ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
-A A +A

Co-option, Collaboration, Conflict

Three Years of PDP–BJP

Mudasir Amin ( is a public policy scholar at the Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, Chennai.

The Peoples Democratic Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir has been marred by doublespeak and U-turns vis-à-vis its poll/alliance mandate, gross human rights violations, and extended (cyber) curfews in the Valley. With Kashmiri youth turning to insurgency in a big way, rising mass protests, and repeated cancellation of local elections, the government and indeed democracy itself face a legitimacy crisis.

On 28 January 2018, the Garhwal Rifles of the Indian Army killed three civilians in Ganawpora village of Shopian district, when they were mourning the killings of two insurgents and another civilian earlier that week (Fareed 2018). The army version claims that they came under heavy stone pelting by protesting youth and fired in self-defence. The facts are being ascertained through a magisterial “enquiry,” farcical in a place like Kashmir owing to the fate of all such enquiries against the Indian Army thus far (Farasat 2014). In this case, a first information report (FIR) was lodged against the army unit, naming the major as well (Pandit 2018). The Indian media, uncritically standing by the Indian military, took no time in castigating the state government for the FIR which could affect the “morale of the soldiers” (Vohra 2018).

The furore over the police report, however, is questionable given the poor track record of the state, which frequently raises the “probe” bogey but fails to indict the forces’ personnel. In rare cases where it did, the perpetrators have never been prosecuted. This was recently established by the Union Minister for Defence, Nirmala Sitharaman, while replying to a question in Parliament, where she stated that the union government had between 2011 and 2016 received 50 cases under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Acts (AFSPA) from the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for sanction to prosecute army personnel which have been denied for “lack of sufficient evidence” (Jaleel 2018).

Despite being fully aware of the immunity enjoyed by the forces under the AFSPA, the J&K Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti “promised” that the investigation in the Shopian case would be taken to a “logical conclusion” (Tribune News Service 2018). People in Kashmir, however, know the powerlessness of the chief minister in a militarised state; that is why the father of one of the deceased youth called the investigation as further harassment of the grieving family (Fareed 2018).

Indeed, exactly a week from the firing, on 3 February 2018, Mufti pitched for the continuation of the AFSPA in the state assembly (PTI 2018). This was in complete violation of her party’s poll promise of reviewing the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, 1992, followed by party leaders ambitiously pledging a complete withdrawal of the AFSPA in the state, if voted to power. Mufti’s Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has come a long way from its earlier green, “soft separatism” stance, with promises of a healing touch and demand for self-rule, to forging an alliance with the “saffron” brigade that they used to despise, in public at least.

A Shaky Start

On 1 March 2015, Mufti MohammadSayeed was sworn in as the chief minister of the coalition government, comprising the PDP and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which materialised after nearly two months of talks. The coalition was dubbed “unethical and unholy” (PTI 2015b; Tribune News Service 2016), perhaps because of the two being politically opposed to each other on a variety ofissues, including the AFSPA and Article 370. In the common minimum programme of the alliance, the PDP softened its position on the AFSPA maintaining that

the government will examine the need for denotifying disturbed areas which will as a consequence enable the union government to take a final view on the continuation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in these areas. (India Today 2015)

On the other hand, the BJP made a U-turn on the abrogation of Article 370 and agreed to maintain a status quo stating that

the present position will be maintained on all constitutional provisions, including special status. (India Today 2015)

However, nothing in the “document” has actually been executed on the ground.

On the very first day of the government’s formation, Sayeed stoked a controversy by thanking Pakistan, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, and insurgents in the Valley for allowing the smooth conduct of elections in the state (PTI 2015a). It was met with calculated condemnation from the BJP. However, Sayeed was not an ordinary politician, he meant business. While receiving flak from every corner for forming government with the BJP, he had to resort to traditional posturing, at least for his own party workers who were not happy with the decision; thus, the Pakistan–Hurriyat card. In 2002, when the PDP first came to power in alliance with the Congress, Sayeed, in a public speech, had said

Kashmiri militants don’t need any guns because their representatives are now in the assembly. (Geelani 2015)

In the next three years of his chief ministerial stint, Sayeed represented everyone but “militants.”

