciated this.

Economic Status and Voting Preference

The upper- and middle-income strata in society preferred the BJP over Congress in all of the last four elections. They overwhelmingly voted for Modi in 2014. But within the last three years, the proportion of BJP voters among them has significantly reduced from 28% and 24% of the rich and middle class respectively. The Congress has gained 44% of the rich and 41% of the middle-income group—the highest in the last four elections. Though the traders and small industry entrepreneurs agitated against GST, many of them voted for the BJP. Some hoped that their issues would be sorted out soon by the government. Others feared that they would be harassed in their business if they voted for the BJP (Saiyed 2017). A few among the rich and middle-class admirers of Modi’s determination and no-nonsense approach had become critical of his election speeches, leading to a polarisation of society. According to them, such speeches undermine the dignity of the Prime Minister’s Office. Both the parties have a fluctuating vote share of the lower middle class and poor. It seems the BJP has penetrated more among the poor than the earlier elections (Figure 3).

Voting by Social Categories

Giving in to pressure from political aspirants of the lower castes in 1967, the Gujarat Congress nominated candidates from these communities for the first time, considering the social composition of the constituencies. Later, during its “garibi hatao” campaign, pro-poor Congress leaders evolved a formula of KHAM (Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasi, and Muslim) for distribution of party tickets in the elections. Committed to the idea of social justice, these leaders invoked consciousness among the deprived groups for their rights around the issues of land, forest, employment, and dignity. This alienated the landed Patidars from the party. Though the party continued this formula in accommodating deprived communities in electoral politics, under the neo-liberal era, the radical leaders have been gradually sidetracked within the party after 1985. In the 2017 elections, the party fell into the trap of the BJP wooing the Patidars. Some local Congress leaders call their present formula PODA—Patidar, OBC, Dalit and Adivasi; excluding Muslims. Nevertheless, the party gave tickets to six Muslims.

Since the mid-1980s, for its agenda of Hindu unity and winning elections, the BJP has also distributed tickets and positions to deprived communities without disturbing the hegemony of the upper castes. While doing so, it not only excluded Muslims but also depicted them as an adversary. On the other hand, the BJP has intensified its ideological grooming, preaching to the deprived communities that there was no discrimination in Hindu society. In everyday politics, the party invokes pride of a caste in the name of traditions. In a bid to revive traditions, caste specific legends, gods, attire, rituals, etc, are recreated to elevate caste pride.

Like in earlier elections, the BJP and Congress nominated the candidates of different major castes. The BJP, however, favoured the upper castes having 88 candidates against 66 of the Congress. There were 52 and 47 Patidar candidates of the BJP and Congress respectively. The Congress had 65 candidates from various OBCs while the BJP had 57. Among the OBCs, the BJP had more Kolis than Thakors, 17 and nine respectively. In the case of the Congress, the position was reversed, 16 Thakors and four Kolis. The Congress had six Muslim candidates whereas the BJP had none. In several constituencies, the candidates of the same caste contest against each other.

Hence, members of the same caste fought elections against each other at a constituency level. Party functionaries used caste-based, inter-personal contacts, and organised group meetings of caste members during the election campaign (Shah 2010). Often, some of them talk in the idiom of “caste pride” and others talk about “caste interest.”

Voting Preference

According to post-election sample surveys carried out by CSDS in the last seven elections (both assembly and parliament), a majority of the upper- and middle-caste voters have voted for the BJP in different proportions from 79% to 57%. In 2017, the Congress got 36% of the upper-caste votes. This is the highest since the BJP came to power in Gujarat in 1996. In 2012, the former BJP Chief Minister, Keshubhai Patel, formed the Gujarat Parivartan Party accusing Modi of humiliating the Patidars. The party got 3% votes and two seats. It would be safe to presume that a large chunk of the votes that the party received were of the Patidars. In 2017, around 35% of the Patidars had voted for the Congress; around 15 percentage points more than in 2012 elections. This could be for three reasons. First, in rural areas like other peasant communities, the Patidars—particularly middle and small cultivators—were also unhappy with the government procurement policy. Second, younger Patidars support Hardik Patel and demand reservation in jobs. Third, their feelings of being Patidar have been hurt by the way in which the government treated Hardik Patel and other Patidar youths. The BJP, however, still enjoys the support of 60% of the community because of their economic interests, Hindutva ideology, and Gujarati pride centred around Sardar Patel.

The votes of OBCs, SCs, and STs fluctuate between the two parties. The OBCs are more inclined to vote for BJP whereas SCs and STs lean towards the Congress (Figures 4 and 5). In 2017, the BJP captured 50% of OBC votes, declined significantly by 18 and 7 percentage points from 2014 and 2012 elections respectively. It has maintained its hold over Kolis of the coastal area of Saurashtra and south Gujarat; and artisan communities. In the predominantly OBC constituencies at several places, Modi twisted Aiyar’s reference to him as “neech” (low) by asking people “[Do] you like being called neech?”7 He urged voters to avenge this insult. Despite emotional speeches, OBC candidates of the Congress in these constituencies won. The Congress, however, has not got a majority of OBC votes but has improved its tally from the earlier polls. The party has maintained its hold over the Kshatriya–Thakors in central and north Gujarat. Thakor’s movement might have helped the Congress in consolidating its position among the Kshatriyas.


Most of the Muslims voted for the Congress varying from 69% in 2002 to 64% in 2017.