The PDP–BJP government came to power at a time when Kashmir was still recovering from the disastrous floods of 2014 that had incurred massive property and agricultural losses with more than 200 people losing their lives. The Indian government while doling out a meagre aid package made the state government pay `500 crore for the “rescue operations” executed by different national agencies in Kashmir (Times of India 2015). A 2015 report by the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) explained how the Valley’s disaster vulnerability has intensified due to a military governance structure and its permanent installations, and criticised the militarised rescue operations, captured and glorified through the cameras of mainstream media. Based on case studies and extensive field research, the report debunks the “heroic humanitarianism” of the military and asserts that it was Kashmiris, through their courageous community volunteerism, who helped each other during the floods (JKCCS 2015a). The PDP got much flak for its silence on a“humiliating package” but the party leadership did not take this up with its alliance partner in the centre, fearing a premature end to the coalition.

Throughout the election campaign, the PDP had vowed to keep the BJP away from Kashmir, reminding people of the “Gujarat pogrom” and the role played by the BJP and particularly the incumbent Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, therein (Sharma 2016). The PDP evoked fear among the people leading up to polling day in the Valley. The BJP did the same against the PDP in Jammu (Sharma 2016). This seemed to have worked for both.

One week into power, the government released Hurriyat leader Masarat Alam through a court order which created a ruckus in the Indian Parliament (Sharma 2015), with the opposition accusing the government of compromising national security by releasing a man who had spent almost half his life in different Indian jails. The BJP feigned ignorance and claimed that the decision had been taken unilaterally by the PDP. Reacting sharply, the BJP warned the PDP that

remaining in power is not a priority for BJP and it will not allow any laxity on the issue of national security and in dealing with separatists and militants. (Sharma 2015)

However, one of the core points of the coalition’s common minimum program­me was facilitating a sustained dialogue with the Hurriyat. This never happened. Alam was rearrested within a week and slapped with the J&K Public Safety Act (PSA), 1978 (PTI 2015c). The PDP’s “battle of ideas” model, thus, died an ironic death (Greater Kashmir 2016).

Within a year, Sayeed died of a multiple organ failure at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi (Indian Express 2016). Back home, his funeral was attended by a few hundreds, most of them politicians and government functionaries. Only a week earlier, some thousands had attended the funeral procession of an insurgent amid curfew in Kulgam (Davedas 2015). Did people’s aspirations need to be made any clearer? As Mufti delayed her swearing-in ceremony, political commentators suggested that the PDP was considering pulling out of the coalition after realising the damage the alliance had already caused it (Kumar 2016).

However, Mufti continued with the “unholy” coalition, with a part of theIndian media and liberals declaring it a historic moment for women’s empowerment in Kashmir. Mufti’s empowerment, however, only caused more misery to Kashmiri women, as unabated violations of human rights continued. Reports and allegations of the use of sexual violence against Kashmiris by the Indian military have surfaced since the early days of insurgency. While the intensity of this has certainly declined, there have been high-profile cases in recent times—be it the Shopian double rape and murder case in 2009 or the Handwara molestation case in 2016. Of course, a lot goes unreported and much is left unsaid. In April 2016, the Indian Army killed five civilians who were protesting after a girl accused the forces of molestation. In order to justify the killings, the girl was taken into “protective custody,” kept at an undisclosed location and made to record a video statement, under duress, exonerating the forces (Pandit 2016). The girl continues to fight the case to date, while the enquiry into the killing of the five civilians is still awaiting a “logical conclusion” after two years. The government, headed by a woman, far from taking up for the victims, provided cover to the perpetrators.

Mass Blinding, Human Shields

The year 2016, for Kashmir, went down as a year of “mass blinding” (Waheed 2016) and “dead eye” epidemic (Barry 2016). The killing of the young and popular insurgent “Commander” Burhan Wani led to a wave of protests in Kashmir in July 2016. The authorities responded with disproportionate force, killing 100 civilians, mostly youth. Curfew was imposed and Kashmir remained in shutdown mode for months. The pellet shotguns, though not new, injured more than 3,000 people, many of them in the eyes, rendering them partially or fully blind. The doctors reported the victims as having “mutilated retinas, severed optic nerves, [and] irises seeping out like puddles of ink” (Barry 2016). The teenage girl Insha Mushtaq became the face of the brutality of “non-lethal” weapons in Kashmir (Fareed 2017). She was blinded when a volley of iron pellets was fired indiscriminately at her as she tried to peep out through the window to see the protests underway outside her home in Kashmir’s Shopian district. As rightly pointed out by Shenila Khoja-Moolji (2018),

A more appropriate way to describe these [non-lethal] pellets and rubber bullets, then, is “lethal over time.” The language of non-lethality is simply a rhetorical excuse by cruel governments to wage wars while carefully eliding responsibility for mass debilitation.

Over weeks and months, the coalition government continued defending every bullet and pellet fired. Thousands were arrested. The internet was blocked for months, leaving Kashmiris incommunicado with each other and the rest of the world. Newspapers were banned and human rights defenders slapped with the PSA. The repercussions of such high-handedness were soon visible on the ground.

In April 2017, by-elections for the Srinagar Lok Sabha constituency were to be conducted after it fell vacant due to the resignation of the then PDP parliamentarian Tariq Hameed Karra (PTI 2017b) in protest against the government’s handling of the 2016 uprising. However, these were boycotted with a meagre voter turnout of 7% and mass protests on polling day, in which eight civilians were killed (Hindustan Times 2017). Re-elections were held in 84 polling stations, resulting in an even lesser turnout, pegged at 2% (PTI 2017b). Thereafter, the by-elections for the Anantnag Lok Sabha constituency were cancelled (Ramachandran 2017) and the government is still to take a call on it. Alongside, the PDP and other opposition parties have already asked for the cancellation of panchayat elections, which were due in the month of February 2018. In a situation where such a huge government machinery has not been able to conduct even a by-election, the continuation of the PDP–BJP coalition in power baffles one and all.

During these by-elections, an army major of the 53 Rashtriya Rifles assaulted a civilian Farooq Ahmad Dar, tied him to the bonnet of an army jeep, and paraded him through different villages of Budgam district for hours as a “human shield” (Al Jazeera 2017). The army and the government in Delhi defended it as a “precautionary measure” and an “innovative idea” against stone pelting, the major was awarded a commendation by theIndian Army chief (Al Jazeera 2017). Kashmiris have been used as human shields before. What was different this time was that the particular incident came to the limelight and the media unwittingly made a hero out of the perpetrator.

In the same month, when students of Government Degree College, Pulwama protested against the installation of a military bunker near the college, the forces entered the college premises and used disproportionate force killing one and injuring more than 50. This led to a wave of student protests in Kashmir (Chakravarti and Naqash 2017). Students in school uniforms with scarves and ties came out onto the streets—unarmed—facing tear gas and pellet shots of the forces. Schools in the region were shut for days.

In recent times, social media has become an alternative space, in addition to militarised streets, to register protest in Kashmir, especially for the young. Several students took to posting videos on Facebook Live of stone-pelting stand-offs with the army in Kashmir (Qadri 2017). Realising the potency of this, the state has, over the years, exercised its punitive authority to ban social media websites and issue indefinite cyber curfews, thereby controlling the lives and emerging narratives of people.

Propaganda and Deception

Far from addressing or even acknowledging its wrongs, the BJP has chosen to not raise objections to a petition filed by a lesser-known civil society organisation “We, The Citizens” that sought the striking down of Article 35A (Anand 2017). This article enables the J&K legislature to define a “permanent resident” and is closely linked to Article 370 that guarantees special status to the state, which nonetheless has been eroded over time. This no-objection by the government coupled with the extension of the goods and services tax to the state is an indication of the encroachment of the special status. This is the exact opposite of what the PDP had promised or included in the agenda of the alliance.

In November 2016, the Indian government’s “demonetisation fiasco” (Shepard 2016) created a cash crunch, adversely impacting the poor. Though Kashmir, for the most bit, remained unaffected (Hindu 2016), the then Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar claimed that demonetisation had brought an end to stone pelting in the Valley (Zargar 2017). It is a familiar ploy, wherein state propaganda seeks to invisibilise the political aspirations of ordinary Kashmiris and to dismiss people’s participation in mass protests, as motivated by the lure of money or performed by a fringe group. However, not only has stone pelting continued, in fact, people have taken to barging to encounter sites and engaging forces in stone pelting in order to help insurgents escape (Qadri 2017).