SCs and STs constitute 7% and 14% of the population. The Congress and BJP got an almost equal proportion of SC and ST votes. Despite the Una Dalit agitation and Mevani leadership, the Congress could not obtain a large chunk of SC votes. One-fifth of the SC votes had gone to BSP, NOTA (None of the Above), and independent candidates. Similarly, the Congress has not improved its vote share than in the earlier elections among the STs. It retained 17 out of the 27 ST reserved seats. Despite Vanbandhu Kalyan Yojana, skill development institutions, and other infrastructure development, the BJP has not been able to make much dent in the Congress vote share. The employment situation for the educated middle-class tribal youth has not improved nor has overall poverty level reduced. The crusade for Gujarati pride did not appeal to these communities who have been invisible in narratives of the glory of Gujarat. Muslims constitute 10% of the state’s population. In the 2017 elections, Muslims have remained invisible in the election discourse. Congress and other non-BJP parties, such as BSP, Aam Aadmi Party, and Janata Dal, gave tickets to Muslim candidates (Dhattiwala 2014; Shah 2015). Like in the 2012 assembly, 27% of Muslims voted for BJP.


Simmering unrest and protests do not necessarily translate into votes against the ruling party, as opposition parties would expect. During the last decade, a tendency of legitimising caste as a social group with ascribed status, pride, and an agency for welfare has increased. That has reflected in the 2017 elections. As a result, a conflict of real or imaginary interests has also come to the surface in electoral politics. At the same time, neither the BJP nor the Congress voters exercised their choice based solely on considerations of the candidate’s caste. Organisationally, the Congress is unable to provide an alternative vision and programme for welfare of the people that can catch the imagination of middle-class voters. It has ignored its traditional vote bank of poor and deprived communities. The BJP, on the other hand, has a strong organisational structure with “ideologically” committed cadres who have faith in Modi’s capacity to win elections and govern the country. His emotional appeal on victimhood, son of the soil, Gujarati pride and anti-Muslim agenda still work, but is now fetching diminishing returns.


1 Times of India, Ahmedabad edition, 15 January 2009.

2 Industries in Gujarat, Statistical Information 2014 Gandhinagar, Industries Commissionerate, 2014.

3 Indian Express, 25 September 2015, and government advertisements in newspapers.

4 Business Line, 22 October 2017; Times of India, Ahmedabad edition, 18 April 2017.

5 Business Line, 22 October 2017.

6 Indian Express, 27 November 2017.

7 Indian Express, Ahmedabad, 10 December 2017.


Bhagat-Ganguly, Varsha (2014): “Mahuva Andolan of Gujarat,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 49, No 40, 4 October,

— (2015): Protest Movements and Citizens’ Rights in Gujarat (1970–2010), IIAS, Shimla.

CSDS (2014): State of Indian Farmers: A Report, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.

Deshpande, Rajeev and Harit Mehta (2014): “Modi Bypasses Party, Tells Electorate ‘Vote for Me’,” Times of India, 6 April.

Dhar, Damayantee (2017): “BJP Sees ‘ISIS Link’ to Ahmed Patel, Hospital but Is Selective on Guilt by Association,” Wire, 29 October,

Dhattiwala, Raheel (2014): The Puzzle of the BJP’s Muslim Supporters in Gujarat, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, Chennai.

Lokniti Team (2009): “National Election Study,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 44, No 39, 26 September, pp 196–202.

Morris, Sebastian (2014): “A Comparative Analysis of Gujarat’s Economic Growth,” Growth or Development: Which Way Is Gujarat?, Indira Hirway, Amita Shah and Ghanshyam Shah (eds), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp 20–81.

Rabari, Sagar (2014): Gujaratma Kheti Ane Khedut: Taki Rehevani Mathaman, Vadodara: Yagna Prakashan.

Saiyed, Kamaal (2017): “Where Faith in BJP Overrode Urban Traders’ Anger and Hardik Appeal,”
Indian Express, Ahmedabad edition, 26 December.

Shah, Ghanshyam (1990): “Caste Sentiments, Class Formation and Dominance in Gujarat,” Dominance and State Power in Modern India, Francine Frankel and M S A Rao (eds), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp 59–114.

— (2007): “Gujarat after Godhara,” India’s 2004
, Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), Delhi: Sage Publications.

— (2010): “Beyond Caste Voting: Modasa, Gujarat Revisited,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol xlv, No 4, 23 January.

— (2011): “Goebbel’s Propaganada and Governance: The 2009 Lok Sabha Elections in Gujarat,” India’s 2009 Elections, Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (eds), Delhi: Sage Publications, pp 167–91.

— (2014): “Governance of Gujarat: Good Governance for Whom and for What?” Growth or Development: Which Way Is Gujarat?, Indira Hirway, Amita Shah and Ghanshyam Shah (eds),
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp 517–56.

— (2015): “Mega Marketing and Management:
Gujarat’s 2014 Elections,” India’s 2014 Elections, Paul Wallace (ed), Delhi: Sage Publications,
pp 258–83.

— (2017): “Neo-liberal Political Economy and Social Tensions: Simmering Dalit Unrest and Competing Castes in Gujarat,” Economic & Political Weekly, 20 September, Vol 52, No 35.

Shah, Ghanshyam and Mahshweta Jani (2014): “Modi’s Political Craft and the Limping Congress,” Party Competition in Indian States, Suhas Palshikar, K C Suri and Yogendra Yadav (eds), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp 100–22.

Updated On : 15th Jan, 2018


(-) Hide

EPW looks forward to your comments. Please note that comments are moderated as per our comments policy. They may take some time to appear. A comment, if suitable, may be selected for publication in the Letters pages of EPW.

Back to Top