In July 2017, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) raided several places in Kashmir in an alleged “terror funding” case and subsequently, arrested most of the second-rung Hurriyat leadership, a businessman, and a young photojournalist, which led to further protests (Ashiq and Singh 2017). Many more were summoned by the NIA, including a sitting legislator and a university scholar (PTI 2017c). Hurriyat maintains that the Indian government led by the right-wing BJP is trying new tactics to curb the movement for right to self-determination, and NIA is but the latest addition to its military campaign against Kashmiris.

The months of September and October 2017 saw Kashmir gripped in mass panic when incidents of “braid chopping” were reported (Safi and Farooq 2017). The police and the government were clueless with their “unscientific” investigations, referring to the phenomenon as “hallucination, a madness, and … mass hysteria” (Ganai 2017). However, the police simultaneously announced rewards for information on culprits. On the ground, people saw it as a deliberate act by the state to create fear and mistrust among people, so as to prevent them from sheltering insurgents. The incidents stopped as suddenly as they had started. Something similar had happened in the 1990s during “Operation Bhoot (ghost).”1 These incidents have served as constant reminders for the people to remember the visible andinvisible forces active in the Valley andcapable of altering their lives.

In October 2017, the Indian government appointed an “interlocutor” for a “sustained dialogue” with all stakeholders in Kashmir (Gupta 2017). The interlocutor’s past few visits, however, have only entailed meetings with government-chosen delegations, who talked anything but the resolution of Kashmir. All factions of the Hurriyat Conference, trade unions and civil society groups in the Valley declined to meet the former intelligence officer. In the proposed “sustained dialogue,” the interlocutor is actually talking only to the government. Such declarations and appointments by the Government of India seek to demonstrate to the world that India cares to accommodate Kashmiri aspirations, but they are almost instantly rendered hollow.

In fact, the notorious “crackdowns”2 that were a routine in the 1990s have returned to the Valley in the form of cordon and search operations, which are extended to multiple villages simultaneously (Naqash 2017), with the forces entering houses, damaging properties and assaulting people. Furthermore, the frisking of people on roads, in buses, and at public places is back.

Swelling Youth Insurgents

However, the more the repression, the stronger the rebellion. The number of young persons joining insurgent ranks has gone up in these four years in Kashmir. This year alone the government provided a figure of 126 local youth joining different armed groups. Some reports suggest that the actual number may be as high as 200 (Wani 2018). Insurgents have gone back to the old tactics of deadly
fedayeen (guerrilla) attacks. Though highly educated youth turning insurgents is not new in Kashmir, when gun-wielding photos of a local Kashmiri youth, Manaan Wani, pursuing a doctoral degree from Aligarh Muslim University, appeared on social media it took the insurgency to a whole new level.

In a conflict zone like Kashmir, focusing on numbers takes us away from many aspects of the everyday militarisation of life but as Peter Beaumont (2010) argues, valid estimates provide true meaning to

[the] narrative of memory and history … It allows us to accurately define events; make comparative judgments both morally and politically, to understand the intention behind acts and the weight of suffering.

The number of deaths in Kashmir under this coalition government (Table 1) is a clear manifestation of the conflict.


While the army, through “Operation All-Out,”3 seems to have blurred the lines between combatants and protestingcivilians, it has not stopped the youth from engaging the forces during encounters to try and help insurgents escape. The army’s increasing interventions in civil affairs,4 and the successful pervasion of cries of “Pakistan Zindabad” (long live Pakistan) from the streets of Kashmir to the legislature (Manhotra 2018), demonstrate the increasing volatility in Kashmir.

An analysis into the three years of the coalition shows that the BJP is driving the PDP into submission and collaboration, reducing the former into a surrogate administration. The periodic demands of self-rule, an end to human rights violations, and revocation of the AFSPA, fail to get any response beyond lip service. This is a familiar script in Kashmir followed by successive governments and opposition parties, whose legitimacy, however, is under challenge like never before.


1 In the 1990s, Kashmir was gripped in nocturnal trauma when incidents of people seeing ghosts who attacked their houses were reported. Later, it was claimed to be a military tactic to instil fear among the masses who supported the armed insurgency and sheltered the insurgents.

2 In Kashmir, “crackdown” is understood as an operation by the forces where a village or two are cordoned, the menfolk made to assemble in open, paraded (sometimes beaten up and tortured) while the forces search houses for insurgents and their hideouts.

3 In early 2017, the counter-insurgency network in Kashmir, including the army, Central Reserve Police Force, Jammu and Kashmir Police, and different intelligence agencies, announced “Operation All-Out” which they claimed was a blueprint to “neutralise” 258 insurgents from different groups. More than 200 insurgents, including 18 commanders, were killed in this operation (Yasir 2017). In February 2017, the Indian Army chief also warned insurgent supporters in Kashmir of “going helter-skelter after them” and further said that “they may survive today but we will go after them tomorrow” (PTI 2017a). This warning was issued mainly for the youth, who go near encounter sites and engage army by pelting stones and raising slogans.

4 In January 2018, the Indian Army chief again stoked a controversy when he blamed government schools in the Valley for “radicalisation of youth.” Questioning the separate map for Jammu and Kashmir, he said “in schools in J&K [Jammu and Kashmir], there can be seen two maps, one of India, another of J&K. Why do we need a separate map for J&K? What does it teach the children? Most misguided youth come from schools where they are being radicalised” (First Post 2018).


Al Jazeera (2017): “Outrage Over India Award for ‘Human Shield’ Soldier,” 23 May,

Anand, U (2017): “SC Hints at Referring Petitions Against Articles 370, 35A to Constitution Bench,”, 14 August,

Ashiq, P and V Singh (2017): “NIA Arrests 7 J&K Separatist Leaders for ‘Creating Unrest,’” Hindu, 24 July,

Barry, A (2016): “An Epidemic of ‘Dead Eyes’ in Kashmir as India Uses Pellet Guns on Protesters,” New York Times, 29 August,

Beaumont, P (2010): “In Dresden or Darfur, the Numbers Are Important,” Guardian, 20 March,

Chakravarti, I and R Naqash (2017): “Violent Crackdown at Pulwama Degree College Triggers Demonstrations across the Valley,”, 19 April,

Davedas, D (2015): “LeT Commander Abu Qasim’s Killing: Police Claim Big Victory, But Attendance at Funeral Reflects Sobering Reality,” First Post, 31 October,

Farasat, W (2014): “Understanding Impunity in India,” Landscapes of Fear: Understanding Impunity in India, P Hoenig and N Singh (eds), New Delhi: Zubaan.

Fareed, R (2017): “Kashmir Victim: Life Since Pellet Guns Blinded Me,” Al Jazeera, 1 October,

— (2018): “Kashmir Families Mourn Civilians Killed by India’s Army,” Al Jazeera, 3 February,

First Post (2018): “Army Chief Bipin Rawat Steps in Political Waters by Commenting on Kashmir’s Education System, Faces Backlash,” 15 January,

Ganai, N (2017): “Ghost of Braid Chopping in Kashmir: 105 FIRs Filed, Panic in Valley, Police Clueless,” Outlook, 16 October,

Geelani, G (2015): “PDP–BJP Alliance Could Be a ‘Paradigm Shift’ in Kashmir’s History: Mufti,” Dawn, 27 February,

Greater Kashmir (2016): “Where Is ‘Battle of Ideas’ Omar Asks PDP in LA,” 22 June,

Gupta, S (2017): “Kashmir’s New Interlocutor: Who Is Dineshwar Sharma?” Hindustan Times, 25 October,

Hindu (2016): “Demonetisation Effect: Kashmir Remains Undisturbed,” 17 November,

Hindustan Times (2017): “8 Killed in Kashmir Bypoll Violence, Srinagar Registers Poor Voter Turnout of 7.14%,” Hindustan Times, 26 May,

Indian Express (2016): “J&K CM Mufti Sayeed Passes Away Due to Mulitple Organ Failure,” 7 January,

India Today (2015): “15 Highlights of PDP–BJP Government Agenda in Jammu and Kashmir,” 1 March,

Jaleel, M (2018): “Shopian Firing: Why J&K Plea May Lead Nowhere,” Indian Express, 14 February,

JKCCS (2015a): “Occupational Hazard: The Jammu and Kashmir Floods of 2014,” Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society,

— (2015b): “Annual Human Rights Review,” Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, Srinagar.

— (2016): “Annual Human Rights Review,” Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society,Srinagar.

— (2017): “A Review of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir,” Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, Srinagar.

Khoja-Moolji, S (2018): “Pellets and Rubber Bullets Are Not ‘Humane’,” Al Jazeera,

Kumar, S (2016): “Political Uncertainty Prevails in Jammu and Kashmir,” Diplomat, 3 February,

Manhotra, D (2018): “Ruckus in J&K Assembly as NC Member Raises ‘Pak Zindabad’ Slogans,” Tribune,

Naqash, R (2017): “Army Crackdown in South Kashmir Village Brings Back Nightmares of the 1990s,”, 19 May,

Pandit, S M (2016): “Handwara Girl Retracts Statement, Now Accuses Jawan of Molestation,” Times of India, 16 May,

— (2018): “Allies BJP and PDP at War Over FIR Against Army Major,” Times of India, 30 January,

PTI (2015a): “CM Mufti Sayeed Credits Pakistan, Militant Outfits for Peaceful Polls in J&K, Opposition Hits Out at PM Modi,” Indian Express, 01 March,

— (2015b) “BJP–PDP Coalition ‘Unholy and Opportunist’: Congress,” Indian Express, 6 April,

— (2015c): “Separatist Masarat Alam arrested in Kashmir,” BusinessLine, 15 April,

— (2017a): “Kashmir Unrest: Army Chief Warns of Tough Action against Local Stone-Pelters,” First Post, 15 February,

— (2017b): “Srinagar Bypoll: Only 2% Voter Turnout Recorded after Repolling in Kashmir,” Hindustan Times, 26 May,

— (2017c): “Hurriyat Funding: NIA Summons J&K Legislator Engineer Rashid,” Economic Times, 29 September,

— (2018): “J&K CM Mehbooba Mufti Rules Out AFSPA Revocation, Says Indian Army Most Disciplined Force in World,” Economic Times, 3 February,

Qadri, Inzamam (2017): “Streaming Violence on Facebook Live Is the New Standard of Proof in Kashmir,”, 18 April,

Ramachandran, S K (2017): “EC Cancels Anantnag Lok Sabha Bypoll, Says Situation Not Conducive,” Hindustan Times, 3 May,

Safi, M and A Farooq (2017): “Braid Chopping’ Claims in Kashmir Spark Mass Panic and Mob Violence,” Guardian, 11 October,

Sharma, A (2015): “Masarat Alam’s Release Not Our Decision, Hadn’t Given Consent to This: BJP,” Indian Express, 9 March,

— (2016): “Discontent in Kashmir: The PDP–BJP Alliance’s Mistakes,” Diplomat, 1 August,

Shepard, W (2016): “One Month in, What’s the Impact of India’s Demonetization Fiasco?” Forbes, 12 December,

Times of India (2015): “Defence Ministry Raises Rs 500cr Bill for J&K Flood Assistance,” 29 June,

Tribune News Service (2016): “‘Unholy’ PDP–BJP Alliance Set State on Fire: Panthers Party,” Tribune, 5 November,

— (2018): “JK Govt to Take FIR Against Army to Logical Conclusion: Mufti,” Tribune, 29 January,

Vohra, Bikram (2018): “Shopian Civilian Killings: Murder Charges Against Soldiers Unfair; Govt Must Investigate Organised Mobs of Stone-pelters,” First Post, 30 January,

Waheed, M (2016): “India Is Blinding Young Kashmiri Protesters: And No One Will Face Justice,” Guardian, 18 July,

Wani, F (2018): “Jammu and Kashmir: 280 Youth Join Militancy in Three Years; 126 JoinedMilitant Ranks in 2017,” New Indian Express, 6 February,

Yasir, S (2017): “Kashmir in 2017: Operation All-Out Was a Success, But Will Force Alone Win Hearts in the Valley?,” First Post, 27 December,

Zargar, S (2017): “Here’s Why Kashmiris Are Laughing Off Parrikar’s Claim That Note Ban Has Ended Stone-Pelting,” Scoop Whoop, 17 November,

Updated On : 15th Mar, 2018


(-) Hide

EPW looks forward to your comments. Please note that comments are moderated as per our comments policy. They may take some time to appear. A comment, if suitable, may be selected for publication in the Letters pages of EPW.

Back to Top